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5Introduction
Minorities are usually among the losers in the process of democratic transition, 
even though they often play a fermenting role at its onset. The political elite gen-
erally swiftly changes in its attitude towards the minorities. The elite may regard 
minorities as allies in the fight against autocratic regimes, but after that fight is 
won, attention soon shifts to conflicts between the two former allies.
At the same time, minorities face tough challenges themselves. In an authori-
tarian regime, their basic and sometimes desperate struggle for the preservation 
of their existence as a minority is naturally combined with the fight against an 
autocratic regime, but after the toppling of that regime, the minorities’ struggle 
for their identity recommences. This indicates that the new democracies are still 
fragile, and that it takes time to consolidate democratic institutions and change 
attitudes towards minorities.
The International Centre for Democratic Transition (ICDT) invited experts, 
policy makers, and representatives of civil society from three regions (Central Eu-
rope, Eastern Europe and the Baltic States, Southeastern Europe) covering twen-
ty countries to a series of regional workshops to discuss the role of minorities in 
recent democratic transitions, to analyse the present situation of minorities in 
light of an enlarged and enlarging Europe, and to formulate recommendations to 
decision makers. 
The uniqueness of this programme was its cross-regional approach. This al-
lowed the participants to observe this issue from a completely new perspective 
and so to compare interregional similarities and differences. This was highly im-
portant in refreshing ideas concerning the promotion of minority rights and in-
spiring interregional/international cooperation. Different situations or similar 
situations with a different understanding of the problem encourages creativity in 
people and brings them to join in the common goal of preserving minority herit-
age and improving living standards of the community.
This publication is the result of these efforts and a humble contribution to a 
European dialogue on minorities in the future Europe. 
Finally, we would like to thank to the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign 
Affairs and the King Baudouin Foundation for their generous support of the 
project.
Sándor Köles
Senior Vice President
International Centre for Democratic Transition

7Project Description
The main objective of this project was to explore the role that national minorities 
have played in the process of democratic transition in South, Central, and Eastern 
Europe, to compare regional similarities and differences in exercising minority 
rights, to identify good practises developed in the target countries to support 
minorities in protecting their interests, and to discuss the role of minorities in 
the new enlarged Europe.
The project focused on two principal areas:
The role of minorities in the process of democratic transition•	
The status and development of minority rights protection, the application of •	
the principles, as well as the mechanism and legal structure of minority right 
protection during and after the transition with special regard to countries that 
joined the European Union since 2004
To emphasise the importance of the minority issue in its complexity and to 
provide a conceptual framework for discussion we developed a Discussion Paper, 
which served as a guideline for three regional workshops.
The project had two phases. The first phase consisted of three preparatory 
workshops to examine experiences minorities had in the transition process in 
Central Europe (Budapest, focusing on Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, 
and the Czech Republic); Eastern Europe (Tallinn, focusing on Estonia, Lithua-
nia, Latvia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova) and Southeastern Europe (Skopje, 
focusing on Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, Albania, Croatia, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia). The participants of the workshops were 
policy makers, international and local experts, as well as researchers from target 
regions. Workshops included countries which went through the process of demo-
cratic transition, countries, which are undergoing the process, and countries in 
which transition has not yet begun. Another interesting feature of the workshops 
was the blend of member states of the European Union, candidate countries, and 
other European countries. This allowed us to put minority issues in a European 
context and examine how European Union standards influence the status of mi-
norities in the process of European integration.
In order to have comparable results, we used the following methodology:
Preparation of Regional Working Papers and Fact Sheets by leading regional 1. 
experts about the state of minorities in the given countries and regions, which 
were delivered to participants before the workshop
8Facilitation of panel discussions on minority policies of individual countries 2. 
before and after the transition
Analysis and comparison of applicable laws, legal measures, and instruments 3. 
to protect minority rights by countries and regions
Examination of the effectiveness of existing institutions, the main functions 4. 
of which would be to secure and guaranty minority rights such as Ombuds-
man, local minority self-governments, school systems, and use of minority 
language
Comparison and discussion of findings at national and regional levels, sum-5. 
marisation of experiences through facilitated discussions and development of 
recommendations
In order to achieve comparable results each workshop was built around the 
same agenda following the same structure such as:
Role of the minorities in the process of transition•	
The situation of minorities today – institutions, legal instruments, status of •	
minorities
Minority rights in practise and the European standards•	
Conclusions and recommendations •	
After each workshop, a regional expert summarised the lessons learned, fo-
cusing on regional characteristics of the minorities’ role in the transition proc-
esses, the challenges they faced, the pitfalls and drawbacks of transition from a 
minority point of view, and the development of minority rights’ protection after 
the political and social transition. 
In the second phase of the project these regional findings and conclusions 
formed the basis for the closing conference in Budapest, held on May 24, 2007, 
and were further discussed by participants selected from the preparatory work-
shops and invitees from different international organisations. The final confer-
ence resulted in Recommendations drafted by a Committee consisting of regional 
specialists and a leading expert. 
Main conclusions
The project has justified our assumption that minorities, though they can actively 
contribute to democratic change and are allies of the forces of change, after the 
political change has occurred, continue to face issues and problems similar to 
those they coped with before. It was observed that, in the case of countries which 
9recently joined the European Union, the governments are making serious efforts 
to meet the requirements of the accession in the field of minority protection, but 
afterwards, due to lack of an effective monitoring system within the EU, are less 
interested in putting these measurements into practise.
Another conclusion is that the traditional concept of minority rights must 
not be abandoned in today’s Europe and, despite all the changes to the political 
agenda and the emergence of new challenges, the concept must be seriously re-
considered, updated, and redefined to make it fit for new realities and the chang-
ing environment. 
The project brought conclusions that underline the role minorities are play-
ing under changing circumstances and emphasised the role that national gov-
ernments, international organisations, including the European Union, and civil 
society organisations should play at local, national, and international levels.
It was also emphasised that the process of democratisation must be continued 
with an extra emphasis on strengthening the democratic values and combating 
anti-democratic sentiments in society. Thus legal framework for anti-discrimina-
tion laws must be established and governments must take further actions for the 
effective involvement of minorities in the political decision-making process, and 
mainstreaming minority issues throughout all policy areas must become a com-
mon practise. 
Another important lesson was that the European Union should establish a 
legal basis for the protection of minority rights under community law. Moreo-
ver, relevant monitoring procedures for the protection of minority rights, as well 
as for the implementation of minority policies for Member States and candidate 
countries, should be created.
The cross-regional approach of the project helped the policy makers develop 
new thinking by giving insight into the diversity of the challenges and practises 
of a basically similar problem. This is even more important for the European Un-
ion as, with the accession of the Central and Eastern European countries, the 
Community is confronted with an unknown problem. The ICDT hopes that this 
project will be able to launch discussions between the member countries and help 
prepare the EU to create successful mechanisms and instruments for the protec-
tion of minorities within and along its borders.
Regarding this cross-regional approach, the ICDT received much positive feed-
back from the participants who were thankful for the opportunity to learn from 
their counterparts. The participants also emphasised that minority problems in 
each region, their method of analysis and management practises, differ, and so 
the participants were able to identify new approaches to advance minorities in 
their own countries.
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The primary end-result of the project is the body of studies prepared by regional 
experts as working papers for the workshops and as workshop reports concluding 
findings of the workshops. These papers were prepared with a similar thematic 
structure to those of the workshops and to those of the whole project in order to 
enable comparative analyses. Through these studies we were able to identify key 
moments of the transition processes from a minority point of view. Taking these 
marked points of potential pitfalls into account, governments and countries in 
transition will be able to learn from other nations and, therefore, not just avoid 
the same mistakes, but also use best practises or at least have some fresh ideas to 
manage their own challenges. As we would like to spread this knowledge in the 
broadest area possible, we are planning to publicise these findings in form of a 
textbook.
11
Discussion Papers
Minorities in transition in Central europe
Discussion Paper of the Budapest Workshop
23 February 2007, Budapest
Prepared by Balázs Vizi, Regional Expert
Ethnopolitics and Democracy – Internal Actors and Features
There is no doubt that after 1989 one of the characteristic features of democratic 
transition in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) was the rise of nationalism, inter-
ethnic tensions and ethnic-based political mobilisation both in minority and ma-
jority societies.1 The joint tasks of political and economic transition in CEE result-
ed in devastating political and social changes within a very short period of time. 
Instability and insecurity emerged in various areas of everyday life and drastic 
changes often lead to the reinforcement of individual and collective identities.2 
As Claus Offe has put it “the unique and unprecedented nature of the East European 
process of transformation springs from the fact that at the most fundamental level a 
‘decision’ must be made as to who ‘we’ are, i.e. a decision on identity, citizenship, and 
the territorial as well as social and cultural boundaries of the nation-state”.3 The new 
democracies in CEE indeed not only faced the challenges of political transition 
from one-party rule to democracy, but also the problem of re-defining, after dec-
ades of forced internationalism under communist leadership, the identity of the 
state and its relation to the existing cultural and ethnic diversity that character-
ises many of these societies. Both national minority communities and majority 
1  Cf.: Cordell, Karl (1999) (ed.) Ethnicity and Democratisation in the New Europe. New York: 
Routledge. pp. 1-6 and 32-49. and Latawski, Paul (ed.) (1995) Contemporary Nationalism in East 
Central Europe: Unfinished Business. New York: St. Martin’s Press. 
2   Kellas, James (1998) The Politics of Ethnicity and Nationalism, 2nd edition London: Macmillan. 
p. 216.
3   Offe, Claus (1991) ‘Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic Theory Facing the Triple 
Transition in East Central Europe’ in: Social Research, Vol. 58, no. 4. p. 869.
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nations started to re-define their nation-building endeavours in the new political 
framework, often leading to contrasting claims and inter-ethnic conflicts.   
Ethnic diversity is also viewed as a significant issue for the political stability 
of nation-states. In this perspective there are two main areas, which are closely 
related to the efficiency of democratic institutions in handling multi-ethnic di-
versity: the domestic political and legal environment on one hand and the inter-
national environment on the other hand. In this paper I will make an attempt to 
give a sketched overview on domestic and international factors in the develop-
ment of democracy in post-communist countries and their effects on the situa-
tion of minorities. 
Democracy – Word without Meaning?
Democratic transition in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989-1991 was often 
characterised as the “third wave of democratization”.4 But the categorisation of 
democracies raised concerns already at the dawn of radical political changes in 
the region, as Robert A. Dahl put it: “It may seem perverse that this historically 
unprecedented global expansion in the acceptability of democratic ideas might not be 
altogether welcome to an advocator of democracy (…) Yet a term that means anything 
means nothing. And so it has become with ‘democracy’, which nowadays is not much 
a term of restricted and specific meaning as a vague endorsement of a popular idea.”5 
This statement clearly reflects the essential duality of this term, as Dahl noted 
both in theoretical context and in everyday speech that the term ‘democracy’ may 
be understood as referring to both an ideal and to actual regimes. In general this 
term can be literally translated simply as the “rule of people”, but it can be still 
interpreted in many different ways. M. Saward made an attempt to focus on logi-
cally necessary conditions of democracy and he identified 24 indices of democ-
ratisation, which can be grouped into five main categories: a.) basic freedoms, 
b.) citizenship and political participation, c.) administrative codes, d.) measures 
concerning publicity and e.) social rights.6 Nevertheless, this institutional defi-
4   Huntigton, Samual P. (1991) The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century 
Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, pp. 3-26.
5   Dahl, Robert A. (1989) Democracy and Its Critics, New Haven–London: Yale University Press, 
1989. p. 2.
6   Saward, Michael (1994) “Democratic Theory and Indices of Democratization,” in David Beetham 
(ed.): Defining and Measuring Democracy, London–Thousand Oaks–New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 
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nition does not necessarily answer the quality of these institutions – thus, any 
potential definition of democracy remains vulnerable to alternative definitions. 
What may be a common feature of the major conceptions of democracy is that 
the ‘rule of people’ is often translated into the ‘rule of majority’ which requires 
an effective system of checks and balances to minimise the evolution of an au-
thoritarian regime. But while majority and minority positions are institutionally 
defined in political terms, and democratic structures offer a competition for po-
litical parties to gain majority, the cultural or ethnic diversity of society cannot be 
accommodated easily in this framework. Already in the 19th century the problems 
of ethnic division of democratic societies were raised.7 In Western Europe in this 
period John Stuart Mill and, later in the early 20th century, Ernest Baker, have 
articulated their concerns on the chances of a multiethnic democracy. Indeed the 
ideas of liberal democracy have emerged in ethnically homogenous states or in 
nation-states, which proudly based their political identity on the identification of 
the nation with the state. But national/ethnic unity does not necessarily entail a 
democratic regime and, in the same way, a heterogeneous society can also live un-
der an authoritarian rule. The new political settlement in Europe after World War 
I in this aspect reflected the Wilsonian ideas on dissolving multinational empires 
for creating new – hopefully democratic – national states. The interwar period 
did not fulfil these expectations for a new system of democratic national states 
in Europe. 
The difficulties in accommodating national diversity in democratic states seem 
to be persistent. One of the main problematic questions here is whether hetero-
geneity leads to authoritarianism or democracy. Walker Connor observed that 
several developments after World War II “indicate a link between multinational-
ism and a pressure for non-democratic action”.8 He mentions three tendencies of 
modern multinational states that underpin his statement. First, he observes that 
the concern of governments to stress their political and territorial integrity has 
not been “conducive to democratic responses to the growing problem of cultural-
political consciousness”. On the contrary “multinational states have tended to 
become less democratic in response to the growing threat of nationalistic move-
pp. 16-17. see also Salat, Levente (2003) Southeast European Challenges to Representative 
Democracy in: Salat – Robotin (eds.) A New Balance: Democracy And Minorities In Post-Communist 
Europe. Budapest: Local Government and Public Reform Initiative. pp. 5-7.
7   Cf.: Eötvös, József [1854] (1996) The Dominant Ideas of the Nineteenth Century and their Impact 
on the State. Vol. I-II., translated, edited and annotated by D. Mervyn Jones, New York: Columbia 
University Press.
8   Connor, Walker (1994) “Self-Determination: The New Phase,” in: W. Connor: Ethnonationalism. 
The Quest for Understanding, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. p. 12.
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ments”. Second, he remarks the self-evident, though generally overlooked, para-
dox that while so many governments exist due to the exercise of self-determina-
tion, and regularly “pay lip-service” to it, “the instances in which a government 
has permitted a democratic process to decide a question of self-determination 
within its own territory are rare indeed.” Third, he calls attention to the tendency 
to view self-determination movements within a state as threats to its survival, 
and to react “violently and to justify the cruellest of treatment accorded to im-
plicated leaders by branding them as rebels or traitors and therefore something 
worse than criminals.”9 
Many other scholars reached similarly negative conclusions regarding the de-
velopment of democracy in multinational societies10 but Salat rightly notes that, 
in spite of scholarly scepticism, “while diversity seems to remain an enduring fea-
ture of our contemporary world, no powerful competitor has emerged to chal-
lenge the unparalleled global legitimacy of democratic rule”.11
Political Movements and Democratic Transition
Indeed the relationship between democracy and ethnic diversity was significant 
in the transitional societies of Central and Eastern Europe. As was already men-
tioned above, after the collapse of communism in the region, early predictions of 
swift consolidation of economic liberalism and institutions of liberal democracy 
failed just as pessimistic expectations for the immanent destabilisation of the 
region had predicted, due to the rise of violent ethnic conflicts and ultranational-
ist political parties. Janusz Bugajski, in his extensive work on political parties in 
Central and Eastern Europe notes that those observers of the region’s political 
transition who took the above-mentioned stances either ignored or overestimated 
a number of essential variables, including legacies of the communist past, the so-
cial and cultural context in which the new institutions were supposed to function, 
the conditionalities of effectiveness of those new institutions, and the threats 
9   Ibid. pp. 12-17 and 22-25.
10   E.g., Bauböck, Rainer (1998) “Sharing History and Future? Time Horizons of Democratic 
Membership in an Age of Migration,” in: Constellations, vol. 4, no. 3. Lichtenberg, Judith (1996) 
“How Liberal Can Nationalism Be,” in The Philosophical Forum, Vol. XXVIII, No. 1-2.
11   Salat, op. cit. p. 15.
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and challenges to democratic reform.12 Bugajski calls attention to the diversity of 
democratic transitional scenarios in the region and states that the eastern half 
of Europe “has witnessed enormous diversification in the pace and content of political 
and economic transformation, and numerous challenges to the ‘completion’ or consoli-
dation of the democratization process. Indeed, the region as a whole can be viewed as an 
ongoing experiment in pluralism and liberalism, the results of which continue to vary 
from state to state.”13 Bugajski identifies four categories of post-communist states: 
a.) regimes with functioning democracies and robust civil societies, b.) pluralist 
systems with weak democratic institutions and nascent civil societies, c.) regimes 
that place order above democracy, and d) unstable regimes, in which the outcome 
of the post-totalitarian transition is still uncertain. It can be said that the first 
two categories include most of the Central European and Baltic states, which 
have displayed a relatively greater success in building stable pluralistic democracy 
and a functioning civil society.  Nevertheless, despite their success in developing 
functional democracy, several aspects of these new democracies bear the evidence 
of strong ethnic bias. The ethnic cleavage and the prejudices of ethnic majority 
are present in constitutional design, in the way in which separation of powers in 
the state has been institutionalised, in choice of electoral systems, in territorial-
administrative structure of the state, in organising local and regional authori-
ties, in property restitution and resource allocation.14 Moreover ethnic divisions 
influence party politics and, in many cases, give a political basis for nationalist 
movements. 
As Bugajski noted, the respective constitutions “have singled out the majority 
ethnic group as the state-forming nation, with attendant privileges, whereas all 
other ethnicities are considered minorities and invariably confront discrimina-
tion”, and in Bugajski’s view “proclaimed the dominant ethnic group’s symbolic 
ownership of the state”.15 This exclusivist approach not only defines the character 
of the state (anthem, national flags, state language, etc.), but may also limit the 
spheres of democratic discussion on the constitutional structure of the state. Bu-
gajski mentions Macedonia, Romania, and Slovakia as unitary states, where even 
the idea of federalism raises suspicion and those who voice their political goals 
12   Bugajski, Janusz (2002) Political Parties of Eastern Europe. A Guide to Politics in the Post-Communist 
Era. Armonk, NY–London, England: M.E. Sharpe (The Center for Strategic and International 
Studies) see also Bugajski, Janusz (1993) Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe: a Guide to Nationality 
Policies, Organizations, and Parties. New York: Sharpe Armonk.
13   Bugajski (2002) op. cit. p. xv.
14   See Salat op. cit. 16-17.
15   Bugajski (2002) op. cit. p. xxxv.
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in a federalist transformation of the state are immediately accused of calling for 
separatism. 
Ethnic dominance also can be observed in electoral systems based on propor-
tional representation. Though in the case of the region’s sizeable minorities, which 
are capable of mobilising sufficient electoral support to overpass the established 
(usually high) threshold, the presence of minority representatives in the parlia-
ments of most post-communist states has a mere decorative role, which does not 
allow a more substantial incorporation of the ethnic minorities’ interests in the 
political agenda.
Bugajski offers a categorisation for both majority parties (independence-fo-
cused formations; moderate or democratic nationalists; conservative nationalists; 
socialist-nationalist formations; neofascist formations) and for minority political 
movements as well. He identifies these latter political formations as mobilising 
on identity-basis, with the common feature of “focus on issues of direct and often 
exclusive concern for a distinct segment of population”.16 Here again, Bugajski 
sets up five main categories, which include a.) cultural revivalism, b.) political au-
tonomism, c.) territorial self-determination, d.) separatism and e.) irredentism. 
Besides majority nationalist and minority ethnicist political movements, he also 
makes a point on regionalist parties, which are not necessarily based on ethnicity, 
but more on a specific regional, territorial identity. Bugajski defines regionalist 
political formations that are a) based around a single, territorially compact, eth-
nic group that seeks administrative or territorial autonomy within the state; b) 
multiethnic groupings which campaign for administrative devolution or regional 
self-governance; c) other regional movements which may involve political forma-
tions in different regions that seek broad decentralisation from the state.17 
This wide selection of ethnopolitical actors has had an impact on the path 
of democratisation in CEE countries and Bugajski states that by and large “the 
emergence of a pluralistic political spectrum has been obstructed in several East-
ern European countries by nationalist, ethnic, and regionalist politics.”18
As a matter of fact, for the time being there are no signs that ethnic cleavages 
in the political systems of many CEE states are being overcome: for instance the 
participation of minority ethnic parties in the governments of Slovakia, Roma-
nia, or Bulgaria has been either a temporary constraint of election results or was 
solicited by the perspective of European integration. In these cases minority par-
ties’ participation in the government could not bring a breakthrough in the ac-
16   Ibid. p. li.
17   Op.cit. p. lii-liii.
18   Op.cit. p. xli.
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commodation of minority rights claims (e.g., in education, cultural or territorial 
autonomy, etc.). 
In spite of this, Salat rightly notes that there is a need for innovation in tack-
ling ethnic diversity in CEE democracies.19 As will be seen, the international ac-
tors recurrently formulate their recommendations in the context of the duality of 
civic vs. ethnic nationalism or in the terms of multicultural democracy, which, in 
practise, are not applicable in CEE. Civic loyalties cannot replace ethnic loyalties 
if both ethnic minorities and ethnic majorities in these states identify themselves 
along their national identities. In a similar way, the term “multicultural democra-
cy” is primarily applied in Western European states where this model was aimed 
at integrating large immigrant communities. But this model is not likely to be 
applicable in societies where the coexistence of ethnic communities is historically 
determined. 
Alternative Models of Democracy in Multiethnic Societies
There are a number of different models for accommodating diversity (e.g., conso-
ciational democracy, multicultural democracy, etc.),20 for the sake of brevity here 
I would like to highlight only two theoretical perspectives: building on the work 
of Sammy Smooha, one is ethnic democracy, while an alternative is offered by 
Kymlicka, on the idea of multinational liberal democracy. 
The picture described by Smooha21 in a model of ethnic democracy probably 
most resembles the political reality in some Central and Eastern European states. 
According to Smooha, the distinctive characteristics of ethnic democracy are the 
following: a) ethnic nationalism installs a dominant nation in the state; b) the 
state separates membership in the dominant nation from citizenship, c) the state 
is owned and ruled by the dominant nation, and the state mobilises this majority 
nation d) non-dominant groups are granted incomplete individual and collective 
rights; e) the state allows non-dominant groups to participate in a parliamentary 
struggle for power f) non-dominant groups are conceived as posing threats to the 
survival and integrity of the majority nation. Smooha briefly describes this model: 
“Ethnic democracy is a democratic political system that combines the extension of civil 
19   Salat op. cit. 22-25.
20   See for a brief overview: Salat op. cit.
21   Smooha, Sammy (2005) A Model of Ethnic Democracy in: Smooha and Järve (eds.) The Fate of 
Ethnic Democracy in Post-Communist Europe. Budapest: LGI/ECMI. pp. 5-59. 
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and political rights to permanent residents who wish to be citizens with the bestowal 
of a favoured status on the majority group. This is democracy that contains the non-
democratic institutionalization of dominance of one ethnic group. The founding rule 
of this regime is an inherent contradiction between two principles—civil and political 
rights for all and structural subordination of the minority to the majority. The ‘demo-
cratic principle’ provides equality between all citizens and members of society, while 
the ‘ethnic principle’ establishes explicit ethnic inequality, preference and dominance. 
The organisation of the state on the basis of this structural incompatibility constantly 
generates ambiguities, contradictions, tensions and conflicts, but not necessarily eth-
nic and political instability. The state belongs to the majority, not to all of its citizens, 
and the majority uses the state as a means to advance its national interests and goals. 
The minority encounters the hard problem of potential disloyalty to the state because 
it can neither be fully equal in nor fully identified with the state. Yet the democratic 
framework is real, not a façade. The conferral of citizenship on the minority enables 
it to conduct an intense struggle for fulfilling its rights and for improving its situation 
without fearing repression on the part of the state and majority. The state imposes vari-
ous controls and restrictions on the minority in order to prevent subversion, disorder 
and instability. As a result, the status quo is preserved, but over time the minority ex-
periences a partial betterment of its status.”22 As a matter of fact, ethnic democracy 
meets the minimal definition of democracy, but it lacks the major Western civic 
values of a tolerant, multicultural democracy. 
From a very different perspective, Will Kymlicka, based on his extensive re-
search23 revealed the deficiencies of classic theories on liberal democracy which 
usually portray democratic states as neutral political structures, in which the 
state remains neutral towards the religious, ethnic, or national identity of its citi-
zens. As a matter of fact Kymlicka calls our attention to three important features 
which may guarantee the success of liberal democracies. First, liberal democracy 
can be successful in ethnoculturally homogenous societies. Second, there may be 
a need for special group rights in situations where homogeneity is not provided. 
And third, institutionalised group rights can be easily accommodated in the theo-
retical framework of the equality between citizens and can offer a pragmatic re-
sponse to particular needs. 
In state practises in CEE states we can find various practises and, in many cas-
es, democratic institutions are still developing. These states have to take a clear 
path to determine which democratic model can best serve the accommodation of 
22   Op. cit. pp. 21-22.
23   See Kymlicka, Will (1995) Multicultural Citizenship, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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ethnic diversity in post-communist societies. Despite the progress these states 
have made in European integration, their democratic structures are still vulner-
able to ethnic exclusion, authoritarian developments, and the oppression of mi-
norities. Below, the impact of European integration on political developments in 
CEE region will be discussed.
Setting the Scene – Democratic Transition, Minorities and 
International Environment
The fall of communism offered a new perspective for international co-operation 
in Europe. After the collapse of Soviet rule, ideological boundaries disappeared in 
Europe and the relations between the former communist countries and Western 
states could start to develop rapidly in a new context. Primarily as a reaction to 
the radical changes in Eastern Europe, various authors, – such as Fukuyama24 – 
prognosticated the “end of history” and the global victory of liberal democracy. 
In this respect, the emergence of a new, larger community of European states 
sharing the principles of democracy and the protection of human rights was in-
deed often seen as the dawn of a ‘New Europe,’ to quote one of the first interna-
tional documents to welcome the landslide political transformation in Eastern 
Europe.25 
But at the same time experience has proved that, along with the democratic 
transition, other, less-expected developments also emerged and posed new chal-
lenges to the rising international system of co-operation in Europe. 
The Question of Minorities in the ‘New Europe’
The fact that in CEE the national minorities of the transition countries are rela-
tively large in number and are often concentrated territorially raised concerns, 
as ethnic division in transition societies was seen as a potential basis for political 
24   Fukuyama, Francis (1992) The End of History and the Last Man. London: Penguin Books.
25  CSCE Charter of Paris for a ‘New Europe’, adopted in Paris on 21 November 1990.
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mobilisation and, thus, also as a determining factor in the path and domestic 
institutional development of political transition.  
Accordingly, Western states had strong fears that political transition in CEE 
could get out of control if ethnic-based nationalism were to gain pre-eminence. 
Experience showed that political tensions and, in extreme cases, violent conflicts 
along ethnic lines in the region, could pose serious threats not only to national 
political stability, but also to regional security and, therefore, these received a 
great deal of attention from the wider international community.26 
In this regard, primarily in an effort to prevent conflict, significant interest 
emerged concerning the situation of minorities and the codification and promo-
tion of their specific rights both at the national and international levels. 
This particular interest was also reflected in the substantial rise in the number 
of international political and legal instruments adopted in the 1990s which ad-
dressed the question of the protection of minority rights.27 
Deep concerns regarding the great potential for ethnic conflict in the CEE re-
gion, particularly in light of the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia (i.e. SFRY)28 
and the Soviet Union along ethnic lines, made it a priority to establish appro-
priate international instruments designed to keep minority-related political 
developments under external control and to provide adequate political mecha-
nisms to prevent the escalation of ethnic conflicts.29 The dominant view shared 
by the international community regarding minority-related issues in the CEE 
underpinned the powerful theoretical argument that there is a positive correla-
tion between international security and the extension of liberal values through 
democratisation,30 so the promotion of liberal democracy was closely related to 
26   On the role of ethnic conflicts in international relations see Gurr, Ted and Harff, Barbara (1995), 
Minorities at Risk: a Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts. Washington D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace 
and Gurr, Ted (2000), Peoples versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century. Washington D.C.: 
U.S. Institute of Peace.
27   Here I use the term “minority rights” in the broad sense, referring not only to rights enshrined in 
legal documents, but also to governmental policies and international actions aimed at recognising 
and accommodating the distinctive identities and needs of ethnocultural groups.
28   The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the official name of the country until 1991.
29   Munuera, Gabriel (1994) Preventing Armed Conflict in Europe: Lessons from Recent Experience. 
Paris: Chaillot Paper 15/16 (Western European Union Institute for Security Studies).
30   See e.g., Herring, Eric (1997) ‘International Security and Democratisation in Eastern Europe’ 
in: Pridham, G. – Herring, E. – Sanford, G. (eds.) Building Democracy? The International Dimension 
of Democratisation in Eastern Europe. London: Leicester University Press.
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the improvement of the situation of minorities and to the reinforcement of inter-
nal and international stability.31  
Division between East and West – is it real?
Nonetheless, minority issues are surely not region-specific: politically active mi-
norities are also present in Western European states and violent inter-ethnic 
conflicts are also familiar to many ‘old’ member states of the European Union 
(see e.g., Welsh and Scottish claims in Great Britain or the violent conflicts in 
the Basque Country in Spain). However, in academia and among policy-makers 
there is a widely shared ideological assertion that the transitional societies of CEE 
for both political and deeper historical reasons are more inclined to ethnic con-
flict than Western states and serious efforts are needed on their behalf to reach 
‘Western civic’ standards of inter-ethnic co-existence.32 Although dual (East-West 
just like ‘civic’ vs. ‘ethnic’ nationalism) approaches to identity-based politics are 
strongly disputed in literature,33 this approach can be seen as characteristic of 
European international organisations in the 1990s. 
International documents that have been adopted relating to the protection of 
minorities have been formulated in a universal language, but in practise the activ-
ity of the international organisations in Europe on minority questions has been 
primarily focused on the CEE region.34 Nonetheless, the paradox that in the ex-
31   As the European states declared their commitments in this regard in the 1990 CSCE Charter 
of Paris for a New Europe: “We reaffirm our deep conviction that friendly relations among our peoples, 
as well as peace, justice, stability and democracy, require that the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious 
identity of national minorities be protected and conditions for the promotion of that identity be created. 
We declare that questions related to national minorities can only be satisfactorily resolved in a democratic 
political framework.”  In a similar way, the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities stressed the same concern related to the close interdependence 
between democratic governance and minority protection in its Preamble under paragraph 6. 
“Considering that a pluralist and genuinely democratic society should not only respect the ethnic, 
cultural, linguistic and religious identity of each person belonging to a national minority, but also create 
appropriate conditions enabling them to express, preserve and develop this identity.”
32   See e.g., Ignatieff, Michael (1993) Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism. New 
York: Forrar, Strauss and Giroux.
33   See Breuning, M. and Ishiyama J. T. (1998), Ethnopolitics in the New Europe. Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner. X. and Couture, Jocelyne (1998) (ed.) Rethinking Nationalism. Calgary: University of 
Calgary Press. 1-65. respectively.
34   This region-specific approach can be illustrated well by the actions of the OSCE High 
Commissioner on National Minorities: although the mandate of the High Commissioner does 
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tension of European integration, the promotion of minority rights was in the first 
place focused on CEE states, while the situation of minorities remained largely 
neglected in Western Europe, was also criticised.35          
The main presumption among Western politicians has been that there is a par-
ticular need to disseminate established civic and liberal political norms in CEE 
through support for political transition and democracy. Civil-rights norms as 
identified in the Western political tradition are based on strong civic loyalty to 
the state, the stability of democratic institutions and the respect for and protec-
tion of human rights and fundamental freedoms, which may include the rights of 
minorities as well (or, as it is usually formulated, the rights of persons belonging 
to minorities).
Nevertheless, the question of whether such a policy export could, or can, in-
deed be real remains largely unanswered. Observing the existing differences in 
the implementation and especially in the interpretation of minority rights stand-
ards in individual states all over Europe, the problem of propagating minority 
protection standards seems to be especially relevant.36 What may work well in 
one country may not necessarily be adaptable to another due to varying institu-
tional and political traditions and differences in the situation of single minority 
communities, which clearly determine the measures needed for their survival and 
protection. 
International organisations have made the protection of minority rights a 
strong priority in their political strategy towards CEE and have played a promi-
nent role in coordinating co-operation on minority issues at an international 
level. Despite existing problems related to the accommodation of minority claims 
in individual countries, the protection of minority rights has become a legitimate 
field of international co-operation in Europe.
International measures adopted after 1989 under the aegis of the Organisa-
tion for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)37 and the Council of Europe 
not include a territorial limitation of its authority, during the past ten years the country-specific 
recommendations issued by the High Commissioner were exclusively related to minorities living 
in CEE region. See: <http://www.osce.org/hcnm/documents.html?lsi=true&limit=10&grp=44> Last 
accessed on 12 January 2007. 
35   Burgess, Adam (1999) ‘Critical reflections on the return of national minority rights regulation 
to East/West European affairs’ in: Cordell, K. (ed.) Ethnicity and Democratisation in the New 
Europe. London and New York: Routledge. pp. 49-60.
36   Kymlicka W. and Opalski, M. (2001) (eds.) Can Liberal Pluralism Be Exported? Western political 
theory and ethnic relations in Eastern Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
37   Before 1994, the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). Particularly 
relevant in relation to this are the 1990 Copenhagen Document on “Human Dimension”, the 1990 
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(CoE), in particular the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Mi-
norities (FCNM) and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages38 
(hereafter also referred to as the Language Charter), in a European context rein-
forced the acknowledgement of minority rights protection as an integral part of 
the universal protection of human rights.39  
As Eide explains:
“There has in recent decades been a slow, but necessary process to find the appropri-
ate balance between the legitimate concerns of the state and those of the minorities. 
Three guiding principles for that balancing act have been the following: 
* firstly, that the minority protection shall fully conform to the human rights system 
as constituted by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
* secondly, those minority rights cannot be used as a pretext for secession, for break-
ing up the territorial integrity of the state. The right of peoples to self-determination, 
whenever it is applicable, cannot be based on minority rights, 
* thirdly, that the existence of the national, ethnic and religious groups shall be re-
spected, and conditions for the preservation a development of that identity shall be 
ensured.”40
These assumptions are visibly reflected in international documents41. Never-
theless, largely because of the above mentioned political fears of states related to 
offering specific rights to minorities which could lead to unwanted political de-
Charter of Paris for a New Europe, the 1992 Helsinki Document or the 1999 Charter for European 
Security, Istanbul.
38   The CoE Language Charter was adopted in 1992 and entered into force on 1 March 1998. 
E.T.S. 148. The Framework Convention was adopted in 1995, entered into force on 1 February 
1998. E.T.S. No. 157. Cf.: Blair 1994; Estébanez and Gál 1999. Specific areas of this international 
minority protection system also included the bilateral treaties agreed upon in CEE in the 1990s. 
See Gál 1999.
39   At the universal level the same principle has already been acknowledged by the inclusion of 
Art. 27 in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and by the adoption of the 
U.N. General Assembly Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, 
Religious and Linguistic Minorities, G.A. res. 47/135, 47 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 210, U.N. 
Doc. A/47/49 (1992).
40   Eide, Asbjorn, ‘Minorities in a Decentralised Environment’ paper presented at the International 
Conference on Human Rights “All Human Rights for All” in Yalta, 2-4 September 1998.
41   As, for example, the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities declares 
under Art. 1: “The protection of national minorities and of the rights and freedoms of persons belonging 
to those minorities forms an integral part of the international protection of human rights, and as such 
falls within the scope of international co-operation.” And at the same time reaffirms that “Nothing in 
the present framework Convention shall be interpreted as implying any right to engage in any activity 
or perform any act contrary to the fundamental principles of international law and in particular of the 
sovereign equality, territorial integrity and political independence of States.”(Art. 21)
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velopments (like claims for secession), the legal and political framework in which 
minority rights have been formulated is rather fragile. Relevant international 
commitments appear either in legally non-binding political declarations or in 
carefully formulated soft-law norms in multilateral and bilateral treaties, which 
leave a large margin of discretion to the signatory states in connection with the 
implementation of their ensuing obligations.
Consequently, the divergent practises of European states on the treatment 
of minorities are a good reflection of the lack of a unanimous consensus on the 
interpretation of protection standards for minority rights.42
Uneasiness towards identifying the specific rights which should be granted to 
minorities, in concrete terms, was reflected not only in the international docu-
ments adopted on the protection of minorities, but also in the political articu-
lation of minority issues in the international realm. The pre-eminent position 
of security concerns often impeded the consistent and relentless promotion of 
minority rights protection through international measures. This was specifically 
the case in the formulation of minority rights protection standards vis-à-vis CEE 
states in the framework of European integration.43 
CEE and European Integration – Extending Co-operation in 
International Organisations
The increasing attention given to the situation and legal protection of minorities 
at an international level has also entailed that questions related to minorities are 
more strongly articulated within the broadening process of European integration 
in the 1990s. The institutional expansion of the Western international organisa-
tional regime to CEE offered a new perspective for international co-operation in 
this field: international organisations that were apparently indifferent or weak 
in addressing the problems related to the accommodation of national and ethnic 
42   As the European Court of Human Rights stated in one of its famous judgements, Chapman 
vs. United Kingdom, No. 27238/95. para. 93-94. “The Court observes that there may be said to be an 
emerging international consensus amongst the Contracting States of the Council of Europe recognising the 
special needs of minorities and an obligation to protect their security, identity and lifestyle [...] However, 
the Court is not persuaded that the consensus is sufficiently concrete for it to derive any guidance as to the 
conduct or standards which Contracting States consider desirable in any particular situation.” 
43   The term ‘European integration’ is intended here as the institutional integration of CEE states 
into European international organisations, especially the Council of Europe, the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation and the European Union.
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diversity within their member states before 1989 turned out to be surprisingly 
active in taking minority issues to the floor in their relations with the new de-
mocracies in CEE. As a result, the propagation of minority rights protection, as a 
‘pan-European’ standard has become an integral element of their political profile, 
at least in their external relations. What could be seen as a novelty was not the 
extension of a consistent legal regime of minority rights, but the fact that the 
concept of the protection of minorities was increasingly articulated as a basic ele-
ment of the ‘ideal’ of liberal democratic governance within the European frame-
work of institutional integration of CEE states. However, while within European 
organisations the lack of clarity regarding the basic standards in the treatment 
of minorities was not a crucial problem for Western European countries; it has 
become a difficult and intrinsic quandary for CEE states in their accession to the 
same international organisations.44 
In the 1990s the idea of ‘recreating Europe’45 became a strong driving force in 
the development of international relations within Europe. The rapprochement 
between ‘East’ and ‘West’ was in fact in many fields institutionally channelled 
through the existing economic, security, and political organisational structures 
of Western Europe. The extension of the institutional framework in this man-
ner was not limited to a territorial or geographic expansion, but also implied an 
ideological assimilation of external states into the values that these international 
organisations represent. Furthermore, as institutional relations between CEE 
and the West were extended after 1989, the articulation of common ideologi-
cal standards was also recurrently reinforced in different international forums, 
based on earlier precedents,46 including respect for minorities.
Indeed, ever since then, despite the differences in their founding goals and 
their different missions, concerns about the protection of human rights and the 
situation of minorities have been more strongly present in the activities of the 
OSCE, the Council of Europe, and even in  the external policy of the European 
Union (EU).47 
44   Cf. Kymlicka and Opalski, op. cit. pp. 47-84. 
45   Mayhew, Alan (1998) Recreating Europe: The European Union’s Policy towards Central and Eastern 
Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. and Emerson, Michael (1998) Redrawing the Map 
of Europe. London: Macmillan.
46   See e.g., Art. 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and CSCE 
Helsinki Final Act 1 August 1975, Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating 
States, Title VII.
47   The European Union gained its name only in 1992 (the Treaty on the European Union 
[hereafter referred to also as TEU] was adopted in Maastricht on 7 February 1992 and entered 
into force on 1 November 1993), but considering that the core-subject of the present study is the 
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“Exporting Democracy” and Institutional Integration
The reinforcement of arguments on minority rights protection at the interna-
tional level regarding CEE states was obviously part of a broader process of “ideo-
logical export” from the West to the new Eastern democracies. Political transition 
after 1989 in CEE and the new democratic ‘institutional architecture’48 adopted 
by CEE states emerged largely as the outcome of domestic political forces, but 
the establishment of democratic governance and the protection of human rights 
clearly reflected ‘Western’ templates.49 
Furthermore, democratic transition and European integration have become 
closely interrelated processes for most post-communist countries.50 In the im-
plementation and stability of the new democratic institutions the membership/
partnership policy of European international organisations also played an impor-
tant role. In this way the rise of ethnic-based politics as a characteristic of politi-
cal transition in CEE, and the protection of minorities as a desirable panacea and 
especially as a basic principle of democratic political ideals, have also been raised 
as key issues in the process of integration. 
Closer co-operation with CEE states clearly necessitated reinforcing political 
stability and security in these states, especially through the stability of demo-
cratic institutions and the protection of human rights. In this context, apparently 
the commitment of international organisations to improve democratic perform-
ance in CEE often required higher standards from CEE states than from Western 
incumbents, which in the field of minority rights protection was manifested in a 
striking way.
To achieve these goals, the community of Western states utilised a great va-
riety of political and economic tools, from providing financial aid and launching 
economic and political co-operation programmes, to employing political pressure 
and – in extreme cases when international security was threatened, as was the 
case in Yugoslavia – international sanctions or military force.
Eastern enlargement of the EU, i.e. it covers a period after 1992, its present name will generally 
be used to denote the institutions of European Union even when referring to previous periods of 
its existence.  
48   Whitefield, S. (1993) (ed.) The New Institutional Architecture of Eastern Europe. New York: St. 
Martin’s Press.
49   Malova, Darina and Haughton, Timothy (2001) Emergence and Divergence: Institutional Change 
in Central and Eastern Europe and the impact of Europe. Florence: European University Institute. RSC 
WP 2001/45
50   Zielonka, Jan and Pravda, Alex (eds.) (2001) Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe, Vol. 2: 
International and Transnational Factors. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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European states applied a complex strategy for strengthening democratic re-
gimes in CEE, primarily within the institutional structure of international co-
operation in Europe. Different international organisations applied rather differ-
ent forms of political and economic pressure and incentives to support not only 
democratic transition, but also positive developments in minority rights policy 
in CEE.51 
One of the most significant political tools applied by Western European states 
in this endeavour was their strategy related to the timing and conditions for the 
formal institutional integration of CEE countries into ‘Western’ international 
organisations. Extending partnership first and later offering membership to 
CEE countries in the Council of Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO) and the European Union was widely believed to be an effective strate-
gy for reinforcing democracy and political stability in the region. Therefore, the 
concern about strengthening the protection of minorities was notably present in 
the membership policy applied by these international organisations towards CEE 
states. 
The CoE, the European Union and, in a less obvious but no less influential 
manner, NATO, have all applied a policy of conditional admission in supporting 
domestic political reforms, and also emphasising the importance of good neigh-
bourly relations, regional stability, and the protection of minorities. 
In this regard, the prospect of membership in the CoE, NATO, and in the Eu-
ropean Union has gained overwhelming importance and proved to be a powerful 
motivation for policy change in CEE countries.52
51   The most significant steps in this regard were the establishment of the OSCE High Commissioner 
on National Minorities (HCNM) as a conflict-prevention mechanism, the 1995 Pact on Stability 
in Europe, and the EU-sponsored 1999 Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe. External pressure 
in the field of minority protection was twofold: on one hand CEE states were expected to agree 
to international legal obligations on minority rights protection (by joining relevant multilateral 
treaties and also by concluding bilateral treaties that included the rights of minorities) and on 
the other hand there have been serious attempts by international institutions to encourage the 
implementation of special domestic policy programmes for minorities.
52   Smith, Karen E. (2001) ‘Western Actors and the Promotion of Democracy’, In Democratic 
Consolidation in Eastern Europe, Vol. 2: International and Transnational Factors, ed. Zielonka J., 
Pravda A., Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 31-57. 
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The Other Side of the Coin? Domestic Policy, Foreign Policy, and 
European Integration in CEE
For many countries in CEE, minority policy, foreign policy, and European inte-
gration have become closely interrelated policy areas. The CoE, the OSCE and, 
more recently, the EU have followed domestic policy developments in CEE tran-
sition countries closely and progress towards integration was strongly linked to 
domestic and regional stability. Improvement in the situation of minorities was 
important both in domestic and external domains: ethnic-based conflicts could 
threaten internal stability and the treatment of minorities could also easily affect 
the external relations of the state, especially with the kin-states of the minorities 
concerned.
Historical sensitivity about the treatment of minorities in CEE countries of-
ten made neighbourly co-operation more difficult and made the reiteration of ex-
isting international minority rights norms in domestic legislation and in bilateral 
treaties necessary, in many cases under the auspices of international organisa-
tions. 
In this regard the articulation of domestic minority policy, co-operation in 
neighbourly relations, and progress in European integration have become three 
closely interrelated areas: the improvement of the situation of minorities in the 
domestic sphere, together with a close co-operation between neighbouring (kin-)
states on minority issues, could enhance better neighbourly relations, increase 
regional stability, gain international recognition, and thus lead to better progress 
towards integration.53  
International minority rights standards developed in the last decade have 
offered a more-or-less comprehensive legal and political framework for positive 
developments in this field. The strengthening of international co-operation on 
the protection of minorities has not appeared merely to be a political move by 
European states and, therefore, it has been a powerful basis for the international 
community to act in encouraging peaceful political transition in the CEE region; 
indeed on various occasions it proved an appropriate setting for the actors (inter-
national organisations, INGOs and NGOs, states, and minorities alike) concerned 
to develop and strengthen their claims for extending the rights of minorities in 
individual countries.
53   Malfliet, Katlijn (1999) ‘Minorities in Central and Eastern Europe: the Link between Domestic 
Policy, Foreign Policy and European Integration’ in: Malfliet, K. and Laenen, R. (eds.) Minority 
Policy in Central and Eastern Europe: the Link between Domestic Policy, Foreign Policy and European 
Integration. Leuven: Garant Publishers. pp. 1-33.
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Despite the divergent interpretations of minority rights protection in indi-
vidual countries, at the international level there has indeed emerged a universal 
and European framework to rely on. Although there are still intense debates on 
the meaning of ambiguous terms within the field of minority rights, such as the 
definition of ‘minority’ or whether the minorities have collective rights or a right 
to self-determination (particularly relevant for minority claims for cultural and 
territorial autonomy), the most fundamental principles, such as the prohibition 
of discrimination or the recognition of states’ responsibility in maintaining and 
preserving the national, cultural, or linguistic identity of minorities are widely 
acknowledged.54 
From a different perspective, the same international framework offered a new 
background for minority claims as well. Politically active minorities have repeat-
edly formulated their requests in reference to the existing international stand-
ards and, in this context, it has also become an accepted practise that minori-
ties appeal to international standards and turn to the international community 
whenever their rights are abused.55
Certainly governmental policies towards minorities also largely react to the 
demands of minorities, and when these claims are formulated in a way that inter-
national actors (especially kin-states and international organisations) are likely to 
associate with minorities, the pressure to improve their situation may become an 
important determining factor for state policies.56 The triadic network – a model 
elaborated by Brubaker57 – between the ‘nationalising state’, the ‘external home-
land’ and the ‘national minority’ (to use his own terms) as interdependent actors 
in articulating their respective policies, reveals one aspect of the international fac-
tors determining minority or kin-state policies. But what’s more, in regard to the 
actions of CEE countries working towards European integration, there is a good 
reason to see a similar interdependence between foreign policy, domestic minor-
ity policy, and European integration.58 This perspective offers a “quadratic”59 rela-
54   Pentassuglia, Gaetano (2002) Minorities in International Law. Strasbourg: Council of Europe 
Publications. pp. 39-51. 
55   Bíró, Gáspár (2000) ‘Minorities in International Relations’ in: K. Imbusch – K. Segbers (eds.), 
The Globalization of Eastern Europe. Hamburg: LIT. pp. 306-307.
56   Ibid. pp. 315-320
57   Brubaker, Rogers (1996), Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the 
New Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
58   Malfliet, op. cit. pp. 17-34.
59   Smith, David J. (2002) ‘Framing the National Question in Central and Eastern Europe: a 
Quadratic Nexus?’, The Global Review of Ethnopolitics, vol. 2 no. 1, 3-16.
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tion, including international organisations among the actors involved in minority 
related policies as well.
In this respect, the interest of international organisations in the treatment 
of minorities has been significant. Their role in closely following and evaluating 
the practise of single states in light of international standards has become very 
important for CEE countries, both in their external relations and for their policies 
towards minorities living within their territory. 
Nonetheless, despite the high prestige given to international minority-rights 
protection measures in the region, the lack of a strong independent judicial or 
quasi-judicial institution in controlling the implementation of these standards 
has left monitoring and evaluation procedures largely vulnerable to political con-
siderations. Due to this, political concerns regarding the situation of minorities 
formulated within the framework of extending institutional relations between 
CEE states and the Council of Europe, NATO, and the EU have gained greater 
prestige than the procedures established for the purpose of implementing inter-
national minority rights standards. In other words, the efficiency of these specific 
procedures and mechanisms often depends greatly on their reinforcement by the 
institutional policies of CoE, NATO, and the EU towards CEE states. The activi-
ties of international organisations in this regard, however, are not strictly norm-
guided, but appear to be driven by looser policy-driven mechanisms.60
Furthermore, due to overlapping membership and close political co-operation 
between the major international organisations supporting democratic transition 
in CEE, minority issues have been raised in different forums, reflecting rather 
different attitudes. Despite this, the few supervising procedures upon which the 
international community could rely in evaluating the progress made by individual 
countries on the treatment of minorities gained considerable prestige. Particu-
larly relevant here are the monitoring mechanisms established to supervise the 
implementation of the FCNM and the Language Charter. The work of the OSCE 
High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) similarly received great at-
tention. But the relevance of their results in formulating domestic policies on 
minority issues was clearly unbalanced. 
Incongruity between the aims targeted and policies adopted was apparent in 
the formulation of minority rights requirements in the membership policies of 
the Council of Europe, NATO and the EU. Whereas the basic goal of settling inter-
ethnic disputes in CEE states and satisfactorily accommodating the claims of mi-
60   Pentassuglia, Gaetano (2002) Minorities in International Law. Strasbourg: Council of Europe 
Publications, pp. 39-44.
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norities living in the region was truly ambitious, the policy instruments adopted 
did not always live up to the goals set.
Conclusion
In general terms it can be concluded that despite the development of democratic 
political regimes in CEE the new structures could not effectively resolve ethnic 
tensions in these states. The internal development of democracy was and could 
not be scrutinised by international organisations in this regard; consequently the 
main emphasis was laid on the establishment of legal guarantees for the special 
civic rights of people belonging to minorities. European organisations, however, 
could not propagate a firm normative standard on minority rights, as the level 
of minority-rights protection is closely attached to the traditional/exclusive or 
innovative/inclusive definition of nation and democracy in each state. Though 
democratic transition in CEE states followed Western patterns and European in-
tegration is based on common liberal democratic values of states, there are no 
general rules for the accommodation of ethnic diversity. This implies that, while 
the theoretical, ideal interpretation of democracy would exclude national domi-
nance and oppression, in practise in the democratic transition and European in-
tegration of post-communist states efforts in overcoming nationalist structures 
remained marginal in the development of democracy. This means that, despite 
our general expectations towards democracy, the evolution of an effective model 
of multiethnic democracy is exclusively dependent on domestic political develop-
ments.
Nevertheless, the accession of CEE states to the European Union may offer a 
new perspective in developing democratic institutions and governmental poli-
cies towards minorities. There are no specific legal standards or common policies 
on minority rights within the European Union, but through its main policies it 
may help regional administrative decentralisation in these states and may of-
fer additional sources for civil organisations (including minority organisations). 
While these measures are not targeted at minority communities, basic principles 
of integration, like subsidiarity, tolerance towards diversity, decentralisation of 
financial sources, etc. may improve the well-being of minorities as well. What is 
important in this regard is that EU member states and EU institutions, in evaluat-
ing the functioning of democratic institutions and the status of human rights in 
member states, shall go further than observing formal institutions. What recent 
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initiatives within the EU in the field of human rights protection have begun (e.g., 
the adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and especially the creation 
of a Fundamental Rights Agency) should also be extended to the protection of 
minority rights. Finding innovative democratic solutions for the accommodation 
of minority communities in CEE states is important, but creating a new level of 
guaranteeing the respect for and protection of ethnic diversity within the EU is 
equally important. 
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Nations and Minorities in the Western-NIS Region
This region, from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, with its population of approx. 
70 million, has been affected by all the specific features of Eastern European his-
tory: almost continuous wars of competing empires, frequent border changes and 
ethnic and religious heterogeneity. As a result of all these factors, clear national 
and ethnic dividing lines have long since disappeared, if they ever existed. Dur-
ing the decades of the Soviet era, this situation was partly conserved and partly 
extended by some new processes. 
The ethnic composition in the Western territories of the Soviet Union has 
been significantly modified, compared to the initial situation. Some of the chang-
es were clearly the result of direct power interference. The artificial famine strik-
ing Ukraine in the Stalinist era, in 1932-33, had such an effect on the age com-
position of Ukrainian society that its effects can still be felt even today. This was 
followed by the deportation of the Crimean Tatars and the Volga Germans during 
the Second World War. Then the mass deportation of the Estonians, Latvians, 
and Lithuanians to Siberia took place as revenge for their resistance during and 
after the war. In addition to these disruptions of heterogeneity, though as a result 
of the interference of another power, namely Nazi Germany, the native Jewish 
population of the region perished almost completely.
Some other processes were less planned. Most of the Russian-speaking popu-
lation living in the Baltic States was settled there in connection with the forced 
industrialisation and russification of the region. However, after the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union, most of them did not intend at all to repatriate, simply due to 
the fact that in the Baltic States the standards of living were much higher than in 
Russia. Something similar happened to the Red Army: after the collapse, tens of 
thousands of soldiers decided not to join their units being redeployed to Russia, 
but left the army and tried to start a new life in their old place of deployment, 
where most of them had their families and friends living, etc. This affected mostly 
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the Baltic States, and – due to the comfortable climate – Moldova and the Crimea 
in Ukraine (the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s continued stationing here is a serious 
source of problems.) In all three Baltic States there are a significant number of 
Ukrainians and Belarusians, though even the latter group is native only in Lithua-
nia. To Estonia and Latvia, these people had originally immigrated as guest work-
ers and after 1991 they did not return to their home country.
Instead of Methodology
For studying the minority and demographic processes of the post-Soviet region, 
one has to keep in mind that the last census, which used the same standards at 
the same time for the whole territory of the Soviet Union, was conducted in 1989. 
Since then, the newly independent states conduct censuses at different intervals, 
with different questions using a diverse methodology, what makes it almost im-
possible to draw consequences which would be valid for the whole region. 
It should also be noted that, in many cases, one also has to calculate the ’flex-
ibility of identities’, which might distort the statistics. In the Soviet era, belong-
ing to the ruling Russian elite meant kind of a privileged position. In many cases, 
ethnic minorities preferred to declare themselves to be Russians and russified 
their family names or, while keeping their traditional family names, they gave 
Russian surnames to their children. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 
the situation in many cases reversed, and more and more people have ’discov-
ered’ their Belarusian, Ukrainian, or Moldovan roots, and many of those ones 
who were forced to russify their names, changed them back to the original form. 
In accord with this, many of those who in 1989 declared themselves to be Rus-
sians, in times of the later censuses instead registered themselves as Ukrainians, 
Moldovans, or even Kazakhs.
In Belarus and Moldova, this happens mostly among the rural population, 
while in Ukraine it is typical, especially in the Trans-Carpathian region, that the 
population answers ’local’ to the question concerning their national identity. It 
also tends to happen that people are not able to make a clear distinction between 
the national identity and the mother tongue (this implies mostly to the perfectly 
bilingual strata of the Ukrainian and Moldovan population). However, this fea-
ture is not a symptom of being uneducated or lacking necessary information. It is 
rather the consequence of the hard mixture of nations and languages in the given 
area, which sometimes makes people unable to define a single identity, as they 
feel themselves belonging to many communities at the same time. 
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Another specific feature characterising the census systems of all states of the 
region is that the Jews are considered to be a separate ethnic group, thus their 
number is separately handled. Most of the Jewish population registered in the 
1989 census migrated to the region after the Second World War, as during the 
Holocaust almost all native Jews were killed and many survivors decided to emi-
grate first to Palestine, then to Israel. 
The Problem of the Russians Living Abroad
According to the 1989 census, more than 25 million people, declaring themselves 
to be Russians lived in any of the 14 non-Russian republics of the Soviet Union. 
During the Soviet era these Russians – despite their numerical minority – be-
longed everywhere to the most developed, mostly urban stratus of the popula-
tion. Most of them worked in the industrial sector and the party elite was com-
posed mainly of them. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, their situation 
was radically changed as from their position as the ruling elite they unexpectedly 
became the weak minority. Protection of the Russians living outside the borders 
of the Russian Federation is one of the constant foreign policy priorities of Mos-
cow, which affects the focus region of this study as well.
The following chart provides information concerning the number of Russians 
living on the territories of the newly independent states: 
Country (before 
1989 former 
Soviet republic)
Population
 [1000 people]
Rate of the population 
declaring themselves to 
be of Russia ethnicity 
compared to the overall 
population [%]
Number of people de-
claring themselves to be 
of Russian ethnicity 
[1000 people]
1989 2002 and after 1989 after 2002 1989 after 2002 
Armenia 3326 2976 2 0.5 67 14
Azerbaijan 7092 7961 6 1,8 425 143
Belarus 10195 10293 13 11,4 1325 1173
Estonia 1573 1324 30 25,6 472 340
Georgia 5431 4661 6 1,5 326 69
Kazakhstan 16580 15233 38 30 6300 4569
Kyrgyzstan 4308 5213 21 12,5 905 652
Latvia 2678 2274 34 29,6 911 673
Lithuania 3695 3585 9 6,3 332 225
Moldova 4359 4466 13 5,8 567 259
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Country (before 
1989 former 
Soviet republic)
Population
 [1000 people]
Rate of the population 
declaring themselves to 
be of Russia ethnicity 
compared to the overall 
population [%]
Number of people de-
claring themselves to be 
of Russian ethnicity 
[1000 people]
1989 2002 and after 1989 after 2002 1989 after 2002 
Russian  
Federation  
(Soviet Union)
147400
(285743)
145649 82 79,8 120868 114029
Tajikistan 5182 7320 8 1,1 414 81
Turkmenistan 3572 5042 9 4,0 321 202
Ukraine 51578 46710 22 17,3 11347 8080
Uzbekistan 20094 27307 8 5,5 1608 1502
Russian population living in the former Soviet republics and in the successor states 1
The Baltic States
The three Baltic States gained their independence in 1918 and lost it as a result 
of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact signed in 1939. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania 
were occupied by the Red Army in 1940 and were annexed to the Soviet Union. 
During the Second World War and the years following, the ethnic composition of 
the Baltic States was radically changed. The German population partly fled to the 
West while those who remained perished in 1944-45, most of the Jews were ex-
terminated, a large number of Baltic people also escaped to the West, and others 
were deported to the East.
As a result of a deliberate Moscow policy, hundreds of thousands of Russian-
speaking workers and experts immigrated to the Baltic States in connection with 
the Socialist industrialisation. Immigration particularly affected Estonia and 
Latvia, while in the less-developed, at that time mainly agricultural Lithuania, 
it was not substantial. Moreover, important military bases were located in the 
1   Source of data: the 1989 census and the CIA World Factbook. In all cases the chart contains the 
data (mostly census infomation) provided by the given country. All these data were gained between 
2002 and 2006, though with certain differences, as the countries studied did not conduct their 
censuses at the same time. As a result of all these – in addition to the round-ups made in order to 
simplify the chart – the data published here is suitable only for informing the reader, but not for 
statistical purposes. This implies especially to countries of highly mixed ethnic composition, such 
as Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova.
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Baltic countries and the soldiers serving there preferred to immigrate to these 
countries with their entire families due to the higher standards of living.
Both the demographic and migration trends were unfavourable for Baltic 
people. According to the 1989 census, the rate of Latvians in their own republic 
was 52% (in Riga it was even lower, 36%), while the Estonians had a majority of 
61% and the Lithuanians of 79%. Due to these trends, both among the Estonian 
and Latvian populations, it became a widespread fear that the ’Russian invaders’ 
might soon gain the majority, which would result in the loss of national charac-
teristics of the republics. This attitude (or self-defence mechanism), is the main 
motivation behind the restrictive Estonian and Latvian minority policies starting 
after 1991. 
While analysing the statistics about the national-ethnic composition of the 
Baltic countries, it is worth to note that all three census systems obviously make 
an ethnically based distinction between the Russians, Ukrainians, and Belaru-
sians. However, from the perspective of the problems posed by the presence of 
the minorities, such as not knowing the state language, the lack of citizenship, 
and their high rate compared to the majority group, they should to be handled 
together. Thus one has to make a distinction between the ethnic Russian (ethnic, 
language and cultural criteria) and Russian-speaking (only language and cultural 
criteria, but not ethnicity) minorities.
One has to add that, despite the often disadvantageous legal position of the 
minorities in the Baltics, in all three countries most of the business elite is Rus-
sian-speaking. Part of them had been members of the Communist nomenclature 
and managed to transform their political influence into business capital. Others 
utilised the investment climate of the early ’90s, which was much more favour-
able than in Russia at that time and together with Russian enterprises, estab-
lished joint ventures which they registered in the Baltics. From the business point 
of view, the Kaliningrad region, which remained Russian territory even after the 
Baltic States regained their independence, is of key importance. The former mili-
tary port has become an important logistical centre, being one of the main transit 
points of the trade between Russia and the West. 
Estonia
The law on citizenship, adopted in February 1992, basically reinstalled the old law 
on citizenship of 1938. Thus, citizens got the same rights and obligations that 
they had before the Soviet occupation. In 1992 only those (descendants included) 
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got Estonian citizenship who had been citizens of Estonia before 16th June 1940 
(the loss of independence). This resulted in 80.000 non-Estonians also getting 
citizenship, but all those ones who immigrated in the Soviet era did not. Those 
who were professional soldiers of the Red Army, who cooperated with the politi-
cal police and who did not have a legal source of income were explicitly excluded.
Thus, hundreds of thousands of Russian-speaking people were left without 
citizenship. The Estonian authorities started the naturalisation process in March 
1993. They introduced the so-called 2+1 system: one had to have a permanent 
place of living already two years before submitting the request and one year after 
it, in addition to prove one’s knowledge of Estonian language. The law was modi-
fied in 1995, when the necessary length of having a permanent place of residence 
was extended to six years; one had to pass an exam on the Estonian constitution 
and had to make an oath of loyalty as well. According to another modification 
in 1998, the children of non-citizens born after 1992 automatically get citizen-
ship. Currently 3-4000 people gets citizenship every year, while between 1992 
and 2002 altogether 117.000 people received it.
Nationality
1989 2000
Number 
[1000 people]
%
Number 
[1000 people]
%
Estonian 963 61,5 930 67,90
Russian 474 30,3 351 25,60
Ukrainian 48 3,1 29 2,10
Belarusian 27 1,8 17 1,20
Finnish 16 1 12 0,87
Other 36 2,3 30 2,10
Altogether 1565 100 1370 100
Ethnic composition of the population of Estonia
Most of the Russians (352 thousand) immigrated to Estonia in the Soviet era; 
however, some of them are natives of the region. The first ones arrived in the 
17th century as refugees of the religious conflicts. They were followed by the per-
sonnel of the Tsarist administration (officials, doctors, etc.), and after 1917 many 
political refugees of the Bolshevik takeover came as well. Most of the Russians are 
urbanised, they either live in the capital (146 thousand, 37% of Tallinn’s popula-
tion) or in the two larger cities of the North-Eastern Ida-Viru county neighbour-
ing Russia (in Narva 68 thousand, 85%, in Kohtla-Järve 47 thousand, 68%). In 
addition to these, 16.000 Russians live in the second largest Estonian city, Tartu 
as well, giving15% of the local population.
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Most of the Ukrainians live in Tallinn (15 thousand) and in the cities of Ida-
Viru county. Similarly, the Byelorussians also live either in the capital or in the 
North-East. Of the smaller national minorities, one has to mention the Finns 
(12.000), the Tatars (3000), the Latvians (2000), the Poles (2000), the Jews 
(2000), the Lithuanians, and the Germans (2-2000)
It is important to note that, according to the Estonian legal system, only citi-
zens can be considered minorities. Both the non-citizens and the stateless are 
officially immigrants. The non-citizens who have a residence permit are allowed 
to vote in local elections but not in the national ones. They cannot be employed 
by the state administration and cannot join political parties.
The Russian language has equal rights in all places where the population rate 
of the minorities exceeds 50%. This seemingly tolerant rule has entered to force 
nowhere in Estonia, as even in the North-Eastern territories, where the Russians 
are in the clear majority, the rate of citizens hardly exceeds one-third. Another im-
portant restriction was imposed by the electoral law, adopted in December 1998: 
only those could be elected either to national or local parliaments who were able 
to speak the state language, e.g., Estonian. After an OSCE protested against the 
law, another modification was made and the language-knowledge requirement 
was abolished. 
The first political organisations orienting themselves towards the Russian-
speaking population appeared in the early ’90s. However, due to the slow natural-
isation process, these parties got only a small number of votes2, at least compared 
to the rate of the Russian-speaking population. In the last years, the ethnic parties 
have almost completely lost their importance. On both recent parliamentary elec-
tions (2003, 2007), a tendency became clearly visible that the Russian-speakers 
tend to vote for Estonian parties – it seems they realised that these parties have a 
larger influence on political life.
The attitude of the Russian-speaking population towards the Estonian major-
ity has also changed since the transition. The initial antipathy, sometimes hatred, 
has mostly diminished and shifted since the EU-accession.3 The Russian-speaking 
youth and businessmen perceive the integration as being an opportunity, while 
elder generations expect Brussels to guarantee minority rights. The ’Estonian 
2   In 1995 the Our Home Estonia party got 6%, which worthed 6 mandates in the parliament of 101 
MPs.. In 1999 the United People’s Party received 6,1%, thus again 6 seats.
3   The April 2007 riots in Tallin, in connection with the removal of the ’Bronze Soldier’ monument 
do not contradict this. A few thousand rioting young people do not characterize the attitude of the 
whole Russian-speaking population towards the Estonian majority – especially as after the first 
night the riots mostly turned into simple looting. 
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economic miracle’ (having an annual GDP growth regularly over 6%) also has a 
positive effect on the attitude of the Russian-speaking population, especially if 
they compare it with the situation of Russia.
Latvia
According to the law on citizenship adopted in 1991, Latvian citizenship went to 
those (and their descendants) who had it before June 17, 1940 or were of Latvi-
an nationality and those who had a permanent place of residence in Latvia and 
attended Latvian-speaking graduate or high school. Thus, in the early ’90s ap-
proximately 72% of the population became Latvian citizens, while those having 
a permanent place of residence in Latvia but no citizenship in any other country, 
received a so-called alien’s passport (until 1998 the old Soviet passports were also 
valid) .
The new law on citizenship passed in 1993 was modified by the Parliament 
in 1994. The so-called naturalisation window system was introduced, according 
to which the longer a person had lived in Latvia, the longer he/she had to wait 
for naturalisation. As a result of the really strict requirements, only a very few 
requests were submitted between 1994 and 1998. Due to the intense pressure 
coming both from Russian-speaking organisations in Latvia and from various 
international organisations (OSCE, etc.), the window-system was removed by a 
referendum held in October 1998. Since then, those who are older than 15 years, 
have had a permanent place of residence for more than five years, have a legal 
source of income, and passed the Latvian language and homeland studies exams 
can apply for Latvian citizenship. 
Those who have an alien’s passport cannot be employed by the state (education, 
administration, police, etc.), and cannot vote in either the national or local elec-
tions. Until 2002, no one could be nominated for the elections without having 
a document testifying to knowledge of the Latvian language. This rule was later 
changed.  However, at the same time Latvian was made to be the sole legal lan-
guage of both the national and local administration. 
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Nationality
1989 2000
Number 
[1000 people]
%
Number 
[1000 people]
%
Latvian 1387 52,0 1370 57,7
Russian 905 34,0 703 29,6
Belarusian 118 4,5 97,0 4,1
Ukrainian 92 3,5 63 2,7
Polish 60 2,3 59 2,5
Lithuanian 34 1,3 33 1,4
Jewish 23 0,9 11 0,45
Other 46 1,7 41 1,7
Altogether 2666 100 2377 100
Ethnic composition of the population of Latvia
Most Russians in Latvia live in the large cities. In the capital, Riga, their rate is 
44% with the number of 336.000, and there are towns where they are in the ab-
solute majority (Daugavpils: 55%, Rezekne 52%). In certain areas, such as in Riga 
and in the South-Eastern region Latgale, they live in such a density that most of 
them hardly speak any Latvian. However, as Latvian is the only official language, 
one cannot see a single street name or official sign written in Russia, despite of 
the high rate of Russian-speaking minorities. 
The Belarusians (97.000) are partly native people, living in the Latgale region 
bordering their homeland, while other groups of them immigrated in the Soviet 
era. In the highest numbers they live in the cities Kraslava (18%), Daugavpils (9%) 
and in Riga (5%). Though most Belarusians do not speak their mother tongue 
anymore, some of them kept their ethnic identity. The ties connecting the Be-
larusian minority to Latvia are getting stronger and according to some expert 
opinions, they might someday become a real national minority.
The Ukrainians (63.000) live quite dispersed all over the country. Many times 
they have a dual, Russian-Ukrainian identity and most of them live in the cit-
ies. (Approximately 4% of Riga’s population is of Ukrainian nationality.) Their 
integration to the Latvian population is slow; hardly one-third of them has citi-
zenship. Many Ukrainians are strongly in favour of developing Russian-speaking 
education.
Most Polish people (60.000) live in the Latgale region, particularly in Dau-
gavpils (12%) and in Kraslava (7%). Despite their small numbers, they are consid-
ered to be the most active national minority in Latvia. Being native inhabitants, 
they supported the independence of Latvia since the late ’80s. Currently, they are 
loyal to the Latvian state and maintain close ties with their home country as well. 
In addition to them, there are the following smaller national minorities living in 
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Latvia: Lithuanians (32.000), Jews (10.000), Gypsies (8000), Tatars (3000) and 
Estonians (2000).
In Latvia, a strong Russian ethnic political community was always present in 
the Parliament.4 Currently, one has to consider the ’For Human Rights in the Uni-
fied Latvia’ (the Latvian abbreviation is PCTVL, the Russian is ZaPCSEL) party 
formation to be the greatest and best organised, Russia-oriented political force, 
which formally worked in coalition with the Latvian Social Party and the Harmony 
for Latvia party. They achieved their greatest success in 2002, when they received 
almost 19% (worthing 25 mandates) in the parliamentary elections, thus became 
the second strongest party. However, due to personal conflicts, the coalition fell 
apart in 2003, as first the Harmony for Latvia stepped out and later the Socialist 
Party as well. These two parties had a common list in the 2006 elections under the 
name ’Harmony Alliance’ and received 14% (17 mandates), while the ZaPCSEL 
almost did not pass the parliamentary threshold with 6% of the votes received.
It is highly typical of the Baltic States that the Russian ethnic parties are prac-
tically locked in a political quarantine and they are almost doomed to be in op-
position. Besides fully supporting the respect of minority rights of the Russian-
speaking population (speeding up the naturalisation process, development of the 
minority education, more rights being granted to non-citizens), these parties 
are in favour of maintaining a good relationship with Russia – which makes the 
Latvian majority think that these parties are directly financed and controlled by 
Moscow. In addition to this, Russian parties promote a radical leftist economic 
programme, which brings them some Latvian votes as well. However, as approxi-
mately half of the Russian-speaking population does not have citizenship (thus 
they are not allowed to vote in the parliamentary elections), their parties cannot 
reach a parliamentary representation equal to the numerical rate of the Russian 
minorities.
Lithuania
From the point of view of minority policy, Lithuania is the least problematic of 
the three Baltic States. When the Soviet Union collapsed, the percentage of the 
Russian-speaking population was relatively low in Lithuania, thus Vilnius could 
4   In 1993 the ’Harmony for Latvia’ raceived 13 mandates, in 1995 6 mandates, while in 1998 16 
mandates in the Saeima of 100 people. In Latvia voters vote for party lists, the threshold in 5% 
since 1995.
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quickly and smoothly settle the question of citizenship. According to the law 
adopted by the Lithuanian parliament already on November 3, 1989, the so-called 
’zero option’ entered force. This meant that all of those who lived in Lithuania and 
had a permanent source of income received Lithuanian citizenship. Only the of-
ficers and employees of the Red Army and of the Soviet political police (the KGB) 
were exceptions, together with their families. The law was modified in December 
1991 and certain restrictions were introduced. According to these modifications, 
one needed to have a permanent place of residence in Lithuania for ten years, had 
to speak Lithuanian fluently and had to know the constitution – however, those 
(and their descendants), who had Lithuanian citizenship before June, 15, 1940 
received it automatically.
Nationality
1989 2001
Number 
[1000 people]
%
Number 
[1000 people]
%
Lithuanian 2924 81,6 2907 83,4
Russian 344 9,4 219 6,3
Polish 258 7,0 235 6,7
Belarusian 63 1,7 43 1,2
Ukrainian 45 1,2 22 0,6
Jewish 12 0,3 4 0,1
Other 24 0,8 20 0,5
Altogether 3391 100 3484 100
Ethnic composition of the population of Lithuania
The Polish minority is a native one in Lithuania, Vilnius/Wilno had been one of 
the centres of the Polish culture for centuries. Between the two world wars the 
city and its surrounding belonged to Poland. As a result of this, most Polish peo-
ple (235.000) live in Vilnius (105.000, 19%) and in the neighbouring counties 
(Salcininkai 79%, Vilnius 61%, Trakai 33%, Svencionys 27%). Approximately 90% 
of the Poles living in Lithuania are concentrated in this region, the rest live dis-
persed in other parts of the country.
The Russian minority (219.000) is composed mostly of people who settled 
during the Soviet era. (Special attention has to be paid to the service person-
nel of the Ignalina nuclear power plant, who live in Visiaginas, thus 55% of the 
town’s population is Russian.) In the early ’90s, approximately 100.000 Russians 
left Lithuania, most of them migrated back to Russia.
The Belarusian minority (43.000) also lives mainly in the cities, particularly 
in Vilnius (22.000 people, 4% of the overall population). Some other smaller mi-
norities living in Lithuania should also be mentioned: Ukrainians (22.000), Jews 
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(4000), Germans (3000), Tatars (3000) Latvians (3000), Gypsies (3000) and 
Armenians (2000). The Karaites, being of Tatar origin are a special minority. In 
historical times, they composed the bodyguard unit of the Grand Duke. Their de-
scendants still live in Lithuania, mostly around the former centre of the Lithua-
nian Grand Duchy, Trakai. Though they are only a few hundred in number, they 
managed to keep their language and alphabet. The real curiosity of the Karaite 
minority is that, due to their historically strong network of contacts, they are 
highly over-represented among the Lithuanian political and business elite – there 
was a time when two Lithuanian ambassadors were of Karaite origin.
The political representation of the Polish minority is conducted by the Electoral 
Action of Poles in Lithuania (in Polish ’Akcja Wyborcza Polaków na Litwie’ AWLP; 
in Lithuania Lietuvos lenkų rinkimų akcija, ALRA). The party was established in 
1994 and it is the political ’manifestation’ of the social-cultural organisation of 
the Polish minority, the Alliance of the Poles in Lithuania. Its programme is com-
posed of typical minority protection elements, such as the promotion of minority 
rights, the strengthening of self-governance and the social and economic devel-
opment of the Vilnius region. Even though the organisation itself cannot exceed 
the 5% parliamentary threshold set for parties, 2-4 of its representatives always 
manage to get elected to MP from the regions neighbouring Vilnius. On the local 
level, the AWLP cooperates with leftist, liberal Lithuanian parties. 
Of the complaints of the Polish minority, one has to mention the rules set 
by the law on languages adopted in 1995. According to this, all names have to 
be transliterated to Lithuanian, using Lithuanian grammar and the diacritic al-
phabet. (Thus the name of Polish national poet Adam Mickiewicz has to be writ-
ten ’Adomas Mickievicius’). In the early ’90s, the autonomy claims of the Polish 
minority were also a source of tension. The Lithuanian elite opposed the plan, 
referring both to historical and actual political reasons. However, the real motiva-
tion behind the decision was that a Lithuanian national identity has been built 
up partly against Poland. Moreover, the establishment of Polish autonomy would 
have endangered the territorial integrity of the state, at least according to Lithua-
nian opinions.
There is no particular Russian ethnic minority party in Lithuania. Most of the 
local Russians support either the liberals or the post-Communists, who are less 
critical towards the Soviet past and seek a dialog with today’s Russia.
45
Belarus
Unlike the Baltic States, settling the issue of citizenship was not problematic in 
Belarus, where the law on citizenship was adopted in October 1991 by the Su-
preme Soviet. According to it, here also the ’zero option’ entered force: everyone 
got citizenship who requested it and had a permanent place of residence in the 
country. The law on national minorities was passed on 11th November 1992 and 
the minorities were involved in the preparatory works of the document. Though 
the law is fully in accord with the relevant international norms, it is still not fully 
implemented, due to the specific political-economic system that exists in today’s 
Belarus being highly different from the European standard. 
Another element of complication is that, due to the specific nature of the 
development of the Belarusian national identity (a basically agricultural soci-
ety without a significant intelligentsia, being ’got stuck’ between the two great 
neighbouring nations, the Poles and the Russians and finally, the russification 
policy of the Soviet era), currently one cannot find a Belarusian majority of high 
self-esteem, using their mother tongue, knowing their own history. Moreover, 
until the recent years, the fenka-regime had not been interested in developing 
the ’national’ character of Belarus. Thus in a referendum organized in 1995, the 
voters accepted Russian to be the second official language and the old Soviet-style 
state insignia (flag, coat of arms) were restored. Therefore for the Belarusian so-
ciety, socialised mostly in the Soviet era, thus still having a basically paternalistic 
attitude, all claims and slogans based on national identity have only a limited 
mobilising power. 
Nationality
1989 1999
Number 
[1000 people]
%
Number 
[1000 people]
%
Belarusian 7905 77,9 8159 81,2
Russian 1342 13,2 1,142 11,4
Polish 418 4,1 396 3,9
Ukrainian 291 2,9 237 2,4
Jewish 112 1,1 28 0,3
Other 82 0,8 80 0,8
Altogether 10150 100 10042 100
Ethnic composition of the population of Belarus
Analysing only the results of the national census held in 1999, the Belarusians are 
in a clear majority in the whole country, except the Grodno region in the North-
West. However, one has to add information on language use.
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Nationality
Number 
[1000 people]
The language, which is identi-
cal to one’s national identity 
is declared to be the mother 
tongue 
[1000 people]
Language used in the family
[1000 people] 
Belarusian Russian Other
Belarusian 8159 6984 3373 4783 3
Russian 1142 1036 49 1093 0
Polish 396 65 228 149 19
Ukrainian 237 102 24 198 15
Jewish 28 1 2 26 0
Other 83 39 7 59 17
Altogether 10054 8227 3683 6308 17
The absolutely dominant role of the Russian language can clearly be seen from 
the chart. In everyday life, Belarusian language is used only by people living in 
the Western part of the country; in addition to that, the part of the intelligent-
sia which has national beliefs uses it. With the Russian language having higher 
prestige, Belarusian is not in a competitive position. Therefore, kind of a ’reversed 
assimilation’ took place: the local population adopted the language of the immi-
grants, coming from the ’elder brother’ country. 5
However, one has to stress that in Belarus not a single ethnic or linguistic 
conflict has taken place in the last 16 years. The main reason behind this is that 
all throughout the region’s history, in the territory of today’s Belarus there has 
always been a very mixed (by ethnicity, by nationality and by language as well) 
population living. Therefore, inhabitants are ’used to’ this colourful picture, for 
them this is considered to be natural. Moreover, the ownership of the territory 
has changed many times during the centuries past, thus the self-definition of 
the population is based rather on a geographic, regional approach instead of a 
national one. Since 1991, the Belarusian political leadership – and especially the 
incumbent president, Alexander Lukashenko - has pursued a policy that is basi-
cally in line with this attitude. Therefore, they strengthened those elements in the 
identity of the population which were connected to the existence of an own, in-
dependent state, without giving a system-level answer to the question of nation 
and ethnicity. In this sense, Belarus in not a nation-state, and the Belarusians are 
5   The weakness of the Belorusian language movement is clearly demonstrated by the fact that the 
first Belarusian journal, the ’Nasha Niva’ was published only in 1905. The Belarusian language was 
considered to be a rather humble, rural one, which to a certain extent is still valid today. President 
Lukashenka tends to speak about the Belarusian language in a degrading way, stating  that today 
there are only two important languages,  English and Russian.
47
not a state-forming nation but – due to a lack of ethnic tensions – this does result 
in overt problems. 
The Poles (396.000) are the greatest national minority of the country. They are 
concentrated (294.000) in the Grodno region, bordering both Poland and Lithua-
nia, while in other regions (Minsk, Brest, Vitebsk) they live dispersed. The main 
political organisation of the Polish minority is the Alliance of Poles in Belarus 
(Zwiazek Polaków na Białorusi, ZPB), established in 1991, originally being a so-
cial-cultural organisation. The ZBP considers one of its main tasks to be the devel-
opment of Polish-speaking education, which had to be built from the ground up 
in 1991 (the last Polish school was closed down in 1948.) In addition to this, the 
ZBP promotes the protection of the mother tongue, respect for minority rights 
and tries to play the role of the mediator between Poland and Belarus.
The actions of the Belarusian authorities against the ZBP had a strong echo 
both in the Polish and international media in summer-autumn 1991. The issue6 
was pictured as an attack against the Polish minority itself. However, in reality, 
the steps made against the ZBP - the authorities managed to utilise the internal 
divisions (personal dislikes, problems with the accounting, etc.) of the organi-
sation - were fully in accord with the general efforts of the regime to crush the 
independent civil society. The issue of the Polish minority living in Belarus be-
came a priority topic of the dual elections (both parliamentary and presidential) 
in Poland in 2005.7
The Ukrainians (237.000) are the fourth largest ethnic group living in Bela-
rus. They are partly native people, who live in the regions neighbouring Ukraine 
(Brest), while other groups immigrated / were settled to Belarus in the Soviet 
era. Most native Jews (112.000 in 1989) left the country in the ’90s. Those who 
stayed (28.000), are largely of Russian mother tongue and culture (93%) and live 
in larger number only in Minsk (10.000). 
A relatively high number of people originating from the Caucasus also live in 
Belarus. They immigrated in the last years of the Soviet era, partly through mixed 
marriages, though most of them arrived after 1988, due to the political and eco-
nomic problems of the Caucasus (Azeri-Armenian war for Nagorno-Karabakh, 
Georgian-Abkhazian war, etc.) Most of the Caucasian minorities (Armenians: 
10.000, Azeris: 6000, Georgians 3000) live in the larger cities of Belarus. Simi-
6   The assembly – though in a not fully legal way – elected a leader, which was ready to cooperate 
with the regime. This led to the break-up of the organization.
7   Currently there are two ZBPs operating parallel and mutually not recognizing each other. One of 
them is recognized and supported by Poland, but it is not by the Belarusian authorities. The other 
one is vice versa. 
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larly to the Belarusian majority, a strong tendency towards russification is vis-
ible among the Caucasian minorities, regardless of their diverse ethnic, cultural, 
and religious backgrounds: in the family they typically8 speak not their mother 
tongue, but Russian. 
Ukraine
The law on national minorities passed in 1992 by the Supreme Soviet (council) 
stated that minority languages can be used equally to the state language in all 
those state and social institutions, where the given national minority is in ab-
solute majority compared to the whole population of the given settlement. The 
Ukrainian constitution, adopted in 1996, declared Ukrainian to be the state lan-
guage.  Nonetheless, it also granted the free use and development of both Russian 
and other, smaller minority languages. 9 
The first census since the independence was held on 5th December 2001. The 
results showed that, compared to 1989, the population had declined by almost 
3 million, from 51.542 thousand to 48.570 thousand. The significant changes in 
the ethnic composition of the country deserve special attention.
 
Nationality
1989 2001
Number 
[1000 people]
%
Number 
[1000 people]
%
Ukrainian 37419 72,7 37542 77,8
Russian 11533 22,1 8334 17,3
Belarusian 444 0,9 275 0,6
Moldovan 324 0,6 258 0,5
Crimean Tatar 47 0,1 248 0,5
Bulgarian 233 0,5 204 0,4
Hungarian 163 0,3 156 0,3
Romanian 134 0,3 151 0,3
Polish 219 0,4 144 0,3
8   I case of the Armenians, the rate is 75%, the Azeris: 72%, while for the Georgians it is 82%. 
9   The Russia-oriented parties, having their support in Eastern-Ukraine (primarily the Party of 
Regions led by Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich), keep demanding the recognition of Russian as a 
second official language. However, neither the core of the political elite, nor President Yushchenko 
are in favor of the idea, as it would mean serious difficulties for the Ukrainian language – in the 
Southern, South-Eastern regions even the limited, only official use of the current state language 
would be ceased.
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Nationality
1989 2001
Number 
[1000 people]
%
Number 
[1000 people]
%
Jewish 486 0,9 103 0,2
Armenian 54 0,1 99 0,2
Greek 98 0,2 91 0,2
Tatar 86 0,2 73 0,2
Gypsy 47 0,1 47 0,1
German 37 0,1 33 0,1
Others 303 0,6 692 1,4
Altogether 51452 100 48457 100
Ethnic composition of the population of Ukraine
The ethnic situation of Ukraine is complicated by the interrelated problem of 
the language-issue. Many independent studies showed that, currently, there 
are three large linguistic groups in Ukraine, each of approximately of the same 
size: people having either Russian or Ukrainian as their mother tongue and the 
Russian-Ukrainian bilingual group. Another analysis shows that the higher the 
educational background of a person and the larger the city a person lives in, the 
more probable it is that the given person uses Russian in everyday life. Due to 
decades of russification, in the Eastern and South-Eastern regions (Kharkhov, 
Lugansk, and Dniepropetrovsk), the Ukrainian language is present on a minimal 
scale only. It is dominant only in the Western regions (L’viv, Ivano-Frankivszk, 
Ternopil, Volyn), both in the big cities and the smaller settlements.
Moreover, according to a survey made in 1999, 77% of the population of Kyiv 
declared themselves to be of Ukrainian nationality and 62% of Ukrainian mother 
tongue – but it turned out that only 14% of them used Ukrainian in their families. 
However, in recent years, the position of the Ukrainian language became signifi-
cantly stronger. The process was fuelled by the ’orange revolution’ as well. In the 
long run, it is expected that a Russian-speaking Ukrainian culture will be born 
and it will co-exist with the Ukrainian-speaking culture.
Because since1989 no mass emigration – either of political or economic nature 
– took place from Ukraine to Russia, the reasons behind the modified rates have to 
be found somewhere else. Namely that due to the differences among Russians and 
Ukrainians in terms of language, culture, religion, and mentality, huge numbers 
of people who declared themselves to be Russians in the Soviet era, ten years later 
already considered themselves to be Ukrainians. The ones affected by the ‘identity 
change’ live mostly in the Southern and South-Eastern regions and despite be-
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ing of Ukrainian origins, they use Russian in everyday life.10 The re-Ukrainisation 
process is expected to become faster, particularly due to the spreading of Ukrain-
ian-speaking education and to the changing attitude of the younger generations 
towards the Soviet past. Consequently, the loyalty towards the Ukrainian state is 
expected to increase as well, which is will probably also become visible in the level 
of self-identification and in choosing a national identity.
Most of the Russians (8.334.000) live in the Eastern and South-Eastern re-
gions of Ukraine, in addition to Kyiv. Part of them immigrated during the Soviet 
era; others are descendants of the industrial workers who settled there in the 
19th century. However, some of those who declare themselves to be Russians 
are russified Ukrainians. The third largest ethnic group of Ukraine are the Bela-
rusians (275.000). Most of them became employed in Ukraine in 1960-1970 and 
reside mainly in urban areas, particularly in Doneck (44.000), Lugansk (22.000) 
and in the Crimea (29.000). Also, in the regions neighbouring their home coun-
try, they are native inhabitants and live in the rural areas (Rivne: 11.000, Zhyto-
myr: 4000)
The Moldovans (258.000) live in the Western part of the Odessa region and 
in the Eastern part of the Chernivtsi region. The Romanians (151.000) are sepa-
rately administered by the Ukrainian census system. Some of them (32.000) live 
in Trans-Carpathia, while the majority (115.000) resides in the Chernivtsi region, 
where they are native inhabitants. The centre of the Romanian minority is Cher-
nivtsi (Cernauti, Czernowitz) city.
The Bulgarians (204.000) live in the region bordered by the Dniester River, 
the Danube delta, and by the Black Sea. Their ancestors fled from the territories 
that belonged to the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century. Nowadays, they reside 
in rural areas. The Hungarians (156.000) live mostly in the far-Western region of 
Trans-Carpathia, particularly in the area being 15-20 kilometres away from the 
Ukrainian-Hungarian border. Due to the geographic location and to the historical 
background (before 1918 the region belonged to Hungary, then to Czechoslova-
kia and from 1944 to the Soviet Union), the local Hungarians maintain strong 
contacts with their motherland. The centre of the minority is Beregszász/Bere-
hove city.
The Poles (144.000) live in the Western regions (Hmel’nitsky: 23.000, Zhyto-
myr: 49.000, L’viv 19.000). Due to the population exchange following the Second 
World War, most Poles (particularly the urban population) left Ukraine, thus to-
10   Two examples from current politics: both Leonid Kuchma, former President of Ukraine and 
Yuliya Timoshenko, former Prime Minister started to learn and use Ukrainian only after they 
achieved a high political position.
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day the Polish minority instead lives in the rural areas. The Jewish population 
(103.000) resides almost entirely in the large cities (Kyiv, Dniepropetrovsk, and 
Odessa). Their number has been sharply decreased compared to the early ’90s, 
most of them (almost 300.000 people!) immigrated to Israel.
Of the other minorities, the Armenians (100.000) should be mentioned, who 
immigrated either in the Soviet era or after 1991. The Greeks (91.000) live mostly 
in the Doneck-basin and they arrived there in the 18th century from the Crimean 
peninsula. Most Tatars (73.000) immigrated from Russia, from the Kazany re-
gion and live in the big cities of the Doneck industrial region. The Gypsies live 
mostly in the Trans-Carpathian region; however, some experts estimate their of-
ficial number of 47.000 to be much higher in reality. Descendants (33.000) of the 
formerly influential Germans, who were settled in Ukraine in the 17-19th century, 
live dispersed in the whole country, while a larger group of them resides in Trans-
Carpathia.
The Problem of the Crimea
The Autonomous Republic of the Crimea is a special region of Ukraine, both from 
the perspective of politics and ethnicity. The ownership of the territory of Crimea 
has changed many times through its history. The Ancient Greek settlers were fol-
lowed by the Romans, the Huns, the Goths, the Bulgarians, and the Kazars. In the 
10-11th century the region belonged to Kievan Rus, then – followed by a short Byz-
antine occupation – became part of the territory of the Golden Horde. After the 
Golden Horde was crushed by Timur Lenk in 1441, the Crimean Tatars, gradually 
immigrating since the early Middle Ages and already forming the majority of the 
region at that time, established their own state, the Crimean Khanate. Though it 
was subjugated to the Ottoman Empire in the 15th century, Crimea always had a 
relatively wide autonomy. When the Kuchuk-Kaynardzha peace treaty was signed 
in 1774, Crimea became a zone of Russian influence and was finally annexed to 
the Russian Empire in 1783.
After the end of the Russian civil war, the Crimean Autonomous Soviet So-
cialist Republic was established, which was subordinated to the Russian Soviet 
Federative Socialist Republic (SFSR). The Stalinist terror in the ’30s affected not 
only the Crimean Tatars, but the Greek community as well, who were considered 
to be ’disloyal’, though they had lived in the Crimea since the times of Byzantium. 
In 1941, Crimea was invaded by the Third Reich. The Tatars joined the German 
forces in a relatively high number, thus a few independent auxiliary units were 
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organised of them. After the Red Army re-conquered Crimea in 1944, the entire 
Tatar population was deported to Central-Asia in three days (!), 18-21st May 1944, 
as vengeance for their ’collaboration with the Nazis.’ Though the survivors were 
rehabilitated in 1967, they were not officially allowed to return to their home-
land until the end of the Soviet era. In 1954, the Crimean oblast (region) became 
subordinated to the Ukrainian SFSR instead of the previous Russian control. Due 
to its moderate climate, Crimea was a popular holiday resort, which resulted in 
the intense immigration of Russians, mostly factory workers, pensioners and the 
service personnel of the Black Sea Fleet. Consequently, the rate of the Russian 
population compared to Ukrainians kept increasing. 
Following the independence of Ukraine, Crimea – after a short-lived option 
of independence – received wide autonomy inside the country. The Autonomous 
Republic of the Crimea is a parliamentary republic; the president is elected by the 
parliament of 100 MPs, with the consent of the President of Ukraine. The elected 
representative body of the Crimean Tatars, the so-called Mejlis, which has the 
right to address either the Crimean or the Ukrainian parliament, exists parallel 
to this.
From the perspective of minority policy, the real curiosity of Crimea is that 
the rates of the three main ethnic groups are in a continuous, dynamic change. 
Moreover, the gap between ethnicity and mother tongue is quite wide. According 
to the Ukrainian census conducted in 2001, the ethnic composition of the Crimea 
is the following:
Ethnic group Number [1000 people]
Rate to the entire population  
of the Crimea [%]
Russian 1.185,6 58,32
Ukrainian 494,4 24,32
Crimean Tatar 245,9 12,10
Belarusian 29,2 1,44
Tatar 11,0 0,54
Armenian 8,7 0,43
Others 57,9 2,85
Altogether 2.033 100
Ethnic composition of the Autonomous Republic of the Crimea 
In addition to these large ethnic groups, there are also Black Sea Germans, Gyp-
sies, Bulgarians, Poles, Azeris, Koreans, and Greeks living in small numbers in 
Crimea.
Though the territorial status of Crimea was settled by relevant international 
and domestic treaties, from time to time (especially in the most recent 2-3 years) 
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the voices demanding that Crimea join Russia have become stronger. The main 
problem is that the Russians and Russian-speaking population achieved a domi-
nant numerical majority in the region. According to the mentioned census, 77% 
of the population declared Russian to be their mother tongue, 11,4% mentioned 
the Crimean Tatar language and only 10,1% Ukrainian. The seriousness of the 
situation is well illustrated by the fact that though in Ukraine the Ukrainian lan-
guage is the only official one, in Crimea the language of administration is Russian 
and the state language is used only in a few Ukrainian schools.
Military presence is an important element of the Russian dominance. Accord-
ing to the 1997 “Treaty on Friendship” between Russia and Ukraine, the Russian 
Black Sea Fleet was granted the use of the Crimean naval bases for 20 years, until 
2017. In addition to this, thousands of sailors and officers are discharged from 
the fleet every year and most of them prefer to reside in Crimea, thus increasing 
the number of the Russian population with militarily trained people. The prop-
erty-acquisition actions of the different Russian companies and individuals are 
also significant. As a result of all these, the Crimean parliament is dominated by 
Russia-oriented parties.
The Crimean Tatars are another source of instability. Since the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union, they keep migrating back to their former places of residence. 
However, the fate of the lands confiscated from them in times of the deportation 
is not settled. There was no compensation, and most of their former properties 
are already owned by individuals. One of the most important political objectives 
of the Crimean Tatar political forces is to regain their former lands – besides the 
respect of traditions; the flourishing tourism business is also among the motiva-
tions. Moreover, according to expert opinions, the real numbers of the Crimean 
Tatars exceed the official data at least one and a half times. The ’surplus’ popula-
tion lives illegally in Ukraine, but the tribal system of the Tatar society – utilis-
ing the weaknesses of the local state administration – manages to conceal their 
presence. 
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Moldova
During its entire history, Moldova (formerly Bessarabia) has always been a terri-
tory of mixed population, both by ethnicity and language, though with a constant 
majority of Romanian (-Moldovan) people. Besides large numbers of Russians 
and Ukrainians, there have been Gagauz people of Turkish origins, Bulgarians, 
Jews speaking Russian and Yiddish and many, ethnically-linguistically mixed 
Gypsy groups living in Moldova as well. 
During the last years of the Soviet Union, the question of citizenship was not 
problematic in Moldova at all. According to the relevant law adopted in 1990, 
citizenship was granted to everyone who requested it, and had a permanent place 
of residence in the republic. Dual citizenship was also allowed on the basis of 
bilateral agreements. More important was the issue of the state language. The 
Moldovan Parliament declared Romanian to be the second official language of 
Moldova (besides Russian) in 31st August 1989. This resulted in protests by the 
non-Moldovan population, who were afraid that this was the first step on the 
road leading to Moldova’s accession to Romania. 
Currently the most important element of the political-social situation of 
Moldova is the existence of the separatist region of the ‘Dniestr Moldovan Repub-
lic’, better known as ‘Transnistria.’11 The region, located on the Eastern banks of 
River Dniestr, broke away from Moldova during the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
with the strong political and military support of Russia. The situation was not 
changed by the three months of the Moldovan civil war in 1992. Following the 
intervention of the Russian (former Soviet) 14th Army led by General Lebed, the 
conflict was ended with the signing of a Russian-dominated ceasefire agreement. 
The document legitimised the de facto separation of Transnistria – even though 
not a single state has recognised the ‘independence’ of the separatist ‘republic’ 
(which is, in reality, a highly centralised, presidential dictatorship.)
Ethnic elements have only a very limited role to play in the Transnistria con-
flict. During the separation process, the fear of the possible consequences of 
Moldova joining Romania was quite strong among the local population (com-
posed of approximately 40% sovietised ethnic Moldovans, 28% Russian-speaking 
11   The various sources use both the names Transnistria and Transdniester. The difference comes 
from the name of the river: in Russian it is called Dniester while in Romanian and in Moldovan 
it is Nistru, without the initial “d.” The authors of this study prefer the Transnistria version, as 
it is closer to the official Moldovan name of the separatist region. In addition to this, the PMR 
abbreviation can be used as well, which comes from the official Russian name of the ‘republic’: 
pridniestrovskaya Moldavskaya respublika. 
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Ukrainians and 25% Russians, in addition to some smaller groups). However, the 
conflict itself is basically a political  and, to a smaller extent, an economic  one. 
Transnistria as a ‘state’ can function only with the constant support of Moscow 
(military presence, energy delivered for free, etc.). The separatist ‘republic’ is Rus-
sia’s political tool for maintaining its influence in the region.
Currently, Moldova has 4,45 million inhabitants. Since the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union, significant changes have occurred to the ethnic composition of the 
population.
 
Nationality
1989 2004
Number 
[1000 people]
%
Number 
[1000 people]
%
Moldovan-Romanian 2796 64,5 3488 78,2
Ukrainian 598 13,8 374 8,4
Russian 563 13.0 258 5,8
Gagauz 151 3,5 196 4,4
Other 164 3,8 142 3,2
Altogether 4335 100 4455 100
Ethnic composition of the population of Moldova
The 1989 data in the chart were taken from the Soviet census; however, the 2004 
data are not from the Moldovan census held that time, but from the summarised 
estimations of the CIA World Factbook. The reason behind this is that Transnis-
tria did not join the Moldovan census in 2004, thus using only the information 
provided by the Moldovan statistical office would be misleading. 
The separatist ’republic’ conducted its own census a month later, in November 
2004. According to the results, the population of Transnistria was approximately 
555.000 thousand, which showed a significant decline compared to the 679.000 
people of 1989. The following ethnic composition was measured: Moldovans 
31,9%, Russians 30,3%, Ukrainians 28,9%, while the remaining 8,9% was com-
posed of Bulgarians, Turks, Jews, etc. One has to add that despite its diverse 
ethnic composition, the population of Transnistria is almost entirely Russian-
speaking. Though the constitution of the separatist ’state’ declares three state 
languages (Russian, Ukrainian, Moldovan), the few Moldovan-speaking schools 
are under constant political pressure, while most Ukrainians in the region are 
Russian-speakers.
There are two main reasons behind the changes in the ethnic composition of 
the Moldovan population, and especially behind the sharp decline of the Rus-
sian and Ukrainian population. First, in the early ’90s, a significant amount of 
them migrated back to Russian and to Ukraine (the effect of this is visible in the 
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Transnistrian data as well.) This was particularly true in the post-civil war period, 
when deportations were also conducted. Second, as it was mentioned in the in-
troduction, since the end of the Soviet era, being in favour of a Russian identity 
ceased to be ’fashionable’ and declaring a Moldovan or Romanian identity became 
more popular. To this one has to add that during the 2004 census, a large number 
of people could not make a distinction between the issues of mother tongue and 
nationality, even members of a same family often gave different answers. That 
is why, in the final results, the Moldovan and Romanian identities could not be 
separated. 
The Gagauz Autonomy
In Moldova the Gagauz people – being of Turkish origin, but Catholics by religion 
– who are approximately 5% of the overall population, form a special autonomous 
community. The cultural movement of the Gagauz people started in the ’80s. By 
the end of the decade, they started to demand autonomy inside the Moldovan 
Soviet Socialist Republic, which was still a republic of the Soviet Union. The 1989 
decision on adopting Moldovan to be the second state language was of crucial 
importance for the Gagauz – using Russian in everyday life, they started to feel 
seriously threatened by a future Moldovan-Romanian unification. 
Therefore, in March 1991 most of the Gagauz voted for preserving the Soviet 
Union. Taking the opportunity of the Moscow coup de état, they declared their 
independence on 19th August 1991, and were shortly followed by Transnistria 
in September. However, the independence of Gagauzia was rather a political dec-
laration, not a de facto break away – the political elite knew very well that an in-
dependent Gagauz state would not have been sustainable at all. Chisinau did not 
recognise any of the separatist steps, but being bogged down by the intensifying 
Transnistrian conflict, more or less admitted that the Gagauz claims were justi-
fied. Thus, the former blatantly pro-Romanian rhetoric of Chisinau became rather 
moderate and more attention started to be paid to minority rights.
The situation of the Gagauz people was finally settled by the law adopted on 
23rd December 1994 by the Moldovan parliament. A Gagauz Autonomous Ter-
ritorial Unit was established with Komrat at its centre. Its autonomy is built up 
on a special territorial system: in each and every settlement where the rate of 
Gagauz people exceeded 40%, a referendum was organised on belonging to the 
newly formed Autonomous Territorial Unit. In all, 32 towns and villages joined 
the autonomy, thus it is composed of two separate parts. 
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The Gagauz people have their own parliament, composed of one chamber, 
which has legislative authority over the territory of the autonomous unit. The 
Gagauz parliament can adopt laws (though not in contradiction to Moldovan leg-
islation!) in the field of education, cultural, local development, social security, fi-
nance and taxation, in addition to the administration of the autonomy itself. The 
Gagauz parliament can participate in forming Moldovan domestic and foreign 
policy and has the right to turn to the Moldovan constitutional court. The head 
of executive power is the directly elected governor, the bashkan, who in person 
is always a member of the Moldova government. Within the territory of the au-
tonomous region, the Gagauz people have their own police, separate elementary 
and high schools, and a pedagogical college and a state university in Komrat. In 
addition to these, with the support of Turkey, a Turkish cultural centre and a 
Turkish library were built as well.
The system of the Gagauz autonomy settled the problem of a minority with 
efficiency earlier unprecedented in Eastern-Europe. Probably the key element 
of the success was that the Gagauz people had rationally moderate claims with 
very good timing. Therefore, for the Moldovan government it was much easier to 
accept the Gagauz requests than becoming involved in another conflict besides 
Transnistria. Currently, the situation of the Gagauz minority is considered to be 
stable. The system of the autonomy functions well and there is no sign that Tur-
key would like to use the Gagauz people for pursuing its own regional political 
objectives.
Summary
The similar demographic trends of the post-Soviet region are illustrated by the 
national censuses conducted 10-12 years after regaining independence. The pop-
ulation is decreasing in all examined countries, though at various speeds. At the 
same time the number of those who declare themselves to belong to minorities 
is also decreasing – with the sole exception of the Crimean Tatars migrating back 
to their homeland. The tendency can be explained by emigration (from the Baltic 
States), assimilation (Lithuania and Belarus) and the gradual change of identi-
ties connected to the regained statehood (Ukraine). It is important to note that, 
in all countries, the rights of the non-majority communities are guaranteed by 
law (constitution, laws on minority, bilateral international treaties.) However, in 
some cases the political practise is not fully in line with the spirit of the laws 
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(Estonia, Latvia), in other cases the whole implementation process is halted (Be-
larus) or the full extension of the minority rights, including the issue of language 
usage and autonomy, might result in a break-up of the country (Ukraine). In those 
territories which are under the control of the Moldovan state, the minority rights 
are pretty well respected, but in the separatist ’republic’ of Transnistria they are 
in a quite weak position. 
Russia plays an active role in the protection of the Russian-speaking commu-
nities, both in the bilateral relations and in the various international organisa-
tions as well. Nonetheless, in many cases Moscow uses the minority issue as a 
cover for exercising political pressure, particularly in Estonia and Latvia. In the 
early ’90s, the situation of the Polish community in Lithuania prioritised Polish-
Lithuanian bilateral relations. Nowadays, the minority issue is still important, 
but is far from having a dominant role in the foreign policy of Warsaw towards its 
North-Eastern neighbour.
National Projects
The young Baltic States are eager to restore the national characters of their coun-
tries - though with different means and levels of determinedness – even if this 
process may harm the minorities living here. However, in the ’90s, pursuing EU 
and NATO membership, neither Tallinn, Riga, or Vilnius could ignore the warn-
ings coming both from international organisations (EU, OSCE, Council of Europe) 
and from their neighbours (Russia, Poland). Thus they had to settle the minor-
ity question according to the European norms and standards. Considering their 
number and role in the country’s entire life, the Russians living in Latvia could 
demand even a dualist transformation of the state, following the example of Bel-
gium, but the Latvian political elite is absolutely opposed to the idea. According 
to expert opinions, both the Latvian and Estonian minority policies in practise 
aim at the assimilation of the minorities instead of preserving their identity. The 
minorities living in Lithuania are much more integrated to the society (knowing 
the language, being loyal to the state, etc.); however, despite of the existence of 
the relevant legislation, the outcome still might be assimilation of the minority 
communities.
In Belarus, there is no visible national project; consequently the situation of 
the minorities is unique. Paradoxically the people using the Belarusian language 
and having a strong national identity are de facto in a minority situation in their 
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own country. Moreover, even those ones who consider themselves to be non-Rus-
sians tend to declare Russian to be their mother tongue. So do the Belarusians 
– having a majority in the statistics - and members of some other minorities as 
well (Poles, Ukrainians, and Jews). In addition to this, the restrictive policies of 
the regime, together with the gradually worsening economic situation, seriously 
hamper the life of not only the national minorities, but of the entire population 
of Belarus. 
In Ukraine, the largest among the studied countries, the political elite did not 
manage to elaborate either a theory or a practise answering the question of ’na-
tion state vs. State of national communities.’ Due to the different historical tradi-
tions and the strong regionalist character of Ukraine, such a choice was made that 
no choice was made at all. There is no national minority in Ukraine which could 
have a real influence on the country’s political life – as the Russians should not be 
considered to be minorities, but rather to be a second state-forming nation. The 
minority question is an issue only in bilateral relations with the given kin-states 
(Poland, Hungary, and Romania.)
Due to the truly mixed ethnic and linguistic composition of the population 
of Moldova, defining the ’national’ objectives is per definitionem complicated. 
Only the Gagauz minority has clear-cut, well-defined national goals, which they 
already achieved in the mid-’90s. In the 16 years of Moldovan independence, 
there has been no clear conflict between the power structures and the minorities 
suppressed by them. The political leadership, bogged down by the Transnistrian 
conflict, always keeps balancing between the three great regional powers, Russia, 
Ukraine and Romania. With such a situation, a strong anti-minority policy would 
not be compatible at all. Nonetheless, even the Russian-speaking minority has 
no chance to take over the country and turn it towards a more favourable, pro-
Russian direction – the presence of the influence of the ’big brother’ Romania is 
enough to prevent such a scenario.
In the long run, it is highly probable that the rate of the Russian-speaking 
population will keep decreasing and, in parallel the Romanian cultural and politi-
cal influence will become stronger. This is partially why Moscow pushes Chisinau 
to guarantee the rights of the Russian minority by law (including the right to lan-
guage use and having their own education) and makes this issue to be a primary 
pre-condition of the settlement of the Transnistria conflict. The question of the 
separatist ’republic’ has no real ethnic or minority-related component. The main 
problem will be that in a case of re-unification, the still Soviet-minded, mostly 
Russian speaking population will have to integrate to Moldovan society. Thus, the 
core question will not be related to the different ethnicity or mother tongue, but 
to the different mentality. 
60
Bibliography
Barbarosie, Arcadiu Dr. – Nantoi, Oazu (eds.): Aspects of the Transnistrian Conflict. Institutul de 
Politici Publice. Chişinău. 2004.
Daftary, Farimah – Grin, Francios (eds.): National-Building, Ethnicity and Language in Transition 
Countries. Budapest 2003.
East Week. A Center for Eastern Studies által publikált, heti rendszerességű hírlevél a poszt-szovjet 
térség politikai helyzetéről, eseményeiről. Elérhető az http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/epub/eko-
ment/ew_arc_2007.htm címen. 
Eberhardt, Piotr: Ethnic groups and population changes in twentieth-century Central-Eastern Europe: 
history, data, and analysis. Armonk, N.Y. 2003.
Eberhardt, Piotr: Przemiany narodowosciowe na Ukrainie, 1989–2001. Przeglad Wschodni 2003, 
vol. 3. (31.), pp. 741-758.
Eberhardt, Piotr: Struktura narodowosciowa ludnosci Republiki Białoruskiej w 1999 roku. Obóz 2001, 
vol. 38., pp. 7-20.
Eurasia Daily Monitor. A Jamestown Foundation által publikált, napi rendszerességű hírlevél a 
poszt-szovjet térség politikai helyzetéről, eseményeiről. Elérhető a http://www.jamestown.org/
edm/ címen. 
Hyndle, Joanna – Kutysz, Miryna: Russian-Speakers in Latvia and Estonia. Warsaw 2004.
Kabrzynska, Iwona: ‘Some Remarks on the Process of Formation of Cultural and National Identity 
of Poles from Belarus in the 20th Century.’ In: Ethnologia Polona 1999, vol. 20., 55-70.
King, Charles (2000): The Moldovans. Romania, Russia and the Politics of Culture. Hoover Institu-
tion Press. Stanford, California. 2000.
Kranz, Jerzy (ed.): Law and Practice of Central European Countries in the Field on National Mi-
norities Protection after 1989. Warsaw 1998.
Maciejewski, Witold (ed.): The Baltic Sea Region. Cultures, Politics, Societies. Uppsala 2002.
Marples, David: Belarus: a Denationalized Nation. Amsterdam, 1999, Harwood Academic. 127 p.
Olszanski, Tadeusz A.: Trud niepodległosci. Ukraina na przełomie tysiacleci. Kraków 2003.
Pabriks, Artis: Occupational Represantations and Ethnic Discrimination in Latvia. Riga 2002. (www.
politics.lv)
Wilson, Andrew: Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990’s. A Minority Faith. Cambridge 1997.
61
Minorities in transition in  
southeastern europe
Discussion Paper of the Skopje Workshop
27 April, 2007, Skopje
Prepared by Katerina Velichkova and Magdalena Kouneva, Regional Experts
Introduction
During the past two decades some of us witnessed and some took part in the 
awakening of national and regional claims, in a religious and ethnic renaissance, 
and in the sharpening of old questions and the birth of new questions of identity 
in the Southeast European countries. The need for establishing continuity be-
tween the past, the present, and the future has intensified, as has the concern for 
procuring roots and memory1. The calls for the preservation of national, religious, 
and cultural identities inevitably led to new forms of national and intercommu-
nity conflicts, and ethnic and religious tensions which question the meaning of 
European development. The painful years of transition that followed were no less 
a test for the Southeast European peoples than were the conflicts themselves. 
It is a well-known fact that problems which have been worsening for decades 
are especially difficult to overcome. At the same time, the last years of transition 
and transformation of the Southeast European countries showed that only effec-
tive and expert governance aimed at solving concrete problems, as well as a clear 
vision of the future and a development agenda common for all social groups could 
be the solution to the old problems. 
What is the role of minorities in the transition processes of the Southeast 
European countries? Has this role been imposed by the majorities or earned by 
the minorities? How much has minorities’ status changed? Are the rights and 
interests of the representatives of minorities really protected as a result of the 
changes? These are the questions which will be addressed in our analysis below. 
1    Lipowetski, Gilles,  Sebastien, Charles, „Hypermodern Times”, Paperback, April 1,2005, 42.
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You Cannot Escape Responsibility for Tomorrow
Eric Weil deliberately looks for the manifestations of nationalism only in societies 
where “modern efforts have still not led to any results and where the standard of 
living is low, where at the same time the differences between the different com-
munity groups are large.” Another reason for the manifestation of nationalism, in 
his view, is the underdevelopment of civil society2. In other words, nationalism is 
the expression of social tensions regardless of whether we study the nationalism 
of the minority or the nationalism of the majority. The first threatens the foun-
dations of the national state and the unity of the nation. The second emphasises 
the ethnic and not the civil characteristics of the nation. In this way both types 
of nationalism hinder the natural development of the processes of transition to a 
multiethnic, democratic society. 
Since, as Weil puts it, the manifestations of nationalism constitute the main 
problem wherever they are a problem, this phenomenon should also be the object 
of express policies of the government and the state. To this end, strategies should 
be created and a systematic effort should be made for building a common positive 
environment on the basis of a broad public debate.
Minority Governance
Minority governance and minority participation in the governance processes in 
the Southeast European countries have always been a challenge for the political 
class. 
The ruling circles of the Southeast European countries, yielding to external 
pressure from international organisations and in the context of the Euro-Atlantic 
accession processes already underway, declared most of the existing international 
standards in the field of minority rights as the principles underlying their poli-
cies. At the same time, however, the application of such standards is a projection 
neither of the values of the general public nor of the conscious political will, but 
is instead a listless performance of commitments made without internal convic-
2   Weil, Eric, Philosophie politique, Librairie philosophique, Paris, 1996, 204.
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tion of their value and necessity. As a result, minority policy in the region is often 
formal, random, and ineffective. 
It is further evident that the institutional framework on minority issues in 
the Southeast European countries is more sophisticated than the actual views of 
a great part of the population. Viewed in the context of mass political culture and 
the developmental level of civil society, the existing policies concerning minori-
ties are even deemed to be unnecessary and servicing political goals external to 
the public interest. Thus, measures which address problems of minorities tend to 
be unpopular. 
All countries in Southeast Europe have ratified the Council of Europe’s Frame-
work Convention on the Protection of National Minorities (hereinafter: ‘Frame-
work Convention’). The Convention is widely applied in the European Union 
member states. The European Union has also included “respect for and protection 
of minorities” in the Copenhagen criteria for membership in the Union. 
The Framework Convention considers minority rights as individual rights 
which, however, may often be enjoyed in community with others (e.g., partici-
pation, language, etc.). The preamble of the Convention shows clearly that the 
protection of national minorities is essential to stability, democratic security and 
peace: that a pluralist and genuinely democratic society is inextricably linked to 
the respect of the identity of persons belonging to national minorities, and that 
the creation of a climate of tolerance and dialogue enables cultural diversity to 
be a source of enrichment of each society. In anticipation of the argument that 
standards are so high that they will never be reached the concept of the grad-
ual and progressive realisation of rights is well accepted, and a key element is 
non-regression. The Council of Europe’s Advisory Committee on the Framework 
Convention (hereinafter: the ‘Advisory Committee’) is sensitive to this and com-
mends any gradual progress it identifies by State parties to the Convention.
A key aspect of the modern understanding of minority rights is the principle 
of participation of persons belonging to minorities in decision-making on the is-
sues directly affecting them. Consequently, the Framework Convention stipulates 
in Article 15 that: 
The Parties shall create the conditions necessary for the effective participation of 
persons belonging to national minorities in cultural, social and economic life and in pub-
lic affairs, in particular those affecting them.
Its official explanatory report notes that: 
80. This article requires Parties to create the conditions necessary for the effective 
participation of persons belonging to national minorities in cultural, social and eco-
nomic life and in public affairs, in particular those affecting them. It aims above all to 
encourage real equality between persons belonging to national minorities and those 
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forming part of the majority. In order to create the necessary conditions for such par-
ticipation by persons belonging to national minorities, Parties could promote – in the 
framework of their constitutional systems – inter alia the following measures:
consultation with these persons, by means of appropriate procedures and, in par-•	
ticular, through their representative institutions, when Parties are contemplating 
legislation or administrative measures likely to affect them directly;
involving these persons in the preparation, implementation and assessment of na-•	
tional and regional development plans and programmes likely to affect them direct-
ly;
undertaking studies, in conjunction with these persons, to assess the possible impact •	
on them of projected development activities;
effective participation of persons belonging to national minorities in the decision-•	
making processes and elected bodies both at national and local levels;
decentralised or local forms of government.•	
Article 4 of the Convention provides that:
The Parties undertake to guarantee to persons belonging to national minori-1. 
ties the right of equality before the law and of equal protection of the law. 
In this respect, any discrimination based on belonging to a national minority 
shall be prohibited. 
The Parties undertake to adopt, where necessary, adequate measures in order 2. 
to promote, in all areas of economic, social, political and cultural life, full and 
effective equality between persons belonging to a national minority and those 
belonging to the majority. In this respect, they shall take due account of the 
specific conditions of the persons belonging to national minorities. 
The measures adopted in accordance with paragraph 2 shall not be considered to be 
an act of discrimination.
Hence, the States which are parties to the Convention regard effective partici-
pation of persons belonging to national minorities, in concert with the principle 
of non-discrimination, protection and advancement of minority identity, and 
the requirement to promote full and effective equality in all areas of economic, 
social, political and cultural life, as an essential (and mandatory) component of 
a peaceful and democratic society. This is why we consider that the Framework 
Convention defines patterns of appropriate State action concerning the protec-
tion of minority rights. However, the framework nature of the Convention means 
that the implementation of these legal standards requires the adoption of national 
legislation and appropriate governmental policies at the domestic level in the Southeast 
European countries. In this study we therefore focus our attention more on the 
quality aspects of the participation of minorities in the transition processes than 
on a discussion of the standards for human and minority rights. We take as giv-
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en the statutory standards on the rights of minorities in compliance with the 
Framework Convention, emphasising issues relating to the application of these 
standards. 
Definition of ‘Minority’
There have been many attempts by international organisations to agree on a defi-
nition of ‘minority’ and ‘national minority’. While there is broad agreement on 
various essential components of such a definition – e.g., that the group has sepa-
rate characteristics and is non-dominant - it has been difficult thus far to reach an 
agreement between states. The Framework Convention does not provide a defini-
tion for the term “national minority”. 3
The prevailing legal doctrine, which dates back to the time of the League of 
Nations, establishes that the existence of a minority is a question of fact, and not 
a question of law. This view is maintained in the General Comment on Article 27 
of the ICCPR4 of the Human Rights Committee.5 This principle is also upheld in 
the case of the Framework Convention. The Advisory Committee has stressed in 
its Advisory Opinions that, in the absence of a definition in the Framework Con-
vention itself, the parties must examine the personal scope of application to be 
given to the Framework Convention within their country. The Advisory Commit-
tee has also noted that, although parties have a “margin of appreciation”, some 
flexibility in this respect, in order to take the specific circumstances prevailing in 
their country into account, it has noted that this must be exercised in accordance 
with general principles of international law and the fundamental principles set 
out in Article 3 of the Convention. No arbitrary or unjustified distinctions can 
result from this decision: Article 3 of the Framework Convention guarantees per-
sons belonging to national minorities the right to choose freely whether or not 
to be treated as such. Freedom to identify, or not to identify, with the name used 
to designate a minority is one essential aspect of this right. It is of crucial im-
3   Consequently, in this report the term ‘minorities’ is often used as a short hand for persons 
belonging to national, ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities. 
4   International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, entry into force 23 March 1976.
5   According to paragraph 5.2 of the General Comment:
“The existence of an ethnic, religious or linguistic minority in a given state party does not depend 
upon a decision by that state party but requires to be established by objective criteria”. 
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portance to ensure that this choice is indeed free, not made under government’s 
pressure, and that indeed no disadvantage results from this choice.6  
Naturally, the personal choice of the individual is bound with objective crite-
ria, relevant to the identity of the person. Such objective criteria could be cultural 
and behavioural models, language, religion etc. The professional opinion of psy-
chologists, cultural anthropologists, pedagogues, and social workers contribute 
to the criteria.7
One question is whether there should be a list of minorities entitled to protec-
tion under the Framework Convention. One of the main problems posed by com-
posing such a list is the need to periodically reconsider its content. Alternatively, 
the lack of definition may mean focusing government attention on select, state-
recognised minority populations, rather than all those entitled to protection. In 
the case of Albania for example, the Advisory Committee noted that despite the 
historic presence of Egyptians in Albania, they appeared to have been a priori ex-
cluded from the protection of the Framework Convention8. 
Implementation of Minority Standards in Southeast European 
Countries
The language of the Framework Convention gives Southeast European countries 
which are parties to the Convention a major responsibility in its implementation. 
The Convention and the Explanatory Report make it very clear that State Parties 
must initiate not only legislation but also policies and programmes in many min-
istries and other public agencies to implement their commitments. Legislation 
and policies need to be transformed into actions to ensure that the legal provi-
sions and the programmes are implemented. This demands planning, good com-
munication and coordination, pilot schemes, implementation mechanisms with 
budget allocations, and resources located both centrally and locally. Successful im-
6   Of course self-identification, as upheld by international bodies including the Advisory 
Committee, is not an absolute right. It does, however, have strong implications for the observance 
of other undeniable human rights principles such as nondiscrimination, freedom of religious af-
filiation, and freedom of association, and must always be considered in connection with such other 
incontrovertible principles of human rights.
7   See Explanatory report CoE 1995: 5.
8   Opinion on Albania, Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention, 12 September 2002, 
ACFC/INF/OP/I(2003)004.
67
plementation will involve senior government officials, local government officers, 
capable managers, good agencies, and experienced and committed staff. All sorts 
of intermediaries need to be engaged including the media, employers, organisa-
tions, and professionals, including teachers. A variety of methods must be used to 
engage individuals, families, and communities; whether people are living in rural 
or urban areas, young, old, men, women, across employment areas, majorities, 
as well as to minorities. Civil society has a key participative role in ensuring that 
such standards are agreed upon, but also to help in the challenge of implementa-
tion. If minority governance policies are to be effectively implemented, they must 
be owned and valued by society at large. We will return to that topic later.
The realisation of minority rights requires the translation of international 
standards, constitutional provisions, and other relevant domestic legislation into 
working practises for every community and every individual. At the same time, 
the rights in question are complex, including civil, political, economic, social, and 
cultural rights. Further, they combine the individual and the collective. As a re-
sult, they are often placed in an environment of dispute. 
Minority rights often do not find support in the mass consciousness, and the 
social and psychological perceptions of the majority. A typical example in this 
regard is the lack of trust among ethnic groups and hostility related to the return 
of refugees and displaced persons on the territories of the former Republic of Yu-
goslavia. Fostering of mutual understanding and intercultural dialogue remains 
vital to the future of social cohesion in these countries, which has been adversely 
affected by armed conflicts. For example, in Croatia, many problems exist with 
the protection, in particular, of the Serbian and Roma minorities in the field of 
employment9. These problems are prevalent in the framework of the return proc-
ess, but they are also severe in other fields. The situation is similar in BIH10 and 
Serbia11 where inter-ethnic relations are still seriously affected by the legacy of 
the recent conflict. Manifestations of inter-ethnic tension are still reported and 
the efforts to build tolerance and trust need to be expanded further. Inter-ethnic 
tensions are also observed in Macedonia12, particularly in the younger population 
9   Opinion on Croatia, Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention, 6 April 2001, ACFC/
INF/OP/I(2002)003.
10   Opinion on Bosnia and Herzegovina, Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention, 27 
May 2004, ACFC/INF/OP/I(2005)003.
11   Opinion on Serbia and Montenegro, Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention, 
Strasbourg, 27 November 2003, ACFC/INF/OP/I(2004)002.
12   Opinion on “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, Advisory Committee on the 
Framework Convention, 27 May 2004, ACFC/INF/OP/I(2005)001.
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groups. These illuminate the existence of significant barriers between the differ-
ent communities, and particularly between Albanians and Macedonians.
Implementation of minority standards is a particularly challenging task in Ko-
sovo13 where hostility between Albanians and Serbs is still very tangible - a situ-
ation which also harms the protection of other communities in Kosovo (particu-
larly Roma). The implementation of practically all principles of the Framework 
Convention is made extremely difficult by the fact that inter-ethnic violence has 
seriously eroded trust between communities. Uncertainty as to the future status 
of Kosovo further complicates the picture. 
The protection of minority rights in Bulgaria is primarily in the field of indi-
vidual rather than collective or group rights. Minority languages are freely used 
in private life, but there is no legislation on the official use of minority languages 
in local public administration. Unlike Bulgaria, Romania has developed a special 
compensatory mechanism for smaller national minorities that represent too 
small a portion of the country’s electorate to win seats in parliament through the 
ordinary electoral process. However, sometimes high thresholds for establishing 
a political party and for minority participation at local elections with organisa-
tions other than those represented in parliament could have a negative impact 
on Romanian minorities’ ability to participate in political life. Representation of 
ethnic Hungarian and, respectively, Turkish populations in Romania and Bulgaria 
in institutions of public administration has been quite successful, especially at 
the local level. However, in both Bulgaria and Romania, Roma participation has 
been far from full and effective. All minorities seem to remain under-represented 
in sectors such as the police, the army, and the judiciary. 
The EU has required a more coherent state policy towards the minorities and 
has financed specific measures aimed at improving the access of especially the 
Roma to various public services and employment.  However, the lack of adequate 
Roma presence in the political life in the Southeast European countries has led 
to Roma problems not being sufficiently reflected. The overall implementation of 
specific measures and activities remains low. 
Perhaps the factor which is most indicative of the current level of awareness 
and commitment of policy-makers in the Southeast European countries is the ex-
tent of funding made available from the state budget for minority programming. 
Insufficient budgets are constraints limiting all policies, not only those that tar-
get minority issues. Nevertheless, funding issues have particular implications for 
minority programming, where long-term commitment is needed to implement 
13   Opinion on Kosovo, Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention, Strasbourg, 
Strasbourg, 02 March 2006, ACFC/OP/I(2005)004.
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dramatic changes. However, too often, minority strategies and programmes are 
adopted without ensuring that the necessary financial resources exist. Very often 
most of the available funding is from donors. The governments themselves have 
provided limited funding, with little long-term scope. 
In addition to increasing the level and efficacy of funding from the state budg-
et, it is necessary to provide inter-related funding of public information and edu-
cation projects. It is critical to involve the media to ensure that minority govern-
ance is seen as a positive contribution to Southeast European countries’ societies 
as a whole. It is important to engage both minority groups and the governments 
in order to nurture a shared understanding of what is needed. A shared under-
standing of concepts relating to needs assessment, programming, and monitor-
ing and evaluation, is required for long-term success of strategies targeting mi-
nority issues in the countries of Southeast Europe.  
Civil Society (State of Mind)
In the last decade, during the Euro-Atlantic accession processes, the Southeast 
European countries have made considerable progress toward liberal democracy. 
The formal procedures for democratic processes have been established, but func-
tioning public institutions are still lacking because the development of civil soci-
ety and public opinion are lagging behind the political institutions. Democracy 
not only requires formal procedures for managing civil and political rights, but 
also presupposes the existence of an effective court system which guarantees that 
these procedures will be applied, as well as a civil society composed of engaged 
and competent citizens. 
Today we see some concepts diverging more and more from their original 
meaning in terms of significance and substance. Today we speak of the nation 
as the citizens of a country united by a common political act, regardless of their 
differences in terms of language, tradition, culture. Over time the state has been 
entrusted with different functions – to express the will of the majority, to secure 
equality of all before the law, and to ensure access to public services. 
The modern state should first of all establish a functioning set of institutions 
which will create confidence that every single citizen will be able to exercise his/
her civil, political, economic and cultural rights, benefit from the public wealth 
and participate in the management of public processes through the political rep-
resentatives he/she has elected. It is not possible to achieve true democratic gov-
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ernment without the adequate and effective participation of minorities in the 
cultural, social, political, and public life. A view of the state as an instrument for 
democratic government is a prerequisite both for balancing the interests of the 
different ethnic, linguistic, and religious communities and for the fair representa-
tion of these interests in public decisions and actions. Deviation from this objec-
tive can undermine the legitimacy of the basic structure of any state.
When the characteristics of a nation such as a community of history, way of 
life, religion, and customs are mentioned more often than those of a community 
of political ideas and visions of the future within a state, there is a risk that cer-
tain groups will be effectively excluded from this nation because they do not share 
the religion, customs, and values of the traditional culture of the majority. 
At the same time, minority communities should not expect their “inclusion” to 
come mainly at the initiative of the majority, the media, or the government, and 
they should not explain its absence only in terms of discrimination. Greater self-
consciousness and organisation among minorities expressed in the form of active 
mechanisms for achieving representation would considerably help speed up the 
desired processes. In order to achieve their purpose, nongovernmental organisa-
tions should formulate a clear stand on the issues which the minority in question 
view as most important in order to stimulate a public debate which will be heard 
by the representatives of the public authorities with the help of the media. 
Participation in the Government
Recent experience shows that a new analysis of the basic concepts for managing 
problems of minorities is necessary in order to help the society overcome prej-
udice. Such a discussion should start by updating basic concepts related to mi-
norities and human rights, including the following: nation, sovereignty, human 
rights, rights of minorities, individual and collective rights, identity, ethnicity, 
liberal order, development, conflicts, democracy, republic, secularisation, consti-
tutional state, liberalism, globalisation, expertise, and representation. 
It is crucial that human rights (including the rights of minorities as an integral 
part) be perceived both as a prerequisite for development and as an instrument 
for development, and not only as an end (in itself). Everyone should become 
aware that “human rights, instead of placing people to development’s service, for-
mulate the requirement for freedom of every person to express his/her needs and 
interests, to formulate his/her understanding of development and to realise it on 
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his/her own behalf and for himself/herself.”14 In other words, the stress placed on 
minority rights must be understood and presented in terms of the development 
of the society as a whole: Considerable differences between minorities on the one 
hand and the majority on the other in social, economic, and cultural status repro-
duce poverty as well as exclusion. 
In its World Development Report for 1998, the World Bank indicates that poor 
people cannot take part in development until they get access to information and 
are in a situation where they can use it. Often, however, they are effectively pre-
vented from exercising their rights by a lack of resources15. Naturally, this is where 
the question of sharing resources and access to them arises. 
Today there is more and more strengthening of the rights-protection aspect 
of development policy which requires rehabilitation of economic, social, and cul-
tural rights and acknowledgment of their equality with civil and political rights in 
a new agenda for moving from the mere rhetoric of rights protection to pragma-
tism and expertise. This change in turn necessitates analysis carried out jointly 
with the poor on their actual experience in accessing their basic human rights16. 
This new aspect of rights protection should be paid special attention in the con-
text of the changing vision of the nature of human development itself, as well as 
of systems of values and definitions of ethnicity. 
In its Human Development Report for 1997, the UN views poverty as the ab-
sence of choice and of possibilities for developing one’s abilities, placing consid-
erable emphasis on the factors which add meaning to the life of a person, rather 
than focusing exclusively on the prerequisites for material well-being. Poverty can 
thus refer to the lack of opportunities for a person to enjoy a long and fruitful life, 
good health, reasonable living standard, freedom and dignity, self-respect and re-
spect for others. For decision makers, poverty understood in this way has always 
been more important than simple income poverty, since it shows the reasons for 
the latter and can serve for creating strategies for empowerment or other actions 
improving the opportunities for everyone.17
In recent years, the meaning of the concept of development has been sought 
increasingly in the need to create, nourish, and acknowledge people’s own idea of 
14   Tomasevski, Katarina. “Правата на малцинствата в политиката за подпомагане на 
развитието”,12, Minority Rights Group International, 2000, www.minorityrights.org.
15   1997 World Bank Development Report, 23, www.worldbank.org/wdr/wdr98.
16   Hauserman, Julia, “A Human Rights Based Approach to Development”, DFID, 1998, London, 
18
17   United Nations Human Development Report 1997, 34, www.hdr.undp.org/reports/view_
reports.
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the world both individually and publicly. Cultural and social rights turn into a nu-
cleus of human and communal development and interaction with the natural and 
social environment. What is more, many people see the condescending or hostile 
attitude of a politically prevailing majority to the economically and socially un-
derprivileged minority as a manifestation of cultural discrimination, an attempt 
to explain and justify the inequality in status with the ethnic, religious, or cultural 
characteristics of this minority. 
There are examples from Bulgaria and Romania of how power-sharing experi-
ences with minority political parties have contributed to boosting these coun-
tries’ image in foreign relations and improving inter-ethnic relations at the level 
of the society as well. The European Commission evaluated very highly power-
sharing and cooperation with the two most active minority political parties, i.e. 
the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (DAHR) in Romania and the 
Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) in Bulgaria. The MRF is an influential 
nationwide party, predominantly supported by Bulgaria’s ethnic Turkish minor-
ity. Founded in 1990, it was twice on the edge of being barred from participating 
in the general elections in the early 1990s due to a Constitutional prohibition of 
ethnic parties. The MRF’s legal status was subsequently established through a 
Constitutional Court decision. The MRF has cautiously distanced itself from de-
mands for territorial autonomy, while insisting on raising the minority’s educa-
tional, cultural, and socio-economic status.18 Nowadays the Bulgarian MRF is an 
influential party in parliament and a partner in the present coalition government 
which is a valuable asset in the democratisation process.  
Founded in 1989, DAHR is the largest Hungarian minority party in Romania 
and represents a wide variety of Hungarian interests. It is a nationwide party 
with a diverse membership of territorial organisations, platforms and associated 
members (social, scientific, cultural, and other groups). The DAHR won 41 seats 
in the 1990 elections, 39 seats in the 1992 elections, 37 seats in the 1996 elec-
tions, 39 seats in the 2000 elections, and 10 senators and 22 deputies in the 2004 
elections. No other organisation of ethnic Hungarians has managed to make a 
successful bid for the Parliament at national elections.19 DAHR has been suc-
cessful at local elections as well. In the period after 1996, DAHR took a more 
18   Hoepken, W. (1997). “From Religious Identity to Ethnic Mobilization: The Turks of Bulgaria 
Before, Under and Since Communism.” In: ed. H. Poulton and S. Taji-Farouki, Muslim Identity and 
the Balkan State. London: Hurst & Co.
19   Alionescu, Ciprian-Calin (2003). “Parliamentary Representation of Minorities in 
Romania”, conference paper of the Political Studies Association (PSA), http://www.psa.ac.uk/
cps/2003%5CCiprian%20Alionescu.pdf.
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moderate stance towards the issue of territorial autonomy, but pressed instead 
for community rights which it considered important for guaranteeing local self-
governance. Prior to 1996, the DAHR proposed using models of autonomy from 
other countries for Transylvania (most importantly, that of the Italian province 
of South Tyrol) (Verdery 1996: 118). Since 1996, the more moderate leadership 
of the DAHR has forfeited the issue of territorial autonomy while obtaining more 
rights for the Hungarian community based on cooperation with other majority 
parties. DAHR has largely succeeded at ascertaining the use of the Hungarian lan-
guage in areas such as justice, education, and local administration, although some 
problems remain. Provisions in the Romanian Constitution safeguard the official 
use of minority language when dealing with local public authorities in localities 
with over 20 percent minority population.20 
Identity, Ethnicity and Cultural Affiliation21
Modern democracy presupposes that citizens, regardless of their ethnicity, should 
respect the culture of others. Within the framework of the globalising community 
and in the context of growing Europe, the preservation of cultural identity turns 
both into a challenge and a conscious need. With the advent of democracy in 
Southeast European countries, various minorities have had their rights restored 
and they were able to acquire additional rights. At the same time, in most coun-
tries, voices can be heard that present minorities’ integration and preservation of 
minority cultural identity as mutually exclusive. Hence despite some progress in 
fields such as education, the use of minority languages in public and private life, 
and participation in cultural life, positive steps remain insufficient. The provi-
20   However, some ethnic Hungarian leaders are criticizing the DAHR’s leadership for giving up 
the idea of territorial autonomy. This led to growing divisions between the DAHR and more radical 
ethnic Hungarian formations.
21   “Modern states which are functionally integrated by market and administrative power still 
delimit themselves from one another as -nations” as they always have done. But this says noth-
ing about the specific character of national self-understanding. It remains an empirical question 
when and to what extent modern populations understand themselves as a nation based on ethnic 
membership or as ‘ a nation of citizens. This double coding has a bearing on the issue of exclusion 
and inclusion. National consciousness vacillates in a peculiar fashion between more extensive in-
clusion and renewed exclusion”. Jürgen Habermas: The Inclusion of the Other, Cambridge, Ma., 1998, 
129-153.
74
sions on teaching minority languages have not prompted substantial changes in 
practise in the region as a whole. A possibility to give greater support for initia-
tives coming from the minority communities – such as Montenegrin, Roma, and 
Aromanian minorities in Albania, or the Vlach minority in North-Eastern Serbia, 
to promote their languages and cultures should be considered. In Macedonia, the 
constitutional and legislative changes made in accordance with the Ohrid Agree-
ment lay the foundations for greater protection for minorities, inter alia, in such 
fields as the use of minority languages, education and participation, with the in-
troduction of the principle of equitable representation for minorities at all levels 
of public administration. Still, additional measures should also be adopted so as 
to take better account of the needs for teaching in minority languages, as ex-
pressed by various communities, notably the Turkish and Albanian communities. 
In this connection, further measures are also needed in relation to the media, so 
as to foster access to the media for persons belonging to minorities22.
Why is it so difficult for the majority in Southeastern Europe to acknowledge 
the minorities’ right to cultural identity? Is the attitude towards cultural identity 
of minorities a question of special treatment or the result of the changing vision 
of ethnicity and identity as a whole?
A key characteristic of information societies seems to be the dominant role 
of identity as an organising principle. Identity means the process through which 
social subjects define themselves and build the meaning of their existence based 
mainly on one specific cultural trait or group of traits, while excluding broader 
affiliation to other social structures.23 Today, when the world is united in global 
networks of cooperation while remaining divided at the same time into persons, 
groups, communities, regions, and even states which are entirely or partially ex-
cluded from these networks, there is a distinctive tendency to build public actions 
and policies around primary identities. These primary identities may be ascribed, 
rooted in history and geography, or recently set up in the process of a frenzied 
search for meaning and spirituality. 
In this situation, the loss of minority group identity to individual identity can 
be characterised as a specific manifestation of the general trend for total globali-
sation – of economy, of culture, of values. As the general progress of the informa-
tion society leads to the gradual loss of national integrity, political independence, 
and even national sovereignty – all crucial for the formation and flourishing of 
22   Opinion on “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, Advisory Committee on the FCNM, 
27 May 2004, ACFC/INF/OP/I(2005)001. 
23   Castells, Manuel, “The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture. Volume I: The Rise of 
the Network Society”, 1996, Oxford: Blackwell, 53.
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the nation state and the classic capitalism from which the modern state emerged 
– all decisions and wills become pointless when they are based entirely or mainly 
on ethnic, national, and religious borders. Regardless of whether minorities com-
prise cultural communities within a nation or translational regions, they should 
develop in the conditions of an overall democratisation of public life both in the 
individual states and at the global level.24 At the same time, because democratic 
decisions take into account the opinion of all and every single member of the so-
ciety, it is evident that the rights of minorities acquire a new role and influence, 
both as political, civil, economic, cultural, and social rights exercised individually, 
and as collective rights exercised within and by communities as such. 
The Strength and Weakness of Civil Society Organisations
Civil society is often seen as symbolised by non-governmental organisations 
working in the civil sector. Indeed, civic organisations should by definition rep-
resent the interests of the society, know the needs of those they claim to repre-
sent, formulate their priorities and tasks, and express their position in order to 
be heard. In order for this to really happen, civic organisations should be backed 
by people, not by interests.
In order to achieve their purpose, non-governmental organisations should not 
only formulate a clear stand on burning social issues, but should also become part 
of the public debate and, more importantly, be heard by the representatives of 
the public authorities. What is of great importance here is the creation of a legal 
and institutional mechanism to guarantee that civil society organisations will be 
heard. Partnership between the public and civil sectors should be a common goal 
because partnership is comprised not only of consultations and debates but also 
of taking decisions. 
What’s more, these decisions providing for specific actions and measures are 
expected to become an integral part of state policy. Otherwise we take part in a 
formal process aimed at suggesting conviction, but which ultimately results in 
reduced trust in public institutions and non-governmental organisations on the 
part of the society at large. In order to convince the society of the effectiveness 
of the partnership between the public and civil sectors, it should be evident that 
24   Неделчева, Таня. „Идентичност и време”, „Марин Дринов”, София, 2004, 95-96.
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every single participant in this process has a relevant role in it and bears a specific 
responsibility. In this sense, the liability for the lack of a real dialogue and part-
nership is shared among all participants. Therefore, we should not “blame” only 
those who “are not able” to formulate the actual needs and priorities or those who 
“refuse” to hear the personal stand expressed. 
In the countries of South-Eastern Europe, the public sector often accuses non-
governmental organisations of not being representative or insufficiently expert, 
while non-governmental organisations accuse public institutions of refusing to 
listen. However, this approach does not lead to any positive solutions. Instead, if 
one of the parties is not comfortable with its role, it should clearly and unambigu-
ously state in public its refusal to accept only formal participation. In a similar 
fashion, if one of the parties does not see the other as a partner, it should state 
that openly and in public. The society should also be enabled to hold each of the 
parties responsible for the fact that it does not perform the tasks it has voluntar-
ily assumed. Otherwise, there are sufficient grounds to think that, with its very 
participation in a process which is formal and ostentatious in its nature, each 
individual party tries to deceive the society into believing that societal interests 
are being protected. 
An effectively functioning public-civic partnership in the field of minorities is 
still nonexistent in South-Eastern Europe. The state authorities habitually fail to 
procure an effective institutional mechanism and do not seek extensive dialogue 
with the non-governmental sector on minority issues. In Bulgaria, for example, 
a National Council on Ethnic and Demographic Issues has been operating since 
1997, but is not a significant factor in solving the problems of minorities. The sit-
uation with the National Council of national minorities in Serbia and the Council 
of National Minorities in Romania is similar. The latter is a consultative body of 
the Romanian Government on minority issues in which minority organisations 
elected to Parliament participate. The Framework Convention Advisory Commit-
tee reports that the Council is not always consulted on all issues affecting mi-
norities, and that its views – even when unanimous – are sometimes disregarded 
without explanation by State agencies. Furthermore, the minority organisations 
in the Council are dependent on financial assistance from the state budget which 
places them in a subordinate position to the government in power. In addition, 
as noted by the Advisory Committee, the structure of the Council gives substan-
tial weight to one organisation for each minority. This creates the risk that other 
organisations representing the same minority may, to some extent, be sidelined 
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and not receive adequate state support25 (especially in the case of Roma organisa-
tions). 
Hence, though established to meet the urgent needs of the minorities, mi-
nority consultative bodies in most Southeast European countries still remain a 
“promising innovation”26. In Southeastern Europe as a whole, the missing link 
for a process of public-civic partnership is the creation of a genuine legal and in-
stitutional partnership framework. Consultation on substantive issues is still not 
sufficient. Government bodies that oversee implementation of minority policy 
often do not have the authority to require other government offices to implement 
them. It is not enough to have consultation mechanisms; it is important to give 
minorities a real voice to shape policy on issues concerning them.
Perfecting the Legal Framework on Minority Issues: Expected 
Results
Regardless of some positive changes in the legal framework and the application of 
good practises in certain sectors, an advanced policy on governing minority-relat-
ed issues will not be created unless the mechanisms of good governance related to 
participation of minorities are provided for expressly in the laws themselves. At 
present, however, the legal framework on the management of minority-related 
issues in most countries of Southeastern Europe is fragmentary, controversial, 
formalistic, and ineffective. 
Adoption of specific legal provisions and even specific laws, such as the An-
ti-Discrimination Laws in Bulgaria and Romania, the Law on the Protection of 
Rights of Persons Belonging to National Minorities and the amendments to the 
Election Law in BiH, and the Law on the Protection of Rights and Freedoms of 
National Minorities in Serbia, alone are unable to solve the existing problems. 
Significant efforts will therefore have to be made by the governments to complete 
the legal and institutional framework, as well as to ensure its full realisation in 
practise. It is also essential that key institutions build further trust within minor-
ity communities, through increasing professionalism and by more effectively ad-
25   Opinion on Bulgaria, Advisory Committee on the FCNM, Strasbourg, 5 April 2006, ACFC/
OP/I(2006)001.
26   Opinion on Serbia and Montenegro, Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention, 
Strasbourg, 27 November 2003, ACFC/INF/OP/I(2004)002.
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dressing inter-ethnic incidents and other concerns of persons belonging to vari-
ous communities.
Furthermore, the creation of a legal framework should be preceded by a con-
sistent and thorough process of creating a concept of the national policy regard-
ing minorities; only through an extensive public discussion can the national poli-
cy on minorities be adopted and supported both by the majority of the citizens of 
Southeast European countries and by representatives of the minorities in these 
countries. 
Efficiunt Quod Figurant27
The interrelated issues of human rights and the rights of minorities, of devel-
opment policy and administration aimed at minorities, as well as of the role of 
minorities in the government are characterised on the one hand by greater com-
plexity than is usually believed and, on the other hand, by a non-systematic ap-
proach to research and insufficiency of analyses including, but not limited to, the 
absence of any fieldwork regarding specific situations. Considering the ambiguity 
surrounding basic principles and the general terminological chaos28 in this area, 
as well as the strained relations between minorities and the majority, there is 
an even greater need for research. Another circumstance causing difficulties is 
that the minority communities themselves are not monolithic but are internally 
heterogeneous and differentiated. As a result, minorities tend to be immune to 
27   Efficiunt quod figurant (Lat.) They achieve what they express.
28   Terminologies are far from innocent; they imply a particular point of view. The neologism 
“ethno-nationalism” blurs the traditional distinction between “ethnos” and “demos”.) This expres-
sion emphasizes the proximity between an “ethnos,” a pre-political community of shared descent 
organized around kinship ties, on the one hand, and a nation constituted as a state that at least as-
pires to Political independence, on the other. In this way the assumption that ethnic communities 
are more “natural” and evolutionarily “more primitive” than nations is implicitly contradicted. The 
“we-consciousness,” founded on an imagined blood relation or on cultural identity, of people who 
share a belief in a common origin, identify one another as “members” of the same community, and 
thereby set themselves apart from their environment, is supposed to constitute the common core 
of ethnic and of national social formations. In view of this commonality, nations would differ from 
other ethnic communities only in their degree of complexity and scope: It is the largest group that 
can command a person’s loyalty because of felt kinship ties; it is, from this perspective, the fully 
extended family. Jürgen Habermas.: The Inclusion of the Other, Cambridge, Ma., 1998, 129-153.
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influence and management by uniform application of undifferentiated policies 
and measures. 
The variation within minorities necessitates even more the decentralisation 
of the management of programmes aimed at minorities, since the possibilities of 
success are greater in case of management on the local level. This is the case be-
cause it is at the local level that the active participation of representatives of the 
specific minority group is possible. Consequently, it is at this level that feedback 
mechanisms must be established with an eye to the timely adjustment of relevant 
policies. 
A characteristic feature of the state policy regarding minorities in Southeast-
ern Europe is its declaratively non-discriminatory nature29. It often provides for 
measures which are applied in the same manner to all citizens of the country and 
fail to create the statutory bases for distinctions and preferences based on ethnic-
ity, culture, religion, etc. Such an understanding stems from abstract fundamen-
tal principles and is, at first sight, not devoid of legal justification and worldly 
justice. In reality, however, it not only fails to be effective and rational but also de-
prives some of the representatives of minorities from any chance of inclusion in 
economic life, closing a vicious circle of poverty, illiteracy, low occupational quali-
fication, lack of opportunities for social and economic integration, exclusion from 
public life, and permanent marginalisation. By themselves, these results lead to 
extremely unfavourable consequences, not only for the individual, but also for 
society as a whole, transforming the problem from one of identifiable persons 
and groups into a general-public one. 
If such a policy were aimed at public relations in which all minority groups, 
together with the majority, were in similar economic, social, and political con-
ditions, it would be justified, effective, and obviously just. However, we should 
keep in mind the fact that the current situation is completely different. In some 
countries, entire minority groups fall into the so-called “risk” or “marginalised” 
groups. In other countries, it is evident that there is a real, factual division be-
tween some minority groups and the remaining part of the population of other 
countries. Sometimes this division is so deep that it creates preconditions for 
upheavals.
We think that the time has come for state policy toward minorities to be re-
considered and re-evaluated through the prism of a new functionality and effec-
29   “…A society is democratic to the extent that people in it have meaningful opportunities to 
take part in the formation of public policy. There are a lot of different ways in which that can be 
true, but insofar as it’s true, the society is democratic. A society can have the formal trappings of 
democracy and not be democratic at all.” Noam Chomsky, Secrets, Lies and Democracy, 1994. 
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tiveness. Policies in different countries should take into account the specifics of 
the minority communities and groups, consider them, and thoroughly rework the 
international standards and measures provided for in international legal docu-
ments in compliance with these specifics. The simple adoption of certain mod-
els from the outside without their adjustment to the specifics of every minority 
group does not lead to positive results. 
Another specific feature of minority communities in Southeastern Europe is 
that a great number of them live in underdeveloped regions. In Bulgaria, this is 
especially true of the Turkish and Bulgarian Muslim communities, but it is also 
true to a great extent of the Romani population, even if the latter is not so evi-
dently concentrated in a specific region. The problems of these groups and others 
like them not only originate from, but are often identified with the problems of 
the region in which they live. In the process, it is often forgotten that it is not the 
peculiarities of the minority population or its traditional religion, way of life and 
culture that are the reasons for the problems in the region but vice versa – the 
problems of the region accruing with time and aggravating because of the lack of 
any specific practical measures aimed at their solution are the basis for the low 
social and economic status and isolation, not only of the minority communities, 
but also of the remaining population of the respective region. 
Considering the fact that in some regions characterised as underdeveloped the 
greatest part of the population is comprised of minorities, it is worth recalling the 
recommendation of the Consultative Council for the Framework Convention that 
the state should take targeted measures to eliminate these structural differences 
which hinder the participation of minorities in the economic life of the coun-
try, reduce their access to public services such as education and healthcare, and 
negatively affect their overall presence in the public life in the country. To take a 
concrete example, considering that underdeveloped regions in Bulgaria are tradi-
tionally inhabited largely by minorities, we should admit that without a stronger, 
targeted policy for overcoming structural differences, Bulgaria will not be able to 
perform the obligations provided for in Art. 4 and Art.15 of the Framework Con-
vention. The situation in Serbia is similar, where the Advisory Committee for the 
Framework Convention noted that there were wide variations between regions 
in terms of efforts taken to protect the languages and cultures of national mi-
norities - whereas in Vojvodina a number of commendable initiatives have been 
introduced, the situation is considerably less developed, for example, with respect 
to the protection of the Vlach minority in North Eastern Serbia30.
30   Opinion on Serbia and Montenegro, Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention, 
Strasbourg, 27 November 2003, ACFC/INF/OP/I(2004)002.
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In addition to the above specifics of minority communities related to the re-
gions they inhabit, some of these communities such as, for example, different 
groups of the Romani minority, have a number of cultural specifics influencing 
their participation in economic life and the labour market which we should take 
into account and investigate with greater objectivity. Another fact of crucial im-
portance is the different opportunities of the above minorities and especially 
those of the Romani minority in terms of level of educational attainment, em-
ployment experience, and specific occupational skills. Another feature specific 
only to the Romani minority is the negative attitude of some employers because 
of the belief that Roma do not have working habits and sufficient motivation for 
active inclusion in the labour process. In combination with the Roma’s insuffi-
cient qualification and experience, this factor puts them into the category of the 
so-called “at-risk” and “marginal” groups. 
In light of the above, great attention and responsibility are necessary for solv-
ing the problems of covert and overt discrimination. Regardless of the existence 
of modern non-discrimination frameworks in compliance with EU standards, for 
instance in Bulgaria and Romania, court proceedings which end with an effective 
ruling are still uncommon. This suggests the existing formal legal framework is 
not sufficiently enforced and proves that the existence of such a legal framework 
does not eliminate discrimination practises. Additional measures are therefore 
needed and should be more systematic and more consistent. The lack of statistical 
information concerning national minorities and the issues affecting them par-
ticularly seriously hampers the monitoring and the design of policy and practise 
in relation to national minorities.31 
With this in mind, policy for the education of minorities should have a double 
aim: to guarantee their complete integration in broader society and, at the same 
time, to preserve their cultural identity. On the one hand, the rights of minority 
communities to study their own language, history, and culture should be pro-
tected. On the other hand it is clear that, in order for them to achieve success, 
all children should also be fluent in the official language of the country. This is 
consistent with relevant international legal documents, which assert that state-
provided education in the languages of minorities should not exclude teaching 
the official language. 
Stress should also be put on circumventing problems of isolation and self-
isolation and reaching forms of total unwillingness for integration among the 
members of the large minority groups if exclusively mother-tongue education 
31   We should also note the insufficiency of available information on this issue. 
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were to be introduced. These situations are more likely if minorities inhabit re-
gions where they form compact masses and are therefore isolated from the rest 
of the population. Throughout Southeastern Europe, circumstances such as these 
hinder the expansion of teaching children from the majority and children from 
minority groups together. On the one hand, this type of teaching could help im-
prove the integration of children of minority origin and has been recommended 
by a number of organisations for protecting the rights of minorities. Grouping 
Romani children in separate schools is, in particular, viewed as an indication of 
a segregation and isolation policy and is not in compliance with the generally ac-
cepted international standards. On the other hand, the ambiguity of this issue 
is evidenced by the example of other minorities, which use separate schools for 
thorough and high-quality teaching and training for the children of these minori-
ties with extensive use of teaching in their mother tongue. 
The problems of minorities in Southeastern Europe can be solved over time 
with the help of a clear vision, consistent and expert policy, flexible measures and 
sufficient funding. However, we cannot and should not expect that these prob-
lems will be resolved at once and overnight32. With this in mind, we should be 
ready to view old problems in light of new developments, with the need for new 
articulations of words which have lost their charm and effect, such as equality 
(in rights and obligations), justice (individual and common to all) and, last but 
not least, involvement and compassion. We do not claim that this discussion has 
the goal or even the possibility to offer entirely new and original solutions, as we 
acknowledge that originality stems from what we already know and what we have 
taken for granted. What is more, we are willing to acknowledge that accumula-
tion is a valuable asset and that new results are often a modification of old ones. 
What we insist on is a public debate in which all groups participate. Such a debate 
should have clear conceptual foundations and should serve as a premise for the 
exchange of opinions and recommendations which can not only be discussed on 
the level of research, but also be adopted and applied in practise. 
32   Gould, Stephen J. The Panda’s Thumb: More Reflections on Natural History, NY: W.W.Norton, 
1980, 9.
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Vulnerable Minorities
Recently a new type of confrontation has started to emerge in the Southeast Eu-
ropean countries. The phenomenon has objective economic roots, but is increas-
ingly ethnicised, with immense economic underdevelopment resulting on the 
one hand from inherited poverty, lack of education and ghettoisation, and on the 
other hand from prejudice on the part of the majority regarding the marginalised 
minority. 
This is a common issue to all Southeast European countries. In Macedonia the 
discrimination suffered by persons belonging to the Roma community occurs in 
various fields and bears witness to considerable socio-economic differences be-
tween them and the rest of the population. Difficulties are particularly obvious in 
the realms of employment, housing, health care, and education33. Similar is the 
situation in BiH where a full and effective equality has not been secured for Roma 
and they continue to be exposed to discrimination and face particular difficulties 
in fields such as housing, health care, employment, and education34. The situation 
of the Roma in Romania also gives rise to deep concern, notably regarding nu-
merous acts of discrimination in a wide range of societal settings.35 Roma are the 
most marginalised group in the society, subject to wide-spread social, economic, 
and educational inequalities.   
The explanation for this phenomenon can be found both in the difficulties 
of the transition and in the cultural and psychological gap which separates the 
Romani community like barbed wire from all other majorities and minorities in 
the Southeast European countries. The obvious isolation and marginalisation of 
the Romani community is deepening, resulting in a new, bipolar situation which 
is much a paradox (insofar as it divides the society not according to ethnic or so-
cial principles but according to the Roma – non-Roma principle) as it is a crisis. 
What makes measures aimed at improving the social and economic status of 
the marginalised Romani minority so unpopular with the majority in the coun-
tries in Southeast Europe? Unlike the generally accepted view that this is a mani-
festation of ethnic opposition, we claim that the reasons more likely stem from 
33   Opinion on “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, Advisory Committee on the 
Framework Convention, 27 May 2004, ACFC/INF/OP/I(2005)001. 
34   Opinion on Bosnia and Herzegovina, Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention, 27 
May 2004, ACFC/INF/OP/I(2005)003.
35   Opinion on Romania, Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention, Strasbourg, 10 
January 2002, ACFC/INF/OP/I(2002)001.
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the economic domain and a basic sense of justice. As a member of the society, the 
citizen has the right to a fair share of the social product. The concept of social jus-
tice in the specific historical conditions is different for every social group since it 
depends on the group’s ideas, social status, and preserved traditions. However, it 
is evident that each of the parties in the bipolar Roma – non-Roma model fosters 
a deep-seated feeling of social injustice stemming from a perceived imbalance in 
the contribution for the creation of the social product on the one hand and the 
participation in its distribution on the other. 
In the long term, a group marked by social and economic inequality based on 
ethnicity will not be able to continue in the face of pronounced differences not 
only in living standard but also in access to and participation in the handling of 
public issues. Persistent inequality and the feeling of exclusion, which stems from 
it, inevitably lead to a dead-lock and, therefore, to opposition. Isolating such a 
group from social processes contributes even more to carrying their values and 
priorities from the public space into the personal one and from the social, politi-
cal and economic life into the community, kin and family. Such exclusion from 
the modern life of the society keeps the members of the group in the bosom of 
traditional culture and estranges them from the values and priorities of society 
at large. 
Today, when the individual is evaluated from the viewpoint of his/her partici-
pation in economic life and his/her place in society is determined with a view to 
the effectiveness of said participation, minority groups which are subjected to 
social exclusion remain associated mainly with traditional values and subordinat-
ed to the “need for belonging”36. The idea that the excluded social and economic 
groups are gradually passing from passive listlessness and despair into active re-
sistance is becoming more and more popular. Undoubtedly, the government has 
the means necessary for striking back, but social practise does not show such 
measures to be effective. 
We should also not underestimate the importance of the hierarchy of unsatis-
fied needs for the formation of the overall individual, the group philosophy, and 
vision of the future. As Abraham Maslow says – and not figuratively at all – the 
utopia of the chronically hungry man can be just a place where there is plenty of 
food.  It is more than probable that the person deprived of food, security, love, 
and respect is hungrier for these very things than for anything else. All abilities 
are placed in the service of satisfying these needs, while the qualities that do not 
contribute to this end remain potential or are pushed to the back. Everything 
36   Ardrey, Robert, „Territorial Imperative”, 1966 г., Маslow, Abraham, „Motivation and 
Personality”, „Kibea”, 2001, 23.
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else is defined as immaterial – freedom, social feeling, respect, dignity, law, and 
order37. 
An absolute premise for the origination of the need for self-realisation is that 
the physiological needs and the needs for security, love, and respect have already 
been satisfied. This is why we maintain that it is time that we gave up loud debates 
about whether the education or the economic development of the Romani people 
(a debate similar to the chicken or the egg dilemma) have a higher priority with 
a view to improving their status and their integration in social life. Accordingly, 
policy should demonstrate a dialectical view of the problem in its dynamics and 
should aim its efforts at elaborating and implementing a strategy for development 
of the community based on the application of international standards– without 
exception and without reservation. This will require considerable resources, but 
the measures contained in international legal documents must be applied in the 
Southeast European countries if the latter wish to be part of Europe in more as-
pects than just the geographical one. 
The Janus Face of the Nation38
Thus far, we have discussed the situation of social injustice in which the rep-
resentatives of the minority are weaker and in a more unfavourable condition 
due to their very quality of being a minority. Here we can note, for the sake of 
comparison, that not all minorities in the Southeast European countries are in a 
disadvantaged economic condition. Often cited examples are the Hungarian mi-
norities in Romania, the Croatian ones in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
and the Armenian and Jewish minorities in Bulgaria. What we observe in these 
37   Maslow, Abraham, „Motivation and Personality”, Kibea, 2001, 82-83.
38   “The Janus face of the nation, which opens itself internally but shuts itself off from the outside, 
is already implicit in the ambivalent meaning of the concept of freedom. The particularistic freedom 
of externally asserted collective national independence seems to be merely the protective shield 
for the internally realized individual liberties of the citizens-their private autonomy as members 
of civil society (Gesellschaftsbürger) no less than their political autonomy as citizens (Staatsbürger). 
The conceptual opposition between a compulsory, ascriptive ethnic membership viewed as an 
inalienable property, on the one hand, and a freely chosen membership guaranteed by subjective 
rights in a voluntary political community that grants its citizens the option of emigrating, on the 
other, is dissolved in this syndrome. This double coding still inspires competing interpretations 
and contradictory political diagnoses”. Jurgen Habermas.: The Inclusion of the Other, Cambridge, 
Ma., 1998, 129-15.
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minorities proves even more how the role and the fatal attractiveness of the eth-
nic decrease with the increase and distribution of the public wealth. Minorities 
in an equal social and economic position (which does not always result from their 
direct participation in and sharing power with the majority), may complain that 
the majority does not follow their way of life, moral values, language, or religious 
affiliations to a sufficient extent, but they do not try to deny from a moral stand-
point or otherwise endanger the political unity of the state and the nation39.
Justice and Effectiveness
Another aspect of the issues discussed which should not be underestimated is the 
sense of social injustice on the part of the majority. In Southeast European coun-
tries the sense of social injustice is often directed against the disadvantaged mi-
norities and is based on the greater contribution of the majority in the formation 
of the social product in the distribution of which the disadvantaged minorities 
objectively (or according to its subjective idea) does not hold a place. That points 
to the need for both the minority and the majority to be convinced that their par-
ticular interest has been taken into account in order to promote cooperation on 
the societal level. The goal of the state is namely to organise social affairs through 
institutions in such a way that satisfies the social and economic needs of every 
group and community, turning their representatives into citizens and thus main-
taining the internal unity of the nation.
It is here that we find the crucial role of effective government, a major obliga-
tion of the states undergoing transition. The task of governments in the region 
is not only to suggest a sense of social justice, but also to respond to that sense 
by taking into account the private interest in ways compatible with social justice. 
In this we see both the great potential of the civil nation and a positive solution 
to the imaginary conflict between justice (on the historical, social, and individual 
level) and effectiveness (in the sense of government taking into account indi-
vidual and group interests). As Eric Weil skilfully summarises in his research on 
nationalism, the government which strives for justice without caring for interests 
is unjust since interest is the driving force of society, while the government which 
aims at effectiveness at the expense of justice is wrong insofar as it contradicts 
39   Weil, Еric, Philosophie politique, Librairie philosophique, Paris, 1996, 206.
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itself and does not create anything lasting because it will not achieve the coopera-
tion of its citizens. 
In the real and active world, justice is justice of interests in much the same way 
as effectiveness is organisation of interests. In this sense, minorities are neither 
fundamentally different from the majority, nor are the measures aimed at im-
proving the status of disadvantaged minorities unpopular in isolation. Instead, 
what makes such measures unpopular is lack of understanding of the need for 
immediate implementation of these measures and the benefit from the imple-
mentation of these measures for the society as a whole. Also contributing to the 
unpopularity of such measures are attempts to depreciate and simplify both the 
reasons for the problems which have accumulated and the overwhelming conse-
quences which the accumulation of these problems could lead to in the future40.
40   Blakely, Edward, “Information City and the Ghetto-The L.A. Experience.” Los Angeles: 
University of Southern California, Lusk Center Research Institute, 1995, WP LCRI-95, 10.
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Workshop Reports
Central europe
Introduction
The first preparatory workshop was organised in Budapest on 23 February 2007 
with the aim of exploring the experiences of democratic transition in the four 
‘Visegrad Countries’, i.e. the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. The 
primary goal of this workshop was to map the situation of minority rights, the 
development of legal institutions protecting minorities, and the implementation 
of international standards on minority rights in domestic policies and legisla-
tion.
In these states democratic transition was a non-violent and institutionally 
channelled process at the beginning of the 1990s. But in this process minority 
communities and people belonging to minorities have often had the sensation 
of being left out of the transition process. They have repeatedly suffered the con-
sequences of democratic changes. In these four countries there have been no 
violent conflicts between minorities and the majority, and more or less stable 
democratic institutions have been developed in the past fifteen-seventeen years. 
Nevertheless, even in these states, minority issues are often formulated in politi-
cal discussions in terms of potential conflicts. Assessing the experiences of the 
workshop, with the exception of Slovakia, the minorities form very small com-
munities, which often live in scattered populations. Most important minority 
problems in the region are not the threats of open, violent conflicts, but much 
more issues related to the political representation of minorities, their effective 
involvement in the political decision making processes, and their social integra-
tion, specifically relevant for the Roma. On the other hand, the legal environment 
has developed in an unbalanced way. Many times the legal environment reflects 
political compromises regardless of the real needs and the perspectives of minori-
ties. The situation of the Roma minority raises particular concern in this respect 
in all of these countries.
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This report summarises the most important issues regarding the situation of 
minorities in the region as they were reflected in the contributions presented at 
the Budapest Workshop.
Role of Minorities in the Process of Transition
The Czech Republic
The Czech Republic is probably one of the most homogenous countries in Central 
and Eastern Europe. According to the 2001 census, the total number of minorities 
living on the territory of the Czech Republic form only 5,4 % of the total popula-
tion, including 3,7% Moravians, who are not officially recognised as minority, but 
they are considered to have a regional identity. The Czech Republic became inde-
pendent after the dissolution of former Czechoslovakia in 1993. Among the dif-
ferent minority groups, the representatives of Polish and Roma minorities were 
more active in political mobilisation. In the political transition in 1990-1991, the 
representatives of the Polish minority joined the political movement Coexistence, 
which was mainly a party of the Hungarian minority. After the Czech and Slovak 
Federation split, the Polish minority section of that Coexistence, which was called 
Spulnota and headed by the representatives of the Polish minority, reached politi-
cal representation only at the local level, not even at the regional one. To improve 
its performance Coexistence has been permanently making some efforts to cre-
ate a successful coalition with majority parties. This has not been really effective. 
It should be also noted that Coexistence still keeps the structure of a joint party 
for all national minorities, however this structure is nowadays more symbolic, as 
the other minorities are not at all active in Coexistence. The general contribution 
of the Polish minority to democratic transition in many cases was very progres-
sive, but often disputable, since some of their representatives were members of 
the communist establishment and many promoted totalitarian and nationalist 
efforts. This could also harm the election attractiveness of Coexistence within the 
progressive part of the minority population. Politicians of Polish origin are also 
present in majority parties; however, they usually promote the idea of a multicul-
tural Czech nation, rather than representing specific minority claims.
In the case of the Roma minority, a huge Roma political movement, the Roma 
Civil Initiative emerged at the time of the democratic transition. It was a part of 
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the minority-friendly leading political power of the Velvet Revolution, the Civic 
Forum Movement. After the breakup of the Civic Forum, the Roma political rep-
resentation was not able to find backing in their community. Thus, the Roma Civil 
Initiative is currently a marginal party struggling for its own survival. The Roma, 
though their share in the total population is much smaller than in Hungary or 
Slovakia, often suffer from political and social discrimination. Major political par-
ties usually see anti-Roma statements as more profitable than pro-Roma political 
programmes. The Czech Republic received severe criticism in this regard from in-
ternational organisations like the Council of Europe and the European Union.
Hungary
Hungarian legislation recognises thirteen minorities living on the territory of 
the country, these are: Armenian, Bulgarian, Croatian, German, Roma (Gypsies), 
Greek, Romanian, Ruthene, Serbian, Slovak, Slovenian, Polish, and Ukrainian. In 
numbers, these minorities – except for the Roma – form rather small commu-
nities, which live in territorially dispersed settlements. According to the official 
census, the total number of all minority communities in Hungary (including the 
Roma) represent 3,4% of the total population. But most independent observers 
agree that the number of Roma can be estimated much higher, representing alone 
around 4-5% of total population. Like in the Czech Republic, minority political 
movements are rather weak; there is no minority party which could achieve stable 
local, not to mention national representation at democratic elections. Neverthe-
less, the minority self-government system offers an important forum for political 
representation of minorities.
In Hungary, the evolution of the minority protection regime was character-
ised by two main principles: the freedom of individual choice of identity and the 
acknowledgment of collective or group rights. In this aspect, in the newly demo-
cratic Hungary, political discourse on minorities was largely determined by the 
joint commitment of Hungarian political elites to support minorities and their 
specific rights, including their collective rights. In Hungarian legislation this was 
reflected in the institution of cultural autonomy established by the Minority 
Act.112. In the external realm, this commitment emerged in the encouragement 
of international legislation on minority rights and on the support of Hungarian 
minorities’ claims for broader rights protection and autonomy. Some authors ar-
gue that clear foreign policy input behind the development of the minority pro-
tection system in Hungary was visible.
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Already from the dawn of political transition in Hungary, a new minority pol-
icy was shaped by multiple variables, including the human rights protection ap-
proach, together with national policy goals and the re-formulation of the Hungar-
ian neighbourhood policy. In this respect, the political representation of minority 
issues was closely related to the recognition of the importance of minority rights 
protection in reinforcing security and maintaining international stability. It is 
widely believed that the Hungarian system of minority rights protection did not 
necessarily reflect the claims of minorities living in Hungary, but was influenced 
by foreign policy interests: fulfilling the political conditions of European integra-
tion and providing a positive example for neighbouring states, where large com-
munities of Hungarian minorities live. The transition period was characterised by 
the development of a minority self-government system, which offers an institu-
tional framework for the cultural autonomy of minorities living in Hungary. 
Nevertheless, in Hungary the gravest problems related to minorities were not 
legal or institutional ones, but had a more social character: the Roma population 
was clearly one of the main losers of the democratic transition; these communi-
ties suffered the most from recent unemployment, social marginalisation, and 
discrimination. For all other minority communities assimilation is considered to 
be the most important challenge. While the new legislation on minority rights at-
tempted to stop and turn back assimilation processes – by offering a wide range of 
institutional guarantees – it could not answer the social problems of the Roma.
Poland
In Poland, according to the legislation in force, a national minority is defined as 
a group that identifies itself with a nation organised in its own state, whereas an 
ethnic minority is defined as a group which does not. For legal recognition, how-
ever, for both groups there are additional conditions: they shall be Polish citizens 
whose ancestors have lived in Poland for at least 100 years.
The 2002 national census in Poland revealed that over 96% of the population 
defined themselves as having Polish national identity and only 1.23% of people 
declared having different national identity. The largest minority communities live 
in the border regions of Poland. The Germans, the Ukrainians, and Belarusians 
form the largest minority populations, but from a political perspective during 
the transition period, the German community raised attention the most. During 
the communist times the government did not recognise Germans as a minority 
and state authorities often persecuted people declaring their German origins. In 
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1989, when the transition process started, the German minority became more 
visible, which shocked Polish public opinion, as most people believed there are 
not any Germans in Poland. This cultural and historical tension provoked political 
and social conflicts at the local level on various occasions.
The German minority was recognised only in 1991, and this status was also re-
inforced in the German-Polish bilateral treaty on reconciliation and co-operation. 
According to the current census the Germans are the largest minority in Poland. 
They are the only minority that exercised their right to have a representative in 
the parliament, although they did not manage to exceed the 5% electoral thresh-
old. Currently there are two representatives of the German minority in the parlia-
ment.
Their biggest organisation is the Union of German Social and Cultural Associa-
tions that is an umbrella organisation for smaller organisations and they enjoy 
subsidies from Germany as well as from Poland. The main aim of all minority 
organisations is to maintain and support culture, language, and folklore. They or-
ganise festivals and exhibitions, but these are basically organised on a local level. 
In Poland, one of the main problems of these organisations is that they are not 
very attractive among young people and the assimilation process is rather strong 
in minority communities.
Slovakia
Slovakia is a truly multi-ethnic state, where about 15% of the total population 
(5.3 million inhabitants) declared an ethnic affiliation other than Slovak – the 
actual share of non-ethnic Slovaks is estimated to be as high as 21-22%. 
In Slovakia, we may differentiate between three types of non-immigrant mi-
nority communities. The first one is the Hungarian minority, the largest one, 
alone forming 10% of the total population and living in a rather compact settle-
ment along Slovakia’s southern border. Moreover, this is an ethnic and national 
group against which the Slovak nation exercised its right to self-determination 
for the first time, against the Hungarian state in 1919, which gives to this rela-
tionship a specific character. The second group is the group of traditional national 
minorities (especially Czech, Ruthene, Ukrainian, and German) which are consid-
ered to be historical communities living on the territory of Slovakia in relatively 
small populations. The Roma minority can be seen as a special minority group in 
Slovakia; according to the official census in 2001 there were 89.920 people de-
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claring themselves to be Roma, but, here again, sociological surveys estimate the 
number of Roma much higher, up to 300.000 - 400.000 persons.
In Slovakia three phases of democratic transition can be identified. The first 
phase was the establishment of the fundaments of democracy in a pluralistic 
political system, (still within the political structure of Czechoslovakia, the Vel-
vet Revolution), as the transformation of the communist totalitarian state to a 
pluralistic democracy. In this first period, emphasis was laid first of all on politi-
cal and civil rights, and ethnic claims were not high on the agenda. It created a 
shock in the Hungarian minority community as such, because one part of the 
political elite or social elite of the Hungarian minority realised that it was not 
a suitable political environment for presenting specific minority demands. Such 
claims simply were not accepted by the majority or the political representation of 
the majority. This caused disagreement within the political representation of the 
Hungarians and one part of it joined the government while the other part stayed 
out, and there were a lot of heated disputes between these two wings. Even with 
this schism, the whole political representation of Hungarians in Slovakia and the 
whole electorate of Hungarian minority in Slovakia backed the first phase of dem-
ocratic transition. Even the Hungarian parties in opposition massively supported 
the government in democratic changes, thus it can be underlined that the politi-
cal parties representing the Hungarian minority played a crucial role in the first 
phase of democratic transition. Other minorities were not successful in political 
mobilisation and were not represented in the Parliament.
The second phase of the democratic transition came in 1998, following the 
rule of Mr. Meciar’s government, which was characterised by anti-democratic 
measures, causing international isolation for Slovakia. This process turned back 
in 1998 when, with the participation of the Hungarian Coalition Party, a new 
democratic government entered in office under the leadership of Mr. Dzurinda. 
The first and second Dzurinda cabinet, which was supported by the Hungarian 
Coalition Party, was successful in obtaining NATO- and EU-membership. Both 
the Hungarian electorate and the Hungarian political elite played a crucial role 
in this process because, without Hungarians, no democratic government could 
have been created in 1998. Moreover, public opinion surveys showed that the 
Hungarian population of Slovakia was the strongest supporter of the case of the 
Euro-Atlantic integration. In these coalitions, the Hungarian party made seri-
ous concessions from its minority claims (like the abolition of Benes-decrees, the 
claim for territorial autonomy) which showed that the Hungarians were ready to 
work for common goals in spite of the fact that they have always been accused of 
focusing on very specific minority issues.
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After the 2006 parliamentary elections the Hungarian Coalition Party was not 
invited into the new Fico-government and the leading Smer party entered into a 
coalition with the nationalist Slovak National Party. The political representation 
of Hungarians has weakened at the national level, but still the Hungarian party 
usually gets the overwhelming majority of votes from the Hungarian minority 
community.
Besides development of the Hungarian political representation, the other sig-
nificant feature of the democratic transition in Slovakia was the social marginali-
sation of the Roma. Just like in Hungary, people belonging to the Roma minority 
lost their jobs in huge numbers (ca. 60-70% of adult Roma population is unem-
ployed) and suffered from various forms of discrimination.
The Situation of Minorities Today: Legal and Institutional 
Framework
The Czech Republic
The basic protection of national minorities is determined by the Constitution and 
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms as a part of the constitutional order. The 
Charter confers both collective and individual rights. It differentiates between 
national and ethnic minorities without defining this difference. In 1994, the Gov-
ernment of the Czech Republic formulated some non-legally binding principles 
of the policy concerning national minorities in the document “Concept to Issues 
Concerning National Minorities in the Czech Republic”. After a long period of diffi-
cult discussions, in June 2001 a Law on Ethnic and National Minorities (Minority 
Act) was finally approved by the Czech parliament, entering into force on August 
2nd, 2001.
This Minority Act specifies the rights of members of national minorities and 
the competence of ministries, administrative authorities, and authorities of ter-
ritorial self-administration units in relation to these rights. Although the Act was 
largely based on the Framework Convention on the Protection of National Mi-
norities, it differs in a fundamental way.
The Minority Act gives definitions for the basic terms “national minority” and 
“a member of a national minority”, which provide subjective definitions for be-
longing to a minority. Furthermore, the Minority Act foresees a Council of the 
Government for National Minorities as a consultative and initiative body headed 
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by a member of the Government. Nevertheless, this law is criticised not only 
by representatives of the national minorities, but also by NGO’s since it offers 
considerably less protection than early drafts and it may have little relevance for 
Roma, given the 10% threshold for application. Moreover, the UN Commission 
for Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination repeatedly criticised the 
lack of legal provisions for the protection of minorities from discrimination, since 
the Minority Act was restricted to rights related to the development of national 
minorities without facing the problems of discrimination.
The Czech Republic has joined the Framework Convention for the Protection 
of National Minorities, which was ratified in 1997, and signed the European Char-
ter for Regional or Minority Languages, which was ratified only in 2006. Among 
other international instruments worth mentioning are the bilateral agreements 
between the Czech Republic and neighbouring countries, in particular the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Poland, and Slovakia, which guarantee the protection of 
rights of persons belonging to the respective national minority. Article 10 of the 
Constitution of the Czech Republic gives human rights treaties precedence over 
domestic law.
Hungary
In Hungary, the Constitution recognises minorities as state-constituent parts 
of the population and ensures their collective participation in public affairs. The 
Constitution also recognises their right to self-government and protects both in-
dividual and collective minority rights. The first and very important feature of 
the Hungarian minority protection system is the way in which the Minority Act 
defines minorities. The Act provides a definition of ‘historical minorities’ as the 
only target groups of the minority protection system. The Act refers to minori-
ties whose members hold Hungarian citizenship and have lived on the territory 
of Hungary for at least one century. Later, the Act names 13 groups that “qualify 
as native ethnic groups of Hungary”, but this enumeration is not exclusive: the 
Act allows for any other minority group to apply for recognition as a minority if 
it fulfils the conditions under Art. 1 (2) and is supported by at least 1000 citizens 
who profess to belong to it. Given, however, the requirement of being present for 
100 years, it is clear that no new minority resulting from recent immigration can 
apply for recognition in the foreseeable future.
The basic principle of the Act and of the entire protection of minorities is that 
each individual is granted the inalienable right to declare his/her national iden-
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tity or to refuse to do so. To its merit, the Hungarian legislation defines the right 
of national and ethnic minorities to their identity as part of universal human 
rights, while their individual and collective rights are seen as basic rights to free-
dom. Thus, one of the main characteristics of the Minority Act is that it is based 
on a dualistic concept of minority rights. In accordance with this, it specifies indi-
vidual and collective rights in separate chapters. Individual minority rights cover 
every person’s right to have an identity, the right to equal opportunity in politics 
and cultural life, to choose and use their names in their own language, and the 
right to use their own language. Moreover the Minority Act defines as an indi-
vidual right the right of every person belonging to a minority community to keep 
family traditions, family relationships, and trans-frontier relations with his/her 
kin-state.
Collective rights defined in the Minority Act cover the most important areas 
of collective minority identity preservation. Minorities have the right to preserve 
their language and traditions, to organise their feasts and events, to preserve 
their architectural, cultural, and religious heritage, and to use their symbols. 
At the same time, the law guarantees their rights to education in their mother 
tongue and to the establishment of a national network of educational, cultur-
al, and scientific institutions. Public radio and television are obliged to prepare 
and transmit minority programmes regularly, while the state is called upon to 
facilitate the reception of radio and television programmes transmitted from the 
minorities’ motherlands. Minorities have the right to form social organisations 
as well as local and national minority governments, and these are entitled to es-
tablish direct international relations. The law mentions the possibility of minori-
ties’ parliamentary representation, too. Finally, it enacts the institution of the 
ombudsman for the rights of national and ethnic minorities. 
The minority self-government system works well, as the past three success-
ful elections have proved. Even though the minority communities are not always 
able to benefit from their legally granted opportunities, because the financial 
background of the minority self-governments is often too weak for maintaining 
special cultural and educational institutions. Thus, these minority institutions 
are often managed by the state authorities. The following minorities have created 
self-governments Hungary: Bulgarian, Gypsy, Greek, Croatian, Polish, German, 
Armenian, Romanian, Ruthenian, Serbian, Slovakian, Slovenian, and Ukrainian. 
The most lasting problem, however, is the lack of parliamentary representa-
tion: despite existing legal provisions, as minority candidates are unable to pass 
the threshold for entrance in parliament, the political parties could not agree on 
the techniques of a preferential mechanism which could guarantee minority rep-
resentation in parliament. Hungary was among the first states to sign and ratify 
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both, the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and 
the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages.
Poland
The most important legal document is the Constitution of the Republic of Poland 
which, under Article 35, states that Polish citizens belonging to national or eth-
nic minorities are ensured with the freedom to maintain and develop their own 
language, to maintain customs and traditions, and to develop their own culture. 
They also have the right to establish their own organisations, to have cultural 
and religious institutions. Approximately there are more than 140 civil minority 
organisations registered in Poland, though it shows a relatively low mobilisation 
of minority populations. Moreover the constitution protects the languages of mi-
norities and prohibits any forms of discrimination. Based on the constitutional 
provisions, a special act was adopted in 2005 (entered into force on 1 May 2005) 
on national and ethnic minorities and on the regional languages. This act accepts 
the subjective definition of being a member of a minority.
Under the new law, individual members of a minority have the right to spell 
their names and surnames according to the orthographies of their own language 
(with the exception of those names which were given by the Third Reich or the 
USSR between 1933-45.), to learn the minority language and to use it freely in 
public and private life. In communes (the lowest local administrative territorial 
unit) where the minority comprises more than 20 percent of the population, its 
language may be used as a supplementary language in public offices and used in 
the names of localities, sites, and streets. Public authorities are obliged by the law 
to support cultural, publishing, and educational activities of minorities, including 
through subsidies.
The issue to pass a special act on the protection of minority rights was first 
raised in 1990 by Jacek Kuron – who, at the time, was the Minister for Social 
Welfare in Poland’s first post-Communist government, as well as being of part-
Ukrainian descent -- but it took over 14 years for the legislation to be drafted and 
enacted. 
It also obliges public authorities to support minorities and this act moved is-
sues of minorities from the Ministry of Culture to the Ministry of Interior and 
Administration, which received some criticism from minority communities. 
Within the Ministry of Interior, which is currently in charge of minorities, the 
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Department of Religious and National-Ethnic Minorities is responsible for mi-
nority issues.
There is also an act on Polish language that actually repeats what the constitu-
tion declares: that the act on Polish language cannot violate the rights of minori-
ties. The 1991 Act on Education is of particular importance, because it guarantees 
the maintenance of national, ethnic, and religious identities and schooling of the 
minorities’ language, history, and culture. 
Among the institutions in charge of minorities the National Minority Assem-
bly needs to be mentioned in particular. This Assembly is an advisory body of 
the prime minister and two subassemblies working in tandem with this assembly 
–the Subassembly on Ethnic and Minority Education and the Subassembly on 
Roma Issues – also play an important role in preparing decision making. How-
ever, the Assembly does not have any formal powers. There is also a joint com-
mission of the government and national and ethnic minorities that was created 
by the act on minorities in 2005 and its main aim is to maintain cultural heritage 
and to protect minority rights.
Poland ratified the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Mi-
norities in 2001, and signed, but did not ratify the European Charter for Regional 
or Minority Languages.
In sum, political transition in Poland was also successful for minorities, in-
asmuch as it opened the path for legal recognition of minorities and made pos-
sible the development of legal protection of minority rights. Nevertheless, the 
majority public opinion is still many times hostile to the recognition of minority 
rights and the implementation of legal guarantees of minority rights could be still 
improved.
Slovakia
The Slovak laws do not offer any criteria for the definition of minorities, but a 
semi-official list was prepared as late as 1999 when Slovakia ratified the European 
Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. In the Language Charter declara-
tion each state party has to name which ethnic or national minority group these 
provisions refer to on its territory. These minorities were invited to participate at 
the Council on National Minorities attached to the government’s office. Based on 
these semi-official recognitions of minorities, Bulgarian, Czech, Croatian, Ger-
man, Hungarian Moravian, Polish, Roma, Russian, Ruthene, and Ukrainian can 
be considered to be official minorities in Slovakia.
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The Slovak Constitution recognised under Art.33 and 34 the right to free 
choice of identity and the basic individual minority rights to use minority lan-
guage in education, and to preserve and maintain minority cultures.
With the ratification of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Lan-
guages in June 2001, Slovakia became party to all major international minor-
ity rights instruments. Slovakia ratified the Framework Convention for the Pro-
tection of National Minorities in 1995. Since 1998, the Slovak government has 
established an institutional framework for realising the rights outlined in these 
documents, including a Deputy Prime Minister for Human Rights, National Mi-
norities, and Regional Development, a Plenipotentiary for Roma Issues, and an 
Ombudsman’s Office. Besides the two international treaties, Slovakia signed 
also bilateral agreements affecting minority rights. Probably the most important 
among these is the treaty signed in 1995 between Hungary and Slovakia. The de-
velopment of internal legislation on minority rights started only after the 1998 
elections, when a new democratic government entered in office. Previously, under 
Mr. Meciar’s government, Slovakia was harshly criticised by the international or-
ganisations for introducing non-democratic mechanisms and for violating human 
and minority rights. To overcome this political heritage and to put Slovakia back 
on the track of European integration, in 1999 the new Parliament adopted an Act 
on the Use of Languages of National Minorities. This law regulates the language 
use of national minorities living in Slovakia only in their “official contacts” with 
local self-governments. The law guarantees the right of national minorities to 
submit written requests to local administration; the right of local administrative 
authorities to distribute official forms in a minority language “on request”; the 
right of local administrative bodies to conduct meetings in a minority language 
“if all present at the meeting agree”; the right of municipalities to keep records 
also in a minority language; and the right to display important information in 
public areas also in a minority language. The largest minority community, the 
representatives of the Hungarian minority, often critiqued the law for its limita-
tive approach (it does not provide any rights at a regional or national level for 
minorities and in many regards it is restrictive on the use of a minority language 
at a local level as well), nevertheless the Hungarian party was a member of the 
coalition when the law was adopted.
Regarding the Roma community, in 1999 the government adopted a Strategy 
for Roma, which was aimed at improving the social circumstances of the Roma 
population and to facilitate their social integration. While the Strategy was later 
regularly updated, it had quite poor results in practise. In sum, the legal and po-
litical instruments developed in Slovakia have been strongly influenced by the 
expectations of international organisations. The process of accession to the Eu-
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ropean Union – after the failure of the Meciar-government – was a very powerful 
force in pushing the Slovak political elite towards the accommodation of minor-
ity claims. Nevertheless, this process remained unfinished and recent develop-
ments, following the Slovakia’s access to the EU in 2004, and especially after the 
change in government following the 2006 elections, raised particular concerns 
about the government’s political intentions in limiting existing minority rights 
mechanisms.
Minority Policies and European Integration
Among the four states under analysis during the workshop, Slovakia was prob-
ably the most influenced by the process of European integration in developing its 
own legislation on minority rights.
In general terms the interest of international organisations in the treatment 
of minorities has been significant in domestic policy and legal developments. 
Their role in closely following and evaluating the practise of single states in light 
of international standards has become very important for these countries, both 
in their external relations and for their policies towards minorities living within 
their territory.
The international community formulated not legal, but political concerns re-
garding the situation of minorities within the framework of extending institu-
tional relations between CEE states and the Council of Europe, NATO, and the 
EU. The European Union in particular has gained huge prestige with respect to 
the procedures established for the purpose of implementing international mi-
nority rights standards within the Council of Europe. Or, in other words, the ef-
ficiency of these specific procedures and mechanisms many times depend greatly 
on their reinforcement by the institutional policies of NATO and the EU towards 
CEE states. The activities of international organisations in this regard, however, 
are not strictly norm-guided, but appear to be driven by looser, policy-driven 
mechanisms.
The European Union in this regard, however, applied a unique approach: de-
spite a lack of its own internal mechanisms and measures to survey or control 
minority rights protection, it continuously monitored the situation of minorities 
in candidate states as an integrated segment of its conditionality policy under the 
institutional mechanism for supervising candidate states’ progress made towards 
membership. Taking minority rights protection into account on the enlargement 
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agenda in an institutionalised form within the EU was therefore a very new devel-
opment both in its implementation of the membership process and on its conse-
quences for candidate states, and also for the EU integration process.
In Hungary the development and implementation of specific policies for the 
Roma could be seen as being directly influenced by EU accession, as this strategy 
focused on combating discrimination in education and on improving social inte-
gration, goals which were regularly formulated by the European Commission as 
well. The Czech Republic received similar criticism on its discriminatory practises 
towards the Roma. The adoption of new policies aimed at improving the situation 
of socially marginalised Roma communities was strongly solicited by the EU.
In Slovakia, as a response to Meciar’s anti-democratic policy, the European 
Union suspended accession negotiations, so, in this case, for the new democratic 
government in 1998 it was of primary importance to improve radically the le-
gal protection of minorities, as was reflected in the adoption of the 1999 Act on 
minority languages. Nevertheless, new policy strategies adopted for the Roma 
seemed to be less effective.
In the case of Poland, minority issues remained marginal during the accession 
process. In general we can conclude that the European integration process was 
important in developing new legal and political instruments, but it also turned 
out during the workshop that EU accession often diminishes national govern-
ments’ attention to minority problems.
Conclusions 
Based on the presentations of the workshop and the discussion, the following 
conclusions can be drawn on the situation of minorities in the ‘Visegrad Coun-
tries’:
The participation of minorities in the transition process was uneven in the •	
four countries under observation, while the Hungarian minority played an im-
portant role in the process in Slovakia, in other states political participation of 
minorities was very weak. Furthermore, a large number of people belonging 
to minorities, especially among the Roma, suffered from the economic and 
social changes of transition, their social marginalisation worsened and gov-
ernments were usually not capable of addressing these problems.
One important lesson learned from the transition process is that the level of •	
democracy, the development of internal democracy in particular, plays an im-
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portant role also when tackling minority problems. Legal instruments alone 
cannot be sufficient without a clear and stable democratic background in sup-
port of tolerance and minority rights protection.
It also turned out that besides domestic developments, international organi-•	
sations had an outstanding influence in norm-setting in the field of human 
and minority rights protection. International influence was usually indirect, 
but legal and political documents adopted at the international level on minor-
ity rights were often accepted as basic standards for CEE states.
Another important experience is that national legislations do not appropriate-•	
ly differentiate between minority communities. For example in Hungary, and 
to a lesser extent in Poland, significant problems are rooted in the fact that dif-
ferent minorities need different treatment and generalised legal instruments 
are not able to answer these differences many times. This means that there are 
groups that are left out from legal protection, there are other groups which 
have no real access to the specific minority rights, while for other minorities, 
especially for the Roma in Hungary, the legally protected cultural minority 
rights are inappropriate in improving their social situation. Diversity of ethnic 
communities may well need divergent approaches and unfortunately, at least 
in Central-Eastern European countries, these divergent approaches are rarely 
present at this time at the level of government policies.
In perspective, conclusions are based on the experience of the years following •	
the enlargement of the European Union in 2004. The former influence of the 
EU in developing minority rights standards has faded away after accession, 
and it is now a common lesson that EU accession alone does not resolve mi-
nority problems. Furthermore, national governments often tend to disregard 
minority claims more after EU accession than during the enlargement process 
when their performance was monitored in this field. Such practises may raise 
particular concerns among the representatives of minorities.
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eastern europe and the BaltiC states
Introduction
The process of democratic transition in post-communist Europe is characterised 
by severe disruptions of former social and economic structures and the collapse 
of the planned economy system. The transition to democracy has not affected all 
social groups equally. Ethnic minorities have been usually among the losers in 
this process. The unemployment rate among minorities tends to be higher com-
pared to the majority population. Similarly, minorities tend to evaluate the ef-
fects of transition to their social status more negatively. In political life the popu-
lar fight against authoritarian regime was supported by minority groups and, in 
some countries, the first years of transition were characterised by the inclusion of 
minority representatives in political activities of the state, then with the progress 
of democratisation, a gradual decrease of the role of minorities in politics can be 
noted.
A preparatory workshop took place in Tallinn, Estonia on March 30, 2007. The 
aim of the workshop was to explore the role that national minorities have played 
in the process of democratic transition in Eastern Europe (Moldova, Ukraine, and 
Belarus) and the Baltic States and to map the situation in the area of the develop-
ment of minority rights, local government models, different forms of autonomy, 
and the application of international standards during and after the process of 
transition.
Countries in the region of Eastern Europe (Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova) 
and the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) are characterised by the 
presence of large groups of Soviet-era immigrants of mainly Russian origin in 
each of those countries. Although the ethnic origins of Soviet-era immigrants (as 
well as so-called historic minorities) are diverse, the dividing line in the area of 
minority issues usually runs between titular nationality and the Russian-speaking 
group. The one exception here is Belarus, where the division line is not strongly 
pronounced in politics or the everyday life of its citizens.
Additionally, the ethno-political situation in the region and majority-minority 
relations in the transition process are heavily influenced by the historic period 
of Soviet nationalities policies. The Russian Federation plays an important role 
as a kin-state in minority-majority relations in all countries in the region. Al-
though the level of so-called securitisation of minority issues varies from country 
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to country, it is evident that Russia as a player in minority issues in the transition 
process is present in all those countries. A current report presents the main issues 
discussed during the workshop and summarises the issues of main concern in the 
area of minority rights and policies in Eastern Europe and Baltic States.
Role of Minorities in the Process of Transition
The largest percentages of Russian-speaking Soviet era immigrants live in Es-
tonia, Latvia, and Ukraine. People with minority ethnic background constitute 
about one third of the population of estonia. Among them, the largest group is 
Russians (26%) followed by Ukrainians (2%) and Belarusians (1%) who all rep-
resent Soviet-era immigrants. The share of ethnic minorities has decreased from 
38% in 1989 to 32% in 2000, due to various reasons ranging from re-emigration 
to Russia, emigration to other parts of Europe, and to generally low birth rates.
The Position of minorities in Estonia during the transition period can be char-
acterised by the process of gradual social and political exclusion. As a result of 
the 1992 Citizenship Act, around 450.000 people, mostly of Russian ethnic back-
ground, were excluded from political participation on the basis of the restitution 
principle. This principle established citizenship rights to direct descendants of 
the pre-Soviet Estonian Republic (1918-1940), thus leaving all Soviet-era immi-
grants in a legal vacuum at the time of first elections to the Estonian parliament 
in 1992. As a result, the first post-soviet parliament of Estonia did not have a 
single minority-background representative. In 1993 Estonia adopted a controver-
sial Aliens Act that established that all Soviet-era immigrants who did not wish 
to naturalise should apply for residence permits. Today, the numbers of people 
who do not possess citizenship of any country (so called stateless people) consti-
tute about 10% of the total population of Estonia. In addition, another 10% are 
citizens of the Russian Federation. These two groups, in total around 20% of the 
population, are excluded from full political participation. During the transition 
period a strong ethnic mobilisation of Estonians took place that was not equally 
balanced by a political mobilisation of minorities. Even today ethnic political par-
ties play a marginal role in the political process and development of active civil 
society organisations among the Russian-speaking minority is weak. Political 
participation index for Russian citizens and stateless people is rather low. Ac-
cording to a recent integration monitoring report, 77% of stateless respondents 
and 81% of Russian citizens stated no participation in the political life of Estonia. 
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Comparatively, among Estonian citizens with titular nationality background only 
38% declared no participation in political life. The rate is higher for people with a 
minority background who hold Estonian citizenship (35%).
Minorities generally feel exclusion from the political and social life of Estonia 
also on the basis of their linguistic differences, mainly through poor command 
of the official language. Linguistic skills also play an important role in the labour 
market where, according to Estonian Labour Force Surveys of 1989-2003, non-
Estonians are over-represented in elementary occupations and underrepresented 
in managerial positions. The overall process of political exclusion, linguistic as-
pects, and social exclusion from the labour market on this basis, has resulted in 
an overall socio-political marginalisation of the Soviet era Russian-speaking mi-
nority.
The situation of minorities is similar in neighbouring latvia. The share of na-
tional minorities that include Soviet-era immigrants as its largest group is the 
highest in the region constituting 42% of the total population of Latvia. Similarly 
to Estonia, the largest minority groups are Russians (30%), Belarusians (4%), and 
Ukrainians (3%). In addition, the political transition process in Latvia, much as in 
Estonia, resulted in exclusion of Soviet-era immigrants from political participa-
tion. However, differently from Estonia, the share of Russian Federation citizens 
in Latvia is lower.
As a result of political exclusion, the rate of political participation of minori-
ties continues to be low. Participation of minorities in parliamentary and local 
elections is significantly lower compared to majority Latvians. A similar tenden-
cy can also be noted in all other areas of political activity such as organisation 
of political campaigns, meetings with politicians, as well as holding discussions 
on social, political, or local development issues. However, in many areas such as 
education and career development, the Russian-speaking minority has accepted 
an adaptation strategy. According to Aasland (2006), differences between ethnic 
groups both in terms of material welfare and level of social integration are not 
significant. In income and consumption levels, the Russian-speaking minority is 
only slightly disadvantaged compared to ethnic Latvians. However, during the 
transition process of 1990ies, minorities felt more insecure in the labour market 
than ethnic Latvians. There is still a considerable degree of ethnic segregation in 
the labour market with certain sectors of the economy featuring overrepresen-
tation of the titular group and others of ethnic minorities. A certain degree of 
political and social exclusion can be discerned from the fact that there is a domi-
nance of ethnic Latvians in the higher positions in public administration. One of 
the crucial factors contributing to social and political exclusion of minorities is, 
like in Estonia, lack of a proficiency in  the official state language.
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In third Baltic country, lithuania, the share of national minorities is lower, 
constituting around 16% of the total population. The largest minority groups 
are Poles (6.7%) and Russians (6.3%) followed by Belarusians (1.2%). The posi-
tion of minorities in the transition process varied over time and differed between 
particular minority groups. In the early phase of national independence an in-
clusive approach prevailed and people with a minority background were sought 
for support. In 1990s the role of the minority as a mediator between cultures 
was a popular image. This role was especially assigned to Tatars, Karaims, and 
Jews, while other minorities were treated as objects rather than subjects in state 
policies. With transition passing its peak the symbolic importance of minority 
representatives decreased. The role of minorities is diminishing in party politics, 
participatory politics, and in symbolic politics. At the same time the general ac-
ceptance of minorities is also decreasing accompanied by a diminishing role of 
minority issues in the political agenda and marginalisation of minority groups.
In Lithuania, the transition period was characterised with problems of social 
adaptations of minorities. Results of an adaptation survey from 2001-2002 show 
that civic and political activism and voter turnout was low compared to the major-
ity population. In addition, minorities represent ethnically isolated segments in 
the labour market accompanied by a generally higher unemployment rate among 
minorities compared to majorities. The overall perception of change in social 
status is negative among minorities. Compared to ethnic Lithuanians, the share 
of people among Russian and Tatar minority groups who perceive the change of 
their social status as negative is higher than those who see the change positively. 
Among Poles and Jews the change is generally perceived less negatively, however, 
these groups are also less optimistic about their social position compared to eth-
nic Lithuanians. Thus, unlike Estonia and Latvia, Lithuania did not pursue an 
official policy of political exclusion of national minorities (a so-called restitution 
policy) and, initially, support for minorities was sought in politics. However, with 
time the inclusion process changed and general acceptance of minorities has di-
minished. During the transition process social adaptation of minorities was prob-
lematic with higher unemployment rates for minorities and an overall negative 
perception of change.
ukraine started its nation-building process with a multiethnic population 
characterised by several territorialised ethnic communities facing the problems 
of securing recognition of highly contested borders, and with a significant cleav-
age between its western and eastern regions. Ukrainians in 1989 were in a clear 
numerical majority in the republic, amounting to 72.7% of the total population. 
Among other nationalities 22% were ethnic Russians and more than 30 nation-
alities numbered over 5,000, with the most numerous being Jews, Belarusians, 
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Moldovans, Bulgarians, Poles,  Hungarians, and Romanians. By 2001 the share 
of Ukrainians had increased, constituting 77.8% of the total population. This 
resulted from the emigration of ethnic minorities on the one hand and self re-
identification of persons belonging to national minorities on the other hand. This 
way the number of Romanians has increased at the expense of the decrease in the 
number of Moldovans.
Additionally, recent research indicates that the country is characterised by the 
presence of dual identities and bilingualism: 57% of the population self-identifies 
only as ‘Ukrainian’, 11% only as ‘Russian’, while about 26% show a dual identity 
in that they affirm to self-identify as both ‘Ukrainian’ and ‘Russian’. The division 
lines based on ethnicity and language are not as clear in Ukraine as, for example, 
in Baltic States.
During the early transition period the process of democratisation and nation-
building enjoyed strong support from representatives of national minorities. Na-
tional minorities were sought for support and the new administration was eager 
to establish a minority-friendly regime. The so- called “zero-option” for citizen-
ship was chosen and the Law on National Minorities was adopted in 1992, the 
first among post-communist countries.
The political activism of minority groups is high, especially when compared 
to the Baltic States. The Crimean Tatars successful participation in political life 
has become possible due to the unique experience of self-organisation and mo-
bilisation. However, these self-government bodies are not officially recognised 
by Ukrainian legislation. Other minorities, mainly Hungarians and Romanians 
in the Transcarpathian region are well-represented in regional, district, and city 
councils. Connected to the problems of dual identities and the fact that there 
are de facto two state-forming nations, Ukrainians and Russians, political mobi-
lisation of the mainly Russian-speaking population remained low. Additionally, 
politically motivated manipulations of minority issues do rise periodically, espe-
cially before and during election campaigns. The most widespread provocative 
issue is the status of the Russian minority and the Russian language.
Tensions rise high in the Crimean peninsula. This part of Ukraine with its 
dominant Russian-speaking group and returning Crimean Tatars has remained 
the most problematic today. Democratic transition is hindered by the activities 
of extremist groups claiming the right of the Russian Federation to the peninsula 
and hindering the process of democratic consolidation.
The Process of economic and social transition hit majority and minority 
groups equally hard. However, some minority groups such as Roma and return-
ing Crimean Tatars have faced serious socio-economic problems. These groups 
are regularly disadvantaged in the labour market compared to other nationalities. 
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Unemployment is a problem affecting Ukrainian society at large however; it ap-
pears to affect disproportionately persons belonging to national minorities. This 
is partially due to the fact that a large number of persons belonging to national 
minorities are concentrated in areas with particular severe economic difficulties 
such as Transcarpathia and Crimea. The unemployment rate amongst Crimean 
Tatars is extraordinarily high.
In Belarus, the clear distinctions between the national majority and minority 
are hard to draw. People who declared their nationality to be Belarusian constitut-
ed 81% of population followed by Russians (11%), Poles (3.9%) and Ukrainians 
(2.4%). However, according to the 1999 census, only 45% of people identifying 
themselves as Belarusians were able to speak their native language, Belarusian. 
During the transition process self re-identification of minorities and the majority 
took place much as it did in Ukraine.
In Moldova a similar process of re-identification took place. In 1989 Moldovans 
constituted 64.5% of the total population of the Republic, while in 2005 the share 
had increased to 71.5%. Among minorities the largest are Ukrainians (11.2%) fol-
lowed by Russians (9.4%) and Gagauz people (4%).
The Situation of Minorities Today: Institutions and Legal 
Instruments
The legal framework of post-communist estonia is derived from the principle of 
restitution ad integrum that declared the period of the Soviet regime as occupation 
and restored the legal framework of the Estonian republic of 1939. As already 
stated earlier, this principle declared a citizenship rule that left the majority of 
Soviet era settlers without citizenship of the Estonian Republic. The Aliens Act 
which was adopted in 1993 and envisioned registration of all citizens of former 
Soviet Union who resided in Estonia and did not possess the citizenship of any 
other country as foreigners, precipitated a large political crisis in the country and 
diplomatic crises with the Russian Federation. Secession referendums in Narva 
and Sillamäe, eastern parts of Estonia with a strong Russian majority were de-
clared illegal by the Estonian government and open inter-ethnic conflict was 
eventually avoided with OSCE negotiations.
The constitution of the Republic of Estonia, adopted in 1992, declared that 
every person in Estonia has the right to preserve their ethnic identity and also 
included an article about non-discrimination. The preamble of constitution, how-
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ever, declared that the state shall guarantee the preservation of the Estonian 
nation and culture through the ages, where Estonian nation refers to ethnically 
Estonian people. This statement in the preamble guarantees collective rights to 
ethnic Estonians, while other ethnic-cultural groups are mainly provided for with 
individual rights. Article 52 of the Constitution sets the Estonian language as the 
official language of the state and the Estonian Language Act (1989, 1995, changes 
in 1999) specifies the rules of applicability of the official language. According to 
the constitution, in locations wherein the majority of the population speaks a 
language other than Estonian, the authorities of the local government can apply 
for special permission from the government to disseminate information and re-
ply to inquiries in the local language.
The National Minorities Cultural Autonomy Act (1995) that is often cited by Es-
tonian politicians as an example of fair and equal treatment of all ethnic groups in 
the country was adopted with slight changes from the act of 1925. The definition of 
a national minority is restricted only to citizens of the Estonian republic who con-
sider themselves to be linguistically, culturally, historically, or ethnically different 
from the majority of population. The applicability of this law is thus very narrow, 
as the greater part of Russian-speaking people do not possess Estonian citizenship.
The Presidential Roundtable on National Minorities has functioned with some 
success as a representative body of minorities; however, its influence on the po-
litical process has been rather limited.
Concerning international legal instruments, Estonia ratified the Council of 
Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (CoE 
Framework Convention) in 1998. Major criticism of the advisory committee is di-
rected to the abovementioned restrictive definition of national minority and the 
ineffectiveness of the cultural autonomy act. The Estonian authorities’ attention 
has also been drawn to the almost non-existent consultation of the state with 
independent bodies representing minorities and different aspects of Estonian 
language enforcement regulations, especially in public.
In latvia there has been progress in the area of legal protection of minority 
rights, however, in some areas the process has gone rather backwards. In Latvia, 
as in Estonia, a large group of Soviet era settlers (730 000 people in 1991) re-
mained stateless after establishment of a citizenship policy based on the restitu-
tion principle. The number of stateless people has slowly decreased since then, 
however, it still remains high, and the problem of statelessness has been brought 
to the attention of the Latvian government by many international observers.
The Law on Cultural Autonomy was adopted in 1999 through which cultural 
associations of national minorities can request state financial contribution to 
their activities.
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A Latvian National Human Rights Office (LNHRO) was established in 1995. 
It is an independent state institution that promotes the observance of human 
rights in Latvia including issues connected to minority rights. Starting from 
January 2007 the office has been reformed into an Ombudsman institution. A 
national integration policy is implemented through the Secretariat of Special As-
signments Minister for Social Integration assisted by Latvia’s Society Integration 
Foundation.
Latvia ratified the Council of Europe Framework Convention only recently, 
in 2006 (signed in 1995). The definition of a national minority in Latvia is less 
restrictive than in Estonia and also includes stateless persons. National minori-
ties are defined as citizens of Latvia who differ from Latvians in terms of their 
culture, religion, or language, who have traditionally lived in Latvia for genera-
tions, and consider themselves to belong to the State and society of Latvia, who 
wish to preserve and develop their culture, religion, or language. Persons who are 
not citizens of Latvia or another State but who permanently and legally reside 
in the Republic of Latvia, who do not belong to a national minority within the 
meaning of the Framework Convention, but who identify themselves with a na-
tional minority that meets the definition, shall enjoy the rights prescribed in the 
Framework Convention, unless specific exceptions are prescribed by law.
Neither Latvia nor Estonia has ratified the European Charter for Regional or 
Minority Languages. lithuania was among the first post-Soviet states to adopt 
the Law on National Minorities in 1989 and, a year later, a governmental Depart-
ment of Nationalities was created, the first ministerial-level organisation of its 
kind in the former Soviet Union.
Lithuania’s Constitution, adopted in 1992, stresses both the guaranteed rights 
of individuals, regardless of nationality, as well as rights of national communities. 
The Law on National Minorities guarantees the rights of national minorities to 
receive state support for the development of their cultures and education. The 
Council of National Communities, an organisation composed of delegates from 
minority associations and affiliated with the government’s Department of Nation-
alities has proposed several modifications to Lithuania’s language and education 
policy that have been implemented. Communities where minorities constitute 
more than half of the population, as well as people belonging to national minori-
ties, have the right to use their native language, in offices and organisations, in 
addition to Lithuanian. An Amendment to the Law on National Minorities ena-
bled minorities to be educated in their native languages with state support of 
native-language schools and special provisions to train national specialists in in-
stitutions of higher education.
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The law on citizenship (1991, amended in 1997) grants ukrainian citizenship 
automatically to all citizens of the USSR, who at the moment of the declaration 
of independence reside in the territory of Ukraine. Thus a citizenship issue has 
not created significant problems in Ukraine. Nevertheless, language remains an 
issue of concern between the majority and minority. The 1996 constitution states 
that Ukrainian is the sole state language without mentioning bilingualism or the 
parallel use of Russian as an official language. However, the 1992 Law on National 
Minorities provides that in areas where other nationalities form the majority of 
the population, their national language can be designated as the official language. 
De facto the use of certain minority languages, such as Russian, Hungarian, and 
Romanian is accepted in contacts with administrative authorities in a number of 
municipalities inhabited by a substantial number of persons belonging to the na-
tional minorities. The Language law also provides a possibility to introduce place 
names in a minority language if the minority in question constitutes a majority in 
the locality. This provision has been used by Hungarian minority in the Transcar-
pathian region; however, a problem arises with Crimean Tatars who do not meet 
the numerical threshold required for implementation of this provision in Crimea.
The Articles of Constitution declare a non-discrimination policy of the Ukrain-
ian state. Members of national minorities in Ukraine are present in the regional 
Councils of Peoples’ Deputies and in organs of local self-government. The State 
Committee for Nationalities and Migration with its 24 branches is the central 
executive body in the fields of national minorities’ rights, international relations, 
issues related to the Ukrainian diaspora and migration. In 1996, a Council of Rep-
resentatives of Civic Communities of National Minorities was created, attached 
to the abovementioned State Committee, as a channel of communication and 
co-ordination between the state and the national minorities’ representatives. It 
includes representatives of 23 national minorities’ organisations that have an all-
Ukrainian status.
The Council of Representatives of Public Organisations of National Minori-
ties by the President of Ukraine is a consultative body of national minorities. 
However, this body is convened only rarely and does not constitute a forum for 
regular and frequent consultation and dialogue on issues pertaining to national 
minorities. The Council of Representatives of Crimean Tatars, set up by presiden-
tial decree in 1999, is a well-functioning forum for discussion on issues pertain-
ing to Crimean Tatars.
The structure of state bodies dealing with national minorities has been in con-
stant flux in Ukraine over the past years. This has had a negative impact on the 
effectiveness and consistency of their work.
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In the area of international minority protection treaties, Ukraine ratified the 
Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minori-
ties in 1997 and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages in 
2003. Ukraine has signed bilateral agreements of friendship and co-operation, 
containing provisions for joint responsibility for the protection of rights of re-
spective national minorities, with all seven bordering states. Moreover with two 
bordering states (Hungary since 1991, Slovakia since 1994) and with Lithuania 
(since 1997), Ukraine has established standing intergovernmental commissions 
composed of representatives of ministries and other institutions with responsi-
bility in the sphere of minority policy. The main areas of concern include outdated 
or still lacking pieces of legislation relating to the protection of minority rights 
and the strategic course of Ukrainian ethno-politics. It is accompanied with an 
unsatisfactory implementation of existing laws, low awareness among national 
and regional authorities and the public at large of the necessity to take further 
steps in protecting minority rights, and insufficient attention to negative trends 
and developments revealing a growth of xenophobia within Ukrainian society.
Moldova has regularly been presented as a good example of minority rights 
protection in the post-communist era. The Moldovan institutional structure has 
been characterised with large number of bodies dealing with minority issues dur-
ing the period of transition in from the 1990ies to 2001. There was a Department 
of Interethnic Relations, a Parliamentary Committee for Human Rights and Na-
tional Minorities, a Commission for Interethnic Relations by the President of the 
Republic of Moldova and a Board for Minority Education within the Ministry of 
Education. In addition, an Inter-Ethnic Studies Institute within the Academy of 
Science of the Republic of Moldova was conducting research in the area of in-
terethnic relations and minority rights.
The Moldovan national legal framework for the protection of national mi-
norities was similarly extensive, ranging from basic protection enshrined in the 
Constitution of the Republic of Moldova adopted in 1994, the Law on Languages 
Functioning on the Territory of Moldova (1989), the Law on Citizenship, the Law 
on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National Minorities and the Status of their 
Organisations (2001) to decrees of the President of the Republic of Moldova on 
Further Development of Ukrainian, Russian, Jewish, Bulgarian, and Roma Cul-
ture in Moldova (1991- 1992). The Law on National Minorities of 2001 has sought 
to improve and extend the relevant legal framework and made practical efforts to 
support national minorities in the fields of culture and education.
However, starting from 2001, a significant decrease in the number of institu-
tions dealing with minority issues has appeared. The parliamentary committee 
and the presidential commission have ceased to operate as well as the board deal-
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ing with minority language education. Ethno-barometer programme research 
has concluded that measures taken to ensure a more balanced use of the various 
minority languages in schools, in the media, and in relations with administrative 
authorities have not produced the intended results.
In area of international minority protection Moldova has again been set as a 
positive example. Legislation of the rights of minorities is generally in accordance 
with international standards. The country has ratified CoE Framework Conven-
tion and signed the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. In 
addition, OSCE instruments - the Oslo Recommendations Regarding Linguistic 
Rights of national Minorities and the Hague Recommendations Regarding Edu-
cational Rights of national Minorities - have been ratified by the state.
However, as in the case of Ukraine, the implementation of legal provisions, 
national as well as international, remain insufficient. There is insufficient moni-
toring of the situation of minorities by the authorities, inadequate programming 
of socio-economic and political integration, and inadequate allocation of financial 
resources and, in some cases, a lack of political will, particularly at local level to 
deal with the protection of minority rights. The question of Transnistria remains 
a serious concern, especially since this conflict affects a great many developments, 
political and others, of importance to the whole population of Moldova.
Belarus took its first steps in the area of protection of national minorities 
already in 1992 by adopting the Law on National Minorities. It establishes the 
definition of national minorities (Art.1.) as the following: national minorities are 
persons permanently residing on the territory of Belarus, having Belarusian citi-
zenship whose origin, language, culture, or traditions are different from those of 
main population of the republic.
Similarly, the Constitution of the Republic of Belarus gives guarantees for 
the respect of rights of minorities and equality before the law of people belong-
ing to different ethnicities. Additionally, the constitution guarantees freedom of 
language choice. Legislation on national minority rights is monitored by State 
Committee on Regions and Nationalities under the Council of Ministers of the 
Republic of Belarus.
Members of minority groups are granted personal autonomy. Most active in 
the public sphere is the Polish minority that has united under the Union of Poles 
in Belarus (UPB). This association unites 75 organisations, as well as 17 so-called 
Polish houses.  The activities of public associations of minorities are financed 
from state-run bodies, mainly local budgets.
Belarus has ratified the Framework Convention of CIS countries for protection 
of national minorities in 1994. However, it has neither ratified the CoE Frame-
work Convention nor the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages.
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Minority Policies and European Standards
Among the countries of Eastern Europe and the Baltic States, estonia has the 
longest experience in developing and implementing national integration pro-
grammes directed at resolving the situation of divided society inherited from So-
viet past and encouraging intercultural dialogue. The first national document lay-
ing down the principles of the state’s approach to society’s integration problem 
was adopted in 1998. In the same year, a national foundation – Non-Estonians 
Integration Foundation – was created. The task of the foundation is to initiate, 
support, and coordinate projects aimed at the integration of Estonian society. 
A comprehensive state integration programme was developed for the period of 
2000-2007. The programme declared an Estonian model of multicultural society 
to be characterised by the principles of cultural pluralism and the preservation 
and development of the Estonian culture. Its main focus was, however, on teach-
ing the Estonian language to Soviet-era settlers. A new national integration pro-
gramme for the period from 2008-2013 is currently under development and will 
have been presented to the government by the end of 2007. Differently from the 
previous programme, the new policy aims at re-focusing from language teach-
ing towards social and economic cohesion, including political integration of the 
whole society. The model of multiculturalism adopted by the state programme is 
based on John Rex’s concept of multiculturalism where society is unitary in the 
public sphere but tolerant regarding differences in the private sphere. The new 
definition of integration focuses on equality of opportunity, promotion of partici-
patory democracy, and takes into account Estonia’s regional differences. It also 
focuses on young people and development of a sense of security for all national 
groups that should form the basis of successful integration.
latvia has developed its national integration programme Integration of Society 
in Latvia in 2001. The need for an integration programme was acknowledged by 
the government and is stated in the programme document: “National develop-
ment may be significantly hindered if alienation persists between the individual 
and the state, between different parts of society, and between the society and the 
state. Integration of society, therefore, has become a matter of urgent necessity.”
Social integration has been divided into sub-areas of (1) political integration, 
(2) social and regional integration, (3) education, language, and culture, and (4) 
information, including media and support for science. The main criticism of mi-
nority groups towards state policy has focused on the rather assimilatory charac-
ter of policy measures of the programme.
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The European Union has been one of the major financial supporters for the 
integration policies of Estonia and Latvia. During the EU accession process a seri-
ous dialogue on the issues of political integration (especially the issue with state-
less persons) in Estonia and Latvia was taken up by the EU and Phare, and other 
aid money was directed to solving these issues. The EU continues to be one of the 
major financial sources for development of integration policy and the implemen-
tation thereof in those two countries.
lithuania developed its first comprehensive national integration programme 
only recently. However, governmental support for minorities has been one of the 
policy lines from the reestablishment of independence in 1991. Various policy 
initiatives have been directed towards integration of national minorities into the 
economic, political, and cultural life of Lithuania. Integration is here defined in 
opposition to assimilation. The integration approach encourages the minority 
groups to retain their specific identities and traditions, but on the other hand 
helps them to participate in society on an equal footing with the majority group 
and thus decrease the economic and educational disparities between different 
nationality groups. Minority groups have actively participated in the formula-
tion of Lithuania’s integration policy, mainly safeguarding their right for cultural 
autonomy and resisting the tendency towards assimilation.
ukraine has not implemented any comprehensive national minority policy 
programme. During the transition period, the leaders of Rukh, the popular move-
ment of Ukraine, argued that Ukraine should adopt a multicultural concept of the 
state. Such a concept would recognise Ukraine as multinational state with many 
different nationalities and a large Ukrainian majority rather than as a Ukrainian 
nation-state. Immediately after its formation in 1989, Rukh established a spe-
cial Council of Nationalities and among the very first resolutions it passed was 
one condemning anti- Semitism and denouncing the act of Deportation of the 
Crimean Tatars in 1944.
However, in the later period of transition, the move towards the conception 
of Ukraine as a nation state for Ukrainian nation dominated and Ukraine became 
an essentially Ukrainian state with national minorities. The Law on National Mi-
norities adopted in 1992 is one of the state policy instruments in supporting 
national minorities. The law calls for budget support for national minorities for 
their cultural activities, as well as for preserving their identity, and it guarantees 
the right of minorities to national-cultural autonomy. The latter principle is nev-
ertheless formulated in an extremely general fashion and the content and merit 
of this concept needs to be defined and developed in more detail. In addition, 
national and especially Crimean authorities have been unable, and sometimes 
117
unwilling, to meet the demands of Crimean Tatars for funding their social and 
cultural needs.
A serious problem remains concerning insufficient state concern and lack of 
policies targeted at improving the situation of the Roma minority. Roma people 
suffer from discrimination, a low level of education, high unemployment, diffi-
cult or even complete lack of access to medical services, and very poor housing 
conditions. The Advisory Committee of the CoE Framework Convention notes 
with concern that the societal attitudes towards the Roma remain negative, and 
sociological studies suggest that the prejudice towards Roma is markedly more 
widespread than towards persons belonging to other nationalities. The Ukrainian 
government has been urged to design initiatives in the sphere of Roma education 
to combat the problem of low attendance figures for Roma children at all levels 
of education.
The inefficient collection of reliable socio-economic and political data, broken 
down by age, gender, and location hinders effective monitoring of the minority 
situation in Ukraine and, subsequently, development and implementation of 
comprehensive state programmes.
Conclusions 
Based on the presentations of the workshop and discussion, the following conclu-
sions can be drawn on the situation of minorities in Eastern Europe and the Baltic 
States:
The situation of minorities in the transition process can be characterised by •	
a gradual process of social and political exclusion. In Estonia and Latvia the 
majority of Soviet-era settlers did not receive automatic citizenship and thus 
remained excluded from political participation, and the situation continues 
with little progress until today. In all countries of the region, minorities were 
disproportionately severely affected by socio-economic changes. Thus the 
numbers for unemployment are higher among minority groups compared 
to the majority populations in all countries of the region. Especially serious 
socio-economic difficulties affect Roma communities in Ukraine and Moldova 
as well as the Crimean Tatars.
Participation of minorities in political life during the transition process has •	
been generally lower compared to the majority. Although differences exist 
between countries in the region: where support of minorities was sought by 
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political parties in Ukraine and Lithuania, in Estonia and Latvia disfranchise-
ment of the Russian-speaking minority took place. Still, in all countries ma-
nipulation with minority issues regularly takes place during election periods.
The situation of minorities during the transition period (including the very •	
definition of who belongs to a national minority) has been strongly influenced 
by the previous decades of the Soviet Union’s nationalities policy. Ethno-po-
litical situations and tensions in inter-ethnic relations in all countries of the 
region reflect the failures of Soviet policies in the area of immigration and in-
tegration. Additionally, significant identity issues affect majority as well as mi-
nority groups in Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova and, to a smaller extent, the 
Russian-speaking groups in the Baltic States. The extent of politicisation of 
identity issue ranges from mild in Belarus to rather problematic in Ukraine.
The definition of a national minority is controversial and likewise affected by •	
the history of the Soviet Nationalities Policy and immigration. Estonia and 
Latvia are reluctant to extend definition of national minority to Soviet-era 
settlers (Latvia though, has accepted a more inclusive definition) and instead 
assign the normative description of immigrants to them, thus excluding a 
large proportion of its population from the possibility to fully exercise rights 
granted to national minorities, i.e. practicing cultural autonomy. Ukraine, on 
the other hand, is unenthusiastic about defining Crimean Tatars as indigenous 
people as is often requested by this group itself. Thus, it can be argued that 
3 different categories of minorities are present in the region: (1) indigenous 
people, (2) national minorities and (3) immigrants. However, attribution of 
those categories to groups of people is in many cases motivated by political 
concerns or struggle for power rather than objective criteria of historical be-
longing, or least the demand by the group under question itself.
All countries in the region highlight the primacy of individual rights and per-•	
sonal autonomy as the basis for guaranteeing the rights of minorities. In ad-
dition they all provide some degree of group-based rights. Group-based rights 
are either formulated in an extremely general fashion or restricted to only cer-
tain groups of national minorities by excluding others.
The legal framework of minority rights protection can be characterised as •	
satisfactory and meeting international standards in most of the countries of 
the region. However, the problem of implementation of these standards, in 
some cases local obstruction of implementation and political obstacles when 
putting guarantees for minorities into force, occur as major problems while 
putting international standards into practise. Implementation problems are 
somewhat more significant in Ukraine and Moldova compared to the Baltic 
States. In Estonia (and to some extent in Latvia) some of the initiatives to 
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protect national minorities, such as the laws on cultural autonomy, contain 
elements that are not suited for the present situation of minorities. Namely, 
the narrow definition of national minority excludes the majority of Russian-
speaking people from the right to use cultural autonomy law provisions.
The adoption of international laws pertaining to situation of minorities has •	
been different in the region. All countries, with the exception of Belarus, have 
signed and ratified the CoE Framework Convention. Belarus has ratified the 
Framework Convention of CIS countries for the protection of national minori-
ties in 1994. Only Ukraine has signed the European Charter for Regional or 
Minority Languages.
The language issue has become highly politicised in Estonia and Latvia and, •	
gradually, also in Ukraine. Conflicts have risen during the transition period 
over the definition of a state’s official language, use of minority languages in 
the public sphere, and in local administrations where a minority group consti-
tutes the majority.
Due to the ethno-political situation of 1991 and the policies of the regimes of •	
independent Estonia and Latvia, the integration issue has become extremely 
important in the long-term sustainable development of these societies. Both 
countries have implemented multi-year national integration programmes 
with financial support from the European Union. These states’ policies have 
been criticised by the minorities to be too assimilative in their character. The 
questions of effective monitoring, as well as basing policy decision on socio-
logical data, have been raised in connection to those programmes. Lithuania 
has followed suit and developed all-inclusive national integration programme 
just recently. Other countries in the region, notably Ukraine and Moldova, 
have a clear need for a comprehensive integration policy. However, no national 
programmes of that sort have been developed as of today. Additionally, these 
countries face the problem of availability of sociological data about the situa-
tion of minorities, as well as effective monitoring procedures.
Last, but not least, minority issues in the region are characterised by what •	
Wæver (1995) called securitisation of ethnic relations. Russia, as a kin-state, 
is an actor that plays a decisive role in all aspects of national minority issues 
of the countries in Eastern Europe and the Baltic States. Minorities often feel 
themselves to be hostage in security politics between their home country and 
Russia. It can be argued that issues of national minority rights and policies can-
not be addressed without consideration of the role of Russia being involved.
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southeastern europe
”Tell me who would like a garden 
that only had white roses or just clovers . . .”
Kimet Fetahu, Representative of Macedonian minority in Albania
Introduction
The timing of this seminar was auspicious, coming as Bulgaria and Romania have 
just joined the EU, Croatia has become a prime candidate to become an EU mem-
ber, Bosnia and Herzegovina marked the twelfth year anniversary of the Dayton 
Peace Agreement that ended the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro 
became independent, Serbia adopted a new Constitution in 2006, and the Ohrid 
Framework Agreement between the Macedonian and the Albanian political par-
ties that ended the hostilities in Macedonia is in the sixth year of its implementa-
tion. We expect the last major undecided issue resulting from the breakup of the 
former Yugoslavia to be settled – the status of Kosovo.
The theme of the workshop - the role of minorities in the process of transition 
in Southeast European countries - was the interconnecting issue that represented 
itself in a variety of ways throughout all of the sessions. A wide range of issues 
were raised, they ranged from concerns about marginalisation and self-isolation 
of minorities to a discussion of notions of identity, citizenship, integration, and 
assimilation.
Taking the example of Serbia, it was maintained that, at this very moment, 
minorities are mostly victims of the fact that Serbia is a weak state with fragile, 
ineffective institutions that cannot fully and effectively protect their rights. This 
is further complicated by the adoption of the new Constitution in 2006 that sets 
many traps in implementing minorities’ rights. Starting from the fact that Alba-
nians in Kosovo (formally still a part of Serbia) were not given a possibility to vote 
on the referendum for the Constitution to the formulation of Serbia as a state of 
“Serbs and others” one can foresee permanent dissatisfaction of minorities and 
tensions within Serbian society.
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The participants particularly enjoyed the open debate. One example is from 
the end of the third session, when there was an interesting debate on the influ-
ence of the EU in shaping minority policy in the Southeast Europe countries. It 
was said that this relationship is similar to a “doctor -patient” relationship.
This needs to be seen in the context of recent European history. The fall of the 
Berlin Wall in 1989 will always be used as a symbol for the end of the Cold War. 
The early 90s were also marked by the dissolution of the Soviet Union and disin-
tegration of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, which led to the formation of numer-
ous new states. In the case of Yugoslavia, this process of disintegration resulted in 
devastating wars on ethnic lines. Ethnic cleansing and large movements of popu-
lations changed the demographic picture of the region with reduced percentage 
of minority populations as a common denominator. With an influx of refugees a 
completely new social dynamic was created in relation to “diversity”. As an exam-
ple, in the Serbian autonomous province Vojvodina, the highest tension at this 
moment is between “Old Serbian population” and “Serbian newcomers”.
Since 2005 the EU has enlarged with twelve new members. In the context of 
an “enlarged Europe” there is an opportunity to take an approach to shared con-
cern for minorities. A recommendation to the EU is to take seriously the concern 
for culture reproduction of minorities as a matter of EU policy, establish strict 
standards and benchmarks, elaborate effective mechanisms to monitor the situ-
ation of national minorities in the EU member states and in countries wishing 
to join the EU, promote the use of minority languages (including the languages 
of numerically smaller minorities), intensify cooperation with the Council of Eu-
rope, etc.
The role played by Roma in the ongoing “democratic transition” in the Western 
Balkans has generally been minimal. This is the case because in the post-Commu-
nist period, as under the previous regime, Roma have been primarily the objects 
rather than the subjects of policy. Also important to keep in mind is that, even in 
the cases of best practise with regard to Roma in the region, Roma invariably con-
stitute the most disadvantaged national minority in countries which remain rela-
tively disadvantaged themselves. While a change in this state of affairs is likely to 
require generations, the speed of such a change might be increased by improving 
the possibilities for cooperation between the Southeast European countries and 
closer integration between the Western Balkans on the one hand and the Euro-
pean Union on the other.
Falling numbers of minorities, along with minorities’ immigration to kin-
states and third countries, is a major concern. This process has intensified since 
Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria joined the EU. An additional change resulting 
from EU membership is a new (dis)balance in international relations, for instance 
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in the case of Serbia and its neighbours. Although they remain bilateral, the 
“added EU value” positioned more favourably those minorities compared to oth-
ers, especially compared to Roma. The same issue was raised with respect to the 
Greek minority in Albania. In Macedonia, there is a trend for ethnic Macedonians 
moving out of mixed areas. On the other hand, representatives of the Albanian 
minority on the local level express concern that decisions are being “ethnicised” 
even if they are of interest to all citizens. The prospect of EU membership is an 
important incentive for the countries that are not yet members of the EU to con-
tinue with reforms and with the efforts to build trust between the various com-
munities.
The discussion’s background was the Council of Europe’s Framework Con-
vention for the Protection of National Minorities (hereinafter referred to as the 
‘Framework Convention’) to which all countries in the region are parties. The 
Convention is widely applied in the European Union member states. The Euro-
pean Union has also included “respect for and protection of minorities” in the 
Copenhagen criteria for membership in the Union.
The Framework Convention considers minority rights to be individual rights 
which, however, are often enjoyed in community with others (e.g., participation, 
language, etc.). The preamble of the Convention shows clearly that the protection 
of national minorities is essential to stability, democratic security, and peace: that 
a pluralist and genuinely democratic society is inextricably linked to the respect 
of the identity of persons belonging to national minorities, and that the creation 
of a climate of tolerance and dialogue enables cultural diversity to be a source of 
enrichment to each society.
The States which are parties to the Convention regard the following to be an 
essential and mandatory component of a peaceful and democratic society: the ef-
fective participation of persons belonging to national minorities, in concert with 
the principle of non-discrimination, protection, and advancement of minority 
identity, and the requirement to promote full and effective equality in all areas of 
economic, social, political, and cultural life. 
Workshop participants considered that the Framework Convention defines 
patterns of appropriate State action concerning the protection of minority rights. 
However, the framework nature of the Convention means that the implementa-
tion of these legal standards requires the adoption of national legislation and ap-
propriate governmental policies at the domestic level in the Southeast European 
countries. Application of the international standards remains a great challenge 
for all countries.
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Conclusions 
In addition, the following, more specific conclusions and proposals were made at 
the workshop:
With the advent of democracy in Southeast European countries, various mi-•	
norities have had their rights restored and they were able to acquire additional 
rights.
All countries moved to adopt and implement reforms that could never have •	
been imagined possible at the start of the transition process. As mentioned, 
all countries have ratified the Framework Convention. A number of Southeast 
European countries have signed the European Charter on Regional and Mi-
nority Languages. There are special provisions and even special laws on the 
rights of national minorities, such as the Law on the Protection of Rights and 
Freedoms of National Minorities in Serbia and the Constitutional Law on the 
Rights of National Minorities in Croatia.
Some examples of special rights accorded to members of minorities in some of •	
the countries include: official use of minority languages and alphabets, educa-
tion in the language of minorities, study of minorities’ mother tongue, use of 
minority symbols, cultural autonomy, freedom of religion and faith, etc.
The institutional framework has also developed. There are clear improvements •	
in the participation of national minorities in Parliament and in local bodies. 
Some countries allow the participation of smaller minorities in the national 
parliament on the basis of the principle of “reserved seats”. In addition, the 
councils of national minorities established in many countries in the region 
remain a promising innovation. They can have an important role in the imple-
mentation of Article 15 and other principles of the Framework Convention, 
provided they have a clear role as well as the capacity and resources to provide 
significant and constructive input to the relevant decision-making processes. 
Currently, however, these bodies are not so effective.
Despite this relatively well developed framework for the protection of the •	
rights of persons belonging to minorities, there continue to be inadequacies 
and legal gaps. Shortcomings are particularly manifest as regards the partici-
pation of persons belonging to national minorities in public service, the police, 
and judicial bodies. This issue also requires further attention by the relevant 
authorities in the design and implementation of related legislation, policies, 
and practises.
Minority policy in the region is often formal. Even though the ruling circles •	
of Southeast European countries, yielding to the external pressure from inter-
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national organisations and in the context of the Euro-Atlantic accession proc-
esses already underway, declared most of the existing international standards 
in the field of minority rights as the principles underlying their policies, the 
application of such standards is not a projection of a conscious political will 
but is rather fulfilment of commitments made without internal conviction of 
their value and necessity.
It is further evident that the legal and institutional framework on minority is-•	
sues in the Southeast European countries is ahead of the views of a great part 
of the population in general. Viewed in the context of mass political culture 
and the development level of civil society, the existing policies concerning mi-
norities are even deemed to be unnecessary and servicing political goals which 
are external to the public interest. Thus, measures which address problems of 
minorities tend to be unpopular.
In most countries voices can be heard that present minorities’ integration and •	
preservation of minority cultural identity as mutually exclusive. Hence, de-
spite some progress in fields such as education, the use of minority languages 
in public and private life, and participation in cultural life, positive steps re-
main insufficient. The provisions on teaching minority languages have not 
prompted substantial changes in practise in the region as a whole. A possibil-
ity to give greater support for initiatives coming from the minority communi-
ties should be considered.
In Macedonia, the constitutional and legislative changes made in accordance •	
with the Ohrid Agreement lay the foundations for greater protection for mi-
norities, inter alia, in such fields as the use of minority languages, education, 
and participation, with the introduction of the principle of equitable repre-
sentation for minorities at all levels of public administration. However, the 
bi-national state that emerged as a result of the post 2001 constitutional order 
in Macedonia does not address the dynamics of multi-ethnic society.
Significant efforts will, therefore, have to be made by the governments to •	
complete the legal and institutional framework, as well as to ensure its full 
realisation in practise. It is also essential that key institutions build further 
trust within minority communities, through increasing professionalism and 
by more effectively addressing inter-ethnic incidents and other concerns of 
persons belonging to various communities. Furthermore, the creation of a le-
gal framework should be preceded by a consistent and thorough process of 
creating a concept of the national policy regarding minorities; only through an 
extensive public discussion can the national policy on minorities be adopted 
and supported both by the majority of the citizens of the Southeast European 
countries and by representatives of the minorities in these countries.
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At the same time, minority communities should not expect their “inclusion” •	
to come mainly at the initiative of the majority, the media, or the govern-
ment, and they should not explain its absence only in terms of discrimination. 
Greater self-consciousness and organisation among minorities expressed in 
the form of active mechanisms for achieving representation would consider-
ably help speed up the desired processes. In order to achieve their purpose, 
nongovernmental organisations should formulate a clear stand on the issues 
which the minority in question view as most important in order to stimulate a 
public debate which will be heard by the representatives of the public authori-
ties with the help of the media.
Civil society organisations and NGOs on all levels have an important role with •	
respect to monitoring the implementation of existing legal framework and its 
improvement where necessary.
The EU has required a more coherent state policy towards minorities and has •	
financed specific measures aimed at improving the access of the Roma in par-
ticular to various public services and employment. However, the lack of ad-
equate Roma presence in the political life in the Southeast European countries 
has led to Roma problems not being sufficiently reflected. The overall imple-
mentation of specific measures and activities remains low.
Perhaps the factor which is most indicative of the current level of awareness •	
and commitment of policy-makers in the Southeast European countries is 
the extent of funding made available from the state budget for minority pro-
gramming. Insufficient budgets are constraints limiting all policies, not only 
those that target minority issues. Nevertheless, funding issues have particu-
lar implications for minority programming, where long-term commitment is 
needed to implement changes. However, too often, minority strategies and 
programmes are adopted without ensuring the necessary financial resources. 
Very often most of the available funding is from donors. The governments 
themselves have provided limited funding, with little long-term scope.
In addition to increasing the level and efficacy of funding from the state budg-•	
et, it is necessary to provide inter-related funding of public information and 
education projects. It is critical to involve the media to ensure that minority 
governance is seen as a positive contribution to Southeast European countries’ 
societies as a whole. It is important to engage both minority groups and the 
governments in order to nurture a shared understanding of what is needed. It 
is necessary to pursue an active policy of building mutual trust and promotion 
of respect of diversity.
Ethno-business is a relevant concern. Appropriate policies need to be devised •	
to minimise negative effects on its growth.
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There are examples, for instance, from Bulgaria and Romania of how power-•	
sharing experiences with political parties representing minority interests 
have contributed to boosting these countries’ image in foreign relations. The 
European Commission evaluated very highly the power-sharing and coopera-
tion with the two most active minority political parties, i.e. the Democratic 
Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (DAHR) in Romania and the Movement 
for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) in Bulgaria. However, leaders of such parties 
need to be mindful of the fact that the parties themselves may become the 
main barrier to their internal modernisation (even if their leaders see the need 
for modernisation of their programmes, they may be reluctant to do so fearing 
a loss of votes in the next elections).
The countries of Southeast Europe should make full use of the CoE Framework •	
Convention as an instrument that all countries in the region have ratified.
The responsibilities that the leaders of Southeast European countries face are •	
huge. The citizens who have elected them look to them to shape the destiny 
of their countries. The modern state should establish a functioning set of in-
stitutions which will create confidence that every single citizen will be able to 
exercise his/her civil, political, economic, and cultural rights, and will benefit 
from the public wealth and will participate in the management of public proc-
esses through the political representatives elected he or she elects. It is not 
possible to achieve a truly democratic government without the adequate and 
effective participation of minorities in the cultural, social, political, and pub-
lic life. A view of the state as an instrument for democratic government is a 
prerequisite both for balancing the interests of the different ethnic, linguistic, 
and religious communities and for the fair representation of these interests in 
public decisions and actions. Deviation from this objective can undermine the 
legitimacy of the basic structure of any state.
The journey to develop democratic states and multiethnic societies contin-
ues today. Regardless of some positive changes in the legal framework and the 
application of good practises in certain areas, an advanced policy on governing 
minority-related issues does not exist in any of the Southeast European coun-
tries. This type of policy will require innovative mechanisms that are a challenge 
for the future.
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Recommendations
The process of democratic transition in post-communist Europe is characterised 
by severe disruptions of former social and economic structures and the collapse 
of the previously existing planned economy system. Moreover, difficulties have 
emerged in connection with the re-definition of the identity of the state and the 
nation and the incorporation, within the new definitions, of the ethnic, religious, 
cultural, and linguistic diversity which characterises the new democracies. Re-
sponses to these problems have often led to competing claims and inter-ethnic 
conflicts. 
Transition to democracy has not affected all social groups equally. Ethnic mi-
norities have usually been among the losers in this process. The unemployment 
rate among minorities tends to be high when compared to that among major-
ity populations. Similarly, minorities tend to evaluate the effects of transition 
in their social status more negatively than majority populations. In political life, 
the popular fight against authoritarian regimes was often supported by minor-
ity groups. In some countries of Central and Eastern Europe the first years of 
transition were characterised by the inclusion of minority representatives in the 
political life of the state. However, the progress in democratisation has often been 
coupled with a gradual decrease of the role of minorities in political life.
The International Centre for Democratic Transition (ICDT) has launched a 
project to analyse the situation and the role of national and ethnic minorities in 
the transition process in Central and Eastern Europe, including in the Western 
Balkans. Regional workshops have been held in Budapest, Tallinn, and Skopje. 
The aim of the workshops has been to explore the role that national minorities 
have played in the process of democratic transition in Central and Eastern Europe 
and to describe the situation of the development of minority rights, local govern-
ment models, different forms of autonomy, and the application of international 
standards during and after the process of transition. Some of the general trends 
which have been identified are described below.
Among the countries of Central Europe which have been analysed, The Czech 
Republic, Hungary, and Poland are characterised by rather small minority com-
munities, which usually live dispersed throughout the state’s territory The Slovak 
Republic constitutes the only exception to this pattern. The minority problems 
of those countries relate to a) the political representation of minorities; b) their 
effective involvement in the political decision-making processes, and c) their so-
cial integration, the latter issue being especially relevant in the case of the Roma 
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minority. The legal framework has developed in an unbalanced way vis-à-vis mi-
norities.  Political compromises have been reached without due regard for the real 
needs of minorities and policies have been drafted without duly incorporating 
minority perspectives on the matters which concern them. 
The countries in Eastern Europe (Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova) and the Bal-
tic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) which were analysed are characterised 
by the presence of large minority groups, mainly of Russian origin, who settled 
in those countries during the Soviet-era. Although their ethnic origin (as well as 
that of so-called ‘historic minorities) is diverse, the dividing line in the area of mi-
nority issues usually runs between the titular nationality and the Russian-speak-
ing group. The ethno-political situation in the region and the majority-minority 
relations are heavily influenced by former Soviet nationality policies. The Russian 
Federation still plays an important role as a kin-state in minority/majority rela-
tions in all of the countries in the region.
In the countries of Southeastern Europe which have been analysed (Bulgaria, 
Romania, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, 
and Albania) the democratisation process has in some cases been strongly de-
termined by devastating wars conducted along ethnic lines. This has changed the 
ethnic composition of the region, leading to a decrease in the minority popula-
tions’ percentages within these states. This has resulted in diminished minority 
representation overall. The implementation of minority standards has often been 
influenced by the lack of consolidated state structures, and the presence of frag-
ile, ineffective institutions or by the lack of transparent and participative forms 
of governance. 
The regional workshops highlighted important aspects which were summa-
rised at the final conference of the Project, held in Budapest. Conference partici-
pants discussed and introduced the policy recommendations for improvement of 
the situation of minorities in Europe which follow.
On the basis of the findings of the “Minorities in Transition” Project, the 
Project’s final Conference wishes to respectfully submit the following recommen-
dations to national governments, the European Union (EU) and other interna-
tional organisations, as well as  to minority groups themselves:
The democratisation process should be characterised by additional empha-1. 
sis on the strengthening of democratic values, including minority protec-
tion, and the combat of anti-democratic attitudes in society. a legal frame-
work for protection against discrimination should be established and im-
plemented. 
Democratic development is an important tool in tackling minority issues. Pop-
ulist discourse and anti-democratic values continue to be widespread in some 
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countries, including new EU Member States. Governments show little interest 
in the protection of minority rights. Public discourse has often incorporated 
hate speech, including attacks against vulnerable groups, minority communi-
ties, and NGOs which promote tolerance and accountability. 
Regretfully, some EU member states have failed to fully implement EU rules 
banning discrimination, such as Council Directive 2004/43, implementing the 
principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic 
origin (OJ 2000 L 180/22).  Moreover, legal instruments alone do not suf-
fice to address the problem of discrimination, especially if a stable and demo-
cratic social environment which supports tolerance and minority protection 
is missing. National governments should strive to create a tolerant political 
environment, where minority issues, rights, and claims can be discussed and 
addressed without prejudices.
Governments should effectively involve minorities in the political de-2. 
cision-making process. Mainstreaming of minority issues in all areas of 
state policy should become a common practise. 
Political participation of minorities is an issue of primary importance for their 
protection. At present, political participation of minorities often develops just 
at a formal level or consists of ‘ad hoc’, informal consultations. Mechanisms 
for the involvement of minorities in the political decision-making processes 
remain rare and are mostly ineffective. National governments should ensure 
that the concerns of all citizens are duly taken into account when state policy 
is developed. 
One of the mechanisms to guarantee more appropriate policy outcomes is the 
granting to minorities of decision-making power in areas of primary concern 
to them. Since minority concerns lie at the heart of all major areas of state 
policy, there should be a mainstreaming of those concerns, in educational and 
social policies and in regional development, as well as in connection with leg-
islative reform, This would allow minority issues to be addressed in a more 
comprehensive and efficient manner. For instance, National Development 
Plans should integrate minority issues into their various policy areas and pro-
grammes.   
There is a need for adopting differentiated minority policies in order to ad-3. 
dress specific concerns. 
One of the conclusions of the Project is that each state faces different socio-
economic and political conditions and has differentiated minority groups liv-
ing within its territory. The application of uniform minority policies may not 
bring about the best possible results. Each minority group deserves a differen-
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tiated consideration and treatment. This is especially the case with regard to 
the Roma minority and indigenous minority groups. 
National governments should develop more flexible approaches in design-
ing policies and implementing the rights of different minority groups, while 
maintaining appropriate levels of protection. Besides combating discrimina-
tion, governments should promote social equality and social integration as 
well as protect the minorities’ particular identity, including their language, 
culture, and customs.
Governments should ensure effective implementation of their interna-4. 
tional obligations.
Since the fall of the Iron Curtain, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
have subscribed to a large number of international norms in the area of mi-
nority protection. The national legal framework for the protection of minor-
ity rights has been significantly developed in all the countries of the region. 
However, the incorporation of the international legal standards alone does 
not suffice. 
There is an overall failure to implement international and national standards, 
due, in some cases, to obstruction by local authorities and to the introduction 
of political obstacles to the implementation of minority protection norms. In 
addition to the adoption of legal provisions, their effective implementation 
and continuous follow-up supervision should also become a priority. State au-
thorities at the central, regional, provincial, and municipal levels should par-
ticipate in this effort.
states should adhere to the european Charter for regional or Minority 5. 
languages. 
While, as a result of democratic transition and the Euro-Atlantic integration 
process, the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 
was signed and ratified by all states analysed under the Project, some of those 
states have not yet signed or ratified the European Charter for Regional or Mi-
nority Languages (the Language Charter). The process of signing and ratifying 
the Charter should serve to enhance dialogue on questions pertaining to lin-
guistic protection, including by means of direct contacts between government 
and minority representatives. 
The implementation of the Language Charter should become a tool for improv-
ing the protection of minority rights domestically, allowing for the progressive 
development of the linguistic protection standards of the state. Minority com-
munities should benefit from and make better use of the opportunities for the 
review of state policies in the linguistic field which the process of monitor-
ing of the Charter’s implementation provides. Public information campaigns 
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should be conducted in order to increase public knowledge about the Charter’s 
content, especially in areas where minorities live
The eu should establish a legal basis for the protection of minority rights 6. 
under community law. 
EC law deals with anti-discrimination on the basis of race or ethnicity. How-
ever, this does not imply a specific treatment of the cultural and linguistic 
protection of minorities. Besides enshrining the Member States’ commitment 
to preserve their diversity, EU law should recognise the existence of minority 
rights, the importance of minority groups for European cultural heritage, and 
the need to preserve their identities. Provisions addressing these questions 
should be incorporated into future treaty reforms or in the adoption of new 
treaties when these deal with issues touching on aspects of human rights pro-
tection. The Reform Treaty will contain a reference on the protection of ‘per-
sons belonging to minorities’. This will provide a legal basis for a comprehen-
sive community legal framework for the protection of minority rights. New 
policy instruments for the protection of minority rights must be integrated 
into the enlargement strategy, as well as the Good Neighbourhood Policy. 
Many minority groups in EU Member States seek EU support for the protec-
tion of their language and culture. There is a need for a comprehensive com-
munity legal framework for the protection of minority rights. Minority rights 
protection should be incorporated into EC derived legislation. Minority pro-
tection should not just become part and parcel of EU human rights legislation 
and policy, but also of other policy areas, and in particular of the Cultural Di-
versity Policy. There is a need to improve EU capacities in the domain of mi-
nority protection policy design, development, and evaluation. New policy in-
struments for the protection of minority rights should be properly integrated 
into the enlargement strategy, and become an important element not only of 
the accession and Good Neighbourhood Policy, but also of EC policy develop-
ment in general.
The eu should establish a monitoring procedure for the protection of mi-7. 
nority rights in relation to the implementation of minority policies by 
Member states as well as by candidate countries.
The conditionality policy of the EU, applied to recent accessions has been an 
important incentive for the improvement of the legal protection of national 
minorities in the acceding countries. The EU should develop its capacity to 
generate positive state responses. However, the interest of the EU in minority 
issues should not be limited to the acceding States. EU Membership does not 
resolve minority rights issues. National governments’ disregard of minority 
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claims often increases after EU accession, once the monitoring of the state’s 
performance in connection with accession comes to an end. 
The EU should introduce a procedure for the monitoring of minority rights and 
policies in Member States as well as in candidate countries. Monitoring should 
become less dependent on political imperatives. It should build on existing 
international minority protection standards and monitoring procedures such 
as those provided, at the European level, under the Framework Convention for 
the Protection of National Minorities and the Language Charter. 
The values of democracy, diversity, tolerance and multiculturalism which 8. 
the eu represents should be more clearly reflected in its policies. 
The EU’s celebration of a year of equal opportunities for all is most welcomed. 
However, there is a need for the broader creation of a culture of democracy, 
diversity, tolerance, and multiculturalism and the mainstreaming of minority 
protection in EU Member States. There is also a need for the aforementioned 
values to be incorporated into all major EU policies, especially those relating 
to the protection of the cultural and linguistic diversity of Europe. EU policies 
should assist in improving its member states’ public awareness of the exist-
ence of minority cultures, as well as of the value of their particular character-
istics. 
The proper harmonisation of the anti-discrimination legislatory framework is 
needed. It is feared that the extension of the notion in the non-discrimination 
directive would have a negative impact on the special protection of minori-
ties. If citizens of other countries belonging to the same linguistic community 
can use the special minority linguistic regime, it could lead to the states be-
ing much more reserved in giving special minority rights. After the Court’s 
decision, there is real danger that the non-discrimination clause would be ex-
tended as in the case of the special linguistic regime.
The eu should intensify its international co-operation activities in the 9. 
field of minority rights protection.
In addition to the ongoing joint programmes in co-operation with the Council 
of Europe undertaken by the Commission, the EU should support the moni-
toring and other activities of the various bodies of the Council of Europe deal-
ing with the protection of minority rights more actively. 
The EU should continue to endorse the activities of the High Commissioner 
on National Minorities of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (OSCE). The EU should support the OSCE High Commissioner’s in-
volvement in minority situations, providing economic and political assistance 
when required for the implementation of the HCNM’s projects and activities. 
This should include those projects and activities in connection with minority 
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situations where, without the immediate threat of violent conflict or serious 
social tensions, the adoption of appropriate minority legislation and policies is 
necessary for the stabilisation of the political and social environment in OSCE 
participating States.  Similarly, the EU should actively support the activities 
of the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) 
in connection with minority protection and, in particular, those of its Contact 
Point for Roma and Sinti issues.
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